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SUMMARY
Long term transport plans produced by county borough councils between i960 
and 197^ had low implementation. This thesis examines the degree and 
likely causes of low-implementation in a detailed and systematic manner.
The findings are then used to recommend improvements to structure and local 
planning including transport planning. The thesis is in five parts.
Part 1 begins with justifications for the research. In Chapter II, the 
landuse-transport planning process in its historical context is 
comprehensively presented. Research by others has been used in 
Chapter 111 to identify key factors affecting implementation. These 
may be grouped as: (l) Institutional - e.g. local government re-organisation 
(2) Shortage of funds. (3) Socio-political. (4) Inaccurate transport 
provision and forecasting. The first three groups arc further distinguished 
between national and local factors. In Chapters 4 cind 5 the following two 
measures are developed to assess implementation. FMR is a ratio of plans 
recommended and implemented TO recommended infrastructure in plan for a 
given period. FMQ measures recommended and implemented works AS A propor­
tion of total capital works undertaken, FMQ is satisfactory but FMR is low. 
Parts II and III examine the causes for low FMR. Part II, (Chapters 7 to 9 
examines national factors - shorage of funds, political and pressure group 
resistances and technical déficiences as reasons. Part. Ill examines local 
factors - shortage of funds, changes in political control in councils, public 
resistance and chief officers' influences. In each case variations in local 
factors and variations in FMR are correlated. The last three factors 
together explains nearly 90 percent of the variation in FMR. In Part IV 
chapter 15 deals with changes in influence of factors, in the post-197/* 
period .and chapter 16 concludes implementation analysis. In Part V (the last 
4 chapters) present day landuse-transport planning is critically reviewed and 
improvements are outlined.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
* * * *
SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
NDTES
* * * *
1.01
This thesis is about "Roads to nowhere". In it, I seek to explain why there 
has been large scale rejection of long-term road plans published in the last 
two decades.
The rejection has led to a number of problems for the provision of transport
(i) Following such rejection, transport authorities have undertaken 
their task based more on political dogma and less on analysis. 
This approach is disturbing because it has led to mistakes which 
particularly in urban transport provision cannot be easily re­
ctified and are normally expensive. For example, in 1981, the 
labour controlled Greater London Council substantially rejected 
the transport provisons contained in the approved Greater London 
Development Plan and introduced the "Fare is Fair" scheme to sub­
sidise public transport fares by income from rates. The scheme 
was challenged and was rejected by the House of lords in 1982 as 
illegal. This rejection has led to abnormal fare increases in 
London for fairly small savings to rate-payers.
(ii) The rejection of plans has impeded the development of suitable 
urban transport planning procedures. This in turn has led to the 
filling in of the vacuum by procedures more suited to rural areas. 
For instance the cost-benefit analysis computer program (COBA) at 
present recommended by the Department of Transport for the just­
ification of urban roads, was developed essentially to assess 
inter-urban projects and is only suitable for the latter purpose. 
Such unrealistic approaches to urban transport planning have re­
sulted in loss of public credibility of the planners. This in 
turn has led to the rejection of even valid professional advice.
(iii) The absence of a co-ordinated transport policy has been a major 
cause of the spiralling fares and service deterioration experienced 
in public transport. This has resulted in hardship, especially 
to the poor who are captive to public transport and has en­
couraged the growth of private car-ownership with its consequent 
environmental and social problems. The need to maintain some 
public transport services for the captives has resulted in a 
rapid rise in revenue-support costs.
(iv) A number of transport planning processes that were rejected in 
the United States in the 1950's and in Europe in the last two 
decades are now being applied with greater vigour in developing 
countries.^- These exercises in planning are expensive and it is 
morally wrong to sell them wihout understanding properly their 
limitations.
1.1 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
In Great Britain many urban transport plans were produced in the 1960's
and early 1970's but little research has been undertaken to assess their 
2 3achievements. ' In this research, I examine the degree and the likely 
causes of under-implementation of plans in a detailed and systematic 
manner.
Transport is a function of land-use which is very much influenced by 
other central and local planning functions as well as private decisions.
In chapter two of this thesis, this inter-related scene is set within a 
historical context. An analysis of recent related research is presented 
in chapter three. This analysis is used to identify those factors that 
are likely to have influenced the implementation of plans. The bulk of 
my research (chapters 4 to 14) is concerned with assessing the influence 
of individual factors on the implementation of urban transport plans 
published before 1972. A statistical assessment is then made of the 
cumulative influence of the more important factors. In chapter 16, I 
have examined the applicability of the findings in the post - 197^ period 
under the re-organised system of local government. Chapters 16 to 20 
forms a post-script to the thesis. In here, I recommend in out-line, a 
new planning method that explicitly takes into account the more 
important factors in order to improve the present day land-use - trans­
port planning process (structure plan, local plan, transport policies 
and programmes system) presently used in G .B. The post-script is con­
cluded with a short discussion on further research resulting from my 
study.
Although all the statistics used in this research is drawn from English 
records, Wales uses an identical planning system and Scotland, a system 
similar in many respects to England. I have therefore no reason to 
believe that the findings are not applicable throughout G.B.
1.03
1.2 NOTES
1. For instance, during May 1982 extensive traffic surveys were conducted 
in Port Moresby - the capital city of Papua New Guinea. The surveys 
were intended to identify traffic problems the city could face over the 
next 20 years and to base recommendations for an improved future road 
network. POST-COURIER (21 May 1982) Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea 
Post-Courier, P.O. Box 85; p. 3.
2. I estimate that some 140 long-term transport plans (excluding transport 
studies completed solely for the preparation of structure plans) were 
published in U.K. during the last two decades.
A bibliography of these and other surveys and plans published before 
1975 is given in; Headquarters Library : Department of the Environment 
(1975) NATIONAL INDEX OF TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORTATION SURVEYS : INFORM­
ATION SERIES.
London SW13EB, 2 Marsham Street.
In 1965, the cost of a typical study in a major conurbation was estimated 
by the Ministry of Transport as pver 0.25 million ( 1.30 million in 1982 
values). Minister of Transport (1965) ROADS IN ENGLAND AND WALES.
London, H.M.S.O.: p. 22.
CHAPTER TWO
LANDUSE TRANSPORT PIANNING IN ENGLAND - A CALENDAR OF EVENTS
* * * * *
2.1 Calendar of Events
2.01
"The problem which we have at present time is how to adapt the 
resources of our modern civilisation to an environment which 
has been produced by our old civilisation. The fact is that 
we have an old centre through which we are trying to drive our 
modern tram cars and so on, and we find it impossible to do it.
We have to cut and carve and rearrange things."
Councillor Marr: Manchester City 
Council, 19101
The problem of balancing landuse against transport provision 
precedes the motor car. In this chapter, my aim is to trace 
the historical developments that led to the publication of 
urban, landuse - transport plans and to their subsequent 
rejection. Presently, there is no comprehensive treatise on 
the post-war history of urban-transport planning in the United 
Kingdom. Therefore I have compiled this chapter more thoroughly 
than is necessary to set the historical context for this thesis.
The presentation that follows is self-explanatory, however the 
following points are worth noting. Firstly, the events are 
presented in date order. Events that occurred during the same 
period in a variety of fields such as central and local govern­
ment, general transport planning, road planning etc are given 
in the same row.
Secondly, discussions and comments on items of interest are 
given in the last column. The items in Column 1 to k  to which 
a comment refers to are marked with asterisks (*) at the end of 
the items. The intention is that the comment should be read 
directly after the items in a row ending with asterisks.
Thirdly, in the UK, the solution prescribed in the mid-60s to 
overcome urban congestion was to provide an extensive network of 
motorways. Nearly two decades before, in the USA, urban dwellers 
experienced similar congestion problems. Urban motorways were
2.02
initially prescribed in the USA to overcome congestion. The 
results were unsatisfactory. I have therefore taken this 
opportunity to draw parallels between the events in the USA 
and similar events in the UK. A review of events in the USA 
is also of interest in another respect. It was in the States 
that many advances were made in landuse-transport planning 
methods. These methods without much validation were imported 
for application in British towns.
* * » * «
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CHAPTER THREE
IDENTIFICATION OF KEY FACTORS AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF PLANS 
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3.5 NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
3.6 CONCLUSION
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3.1
"It is on the law, on the response of the public to proposals for large 
schemes of expenditure to be undertaken on their behalf, and on the 
attitude of legislators and administrators to current economic problems as 
much as (or more than) on technical improvements in the arts of carriage and 
on the structure of the industry, that the future efficiency of British 
transport will depend".
—  G. Walker and C.J. Savage: 1958'
The heart of my research is to study the nature and significance of factors
that led to the low implementation of urban transport plans. Therefore,
initially my search for recent works was limited to the theory and practice
of transport planning. The study of policy execution in transport planning
has not attracted much attention by serious professional researchers. In
commenting on the low implementation of urban transport plans one must first
analyse the factors which might cause it. Frequently such analyses as have
been made ascribe the failures to a single dominant cause - e.g: pressure
group activities, and then proceed to prescribe remedies to overcome that one
pproblem . I therefore extended my search to include political and social 
sciences with general emphasis on urban planning.
Most researches completed in this area identify one or more factors affecting 
the implementation of transport plans which may be loosely grouped into five 
categories.
(i) Variation in local social objectives, e.g.: as reflected by 
politicians and pressure groups;
(ii) Economic factors, national and local;
(iii) Conflicting value systems as manifest in national political and 
pressure groups;
(iv) Technology, the state-of-the-art in both transport and forecasting
(v) fbtional institutional factors.
3.1 LOCAL SOCIAL OBJECTIVES AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION
The POLITICS OF URBAN TRANSPORT PLANNING by John Grant is the case study 
most relevant to my research in this aspect.^ Grant examines the 
transportation policy formulation in three U.K. country boroughs - 
Portsmonth, Southampton and Nottingham between 1947 and 1974. His exam­
ination begins with the hypothesis that,
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"..... there are three major actors who became involved in the
transport policy process at the local level. These are the members 
of the Council; the salaried officers; and groups from Oie 
communi ty.....
Interaction between the actors takes place within legal, financial 
and technical constraints which limit the range of options
available ........  Since local policies have varied widely it
would seem clear that local policy making systems are indeed able 
to exhibit a degree of initiative and independence from Whitehall".
He then provides evidence based on transport policy formulation 
from the three towns to conclude that,
"There is generally a close relationship between the (three) factors 
to influence the transportation planning and policy making process 
and the transport policies which developed in each city".
Grant unndertook his research under the supervision of Professor
Peter Hall who extended the above theory in his recent book, 'Great 
4Planning Disasters'. Hall attempts to explain why great planning 
disasters such as Concorde or the London Motorway network occured.
He based his explanation on the works of Friend and Joseph who dis­
tinguished three kinds of uncertainty in planning denoted as types 
UE, UV and UR. IE is an uncertainty about the relevant planning 
environment, i.e. everything outside the immediate decision-making 
system, such as forecasts of population and economic growth. UR is 
an uncertainty in related decision areas. It deals with the be­
haviour of other individual decision makers or these same decision 
makers. They may be in other organisations, or in other parts of 
the same organisation. E.g.: a landuse plan being rejected 
because the surrounding areas are unable to handle the traffic 
generated. UV is an uncertainty about value judgements, which in­
cludes all the problems where information has been assembled, but 
where the final decisions turns upon questions of value. In any 
democratic society, however manipulated, it must include the 
problem of gauging the values of the client population and predict­
ing how these may change over time. E.g.: the London motorways, 
where the prevailing value system of the population in the early 
1960s was in greater freedom to drive their own cars, even in 
Central London.
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By the late 1960s and subsequently, the prevailing values were in favour 
of restraint of traffic in Central London, and of better public transport. 
Hall concludes that,
"In some sense, indeed, shifts in values provides the final explanation 
of everything else: apparent UE or UR problems can all be traced
finally to UV explanations .........  consider for instance the London
Motorways. They failed partly because of inadequate demand forecasts 
(UE) and partly because of shifts in general policy which made investment 
in public transport more attractive relative to investment in urban 
roads (UR). But the main reason was without doubt a massive shift in 
values and the expression of these changed values in the political 
arena."
He substantiates this theory based on six case studies which complements 
Grant's work.
Somewhat in contrast to the above findings, Griffiths (1966) stated that,
"The surveyor knows more about his job and its problems (whether he 
sees his problems narrowly or widely) than any one else in the locality.
And it is hiB function to present to his committee the highway schemes
which he believes to be of the highest priority .......  Party caucuses
seem to exercise little influence over the decisions affecting the 
selection of schemes and their priority. This is not only because 
highway construction, improvement or maintenance lack the element which 
involve party political passions - an element present for example in 
many educational questions - but also because of their technicalities.
5It is difficult to have a party line about an improvement line".
However, Griffiths refers to the 1960s and concentrated his efforts on 
the functioning of county councils as opposed to city councils. Also a 
number of other research workers dealing with urban political process 
have provided evidence supporting the importance of party politics 
in decision-making. In the U.K., party politics are less obvious in county 
than in city councils.
Decision-making in British local government has been a subject Of intense 
research interest in the U.K. since the study undertaken on behalf of 
the Royal Commission on Local Government.^
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The case-study approach is frequently employed for this purpose where 
the decision-making in a selected town is studied. Ihe conclusions by 
Newton, Dearlove and Wiseman are typical of those arrived by the range 
of the U.K. publications in this field.^'0,0
Newton studied the democratic processes and decision-making in Birmingham. 
His conclusion was that the party hierarchy and the bureaucracy were 
equally responsible for decisions.10 Dearlove studied the case of the Royal 
Borough of Kensington and Chelsea where the Conservative party had a 
strong majority. In this case, the author concluded that the party 
political leadership was substantially responsible for decision-making 
in consultation with their officials who saw their role as that of 
implementing the decisions. Wiseman reporting on his experience in 
Leeds during 1951 to 1960 stated that,
"The Council Group, consisting of all the majority party aldermen and
councillors is the supreme controlling body .....  Official advice is
channelled through the leader, the Deputy and the chairman of the various
committees of the Council .......  whatever the advice, responsibility for
acting upon it rests with the majority party" . ^ 1
Boaden is one of a very few researchers who used statistical analysis to 
study urban policy-making in England and Wales. One of his conclusion 
was that:
"Councillor disposition measured in party terms was the most relevant
12variable (to affect service provisions 1 "
Generally, case studies completed before the 70s did not consider local 
pressure group activities as an important factor in decision-making.
For example
Newton reported that,
"The main feature of these results is that although council members belong 
to many organisations, and often give assistance to them they are less
likely to make use of them as sources of collective opinion about public 
13matters".
However, these comments may be the result of analysing a large number of 
routine decision-making that takes place in a council.
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Pressure by more powerful groups may be reserved for special occasions
such as when the council deliberates on the provision of major urban
roads. Secondly, as shown by Mick Hammer and others, before the
1970s, pressure group activities in transportation was dominated by
the highway lobbies, the most prominent of them being the British 
14Road Federation. A large number of anti-road lobbies were 
established in the 1970s, e.g.: Transport 2000. These lobbies 
have put forward a number of alternative solutions to tackle local 
transport problems.
Those by Transport 2000 and London Amenity and Transport Association 
are of particular interest in this respect. 1 J ’
I have devoted chapters 11, 12 and 13 to analyse the influence of 
local social objectives (as reflected in party polities, by 
professional groups and by pressure groups) on plan implementation.
Research methods to study urban policy-making, employed in the U.K. have
their origins in the U.S.A. The "reputational approach" suggested
1 Y 18by Hunter in 1953 is the method favoured by sociologists. ’
It is based on asking a selected number of interviewers to name and 
rank the influential people in the city. The people named most 
frequently were classified as forming the city's power structure.
The political-scientist has frequently used the 'decisional approach"
, first suggested in the U.S.A. by Edward Banfield and Robert Dahl in 
1961. Instead of studying the reputation for power, the work 
attempted to get a picture of real power by analysing actual decision.
By using interviews, newspaper reports, official documents and 
participant observation, the aim is to reconstruct political decisions 
in order to see who initiated them, who opposed them and who won and 
lost the political battle. However, because of the significantly 
different systems of local government operating in the U.S.A., the 
results of these studies may well be somewhat misleading for 
1 application to the situation in the U.K.
3.2 ECONOMIC FACTORS, NATIONAL AND LOCAL
In a number of letters received by me during the past three years 
from the chief engineers of various councils, cut-back in economic 
reasons was blamed for low implementation of plans. For instance, the 
Director of Engineering for the Sunderland Borough Council wrote that,
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"the explanations as to why schemes .....  did not proceed was, and
still is, simply that there was not sufficient funds available for 
the overall requirements for highway construction". ^
Similarly, referring to the South East Lancashire North East Cheshire 
(SELNEC) Highway Plans proposals for the city of Salford, the City Tech­
nical Services Officer stated that,
20"Delays have been entirely due to financial constraints"
However no research studies have considered cut-back in expenditures as 
even a probable cause for low implementation of plans. This could be 
because transport expenditure by public authorities in U.K. has increased 
by more than 50 percent in real terms over a decade from the mid-60s. 
Overall cut-back in transport expenditure has occured only since 1976.
In chapter 7 and 11, I will deal with the effects of national and local 
economic resources on the implementation of transport plans respectively, 
while in chapter 15, the applicability of my findings after local govern­
ment re-organisation is discussed.
3.3 VALUE-SYSTEMS RS MANIFEST IN NATIONAL POLITICAL AND PRESSURE GROUPS
"I knew that the early Edwardian motorists, as portrayed by Mr. Kipling,
or personified by Kenneth Graham's Mr. Toad, has been not only a minority,
but an unpopular minority, and had been treated accordingly, at least in 
21the courts. Had there come a moment at which the number of motoris ts 
had grown so great that politicians had no longer dared to offend them by 
trying to keep them in check? Or was it that the general public has even­
tually become indifferent to the motor car with the result that the motor­
ists were able to persuade the politicians to remove existing restrictions? 
Or was it misleading in either case to concentrate on the politicians: 
was this an area in which policy had been made by civil servants; perhaps 
for administrative rather than political reasons, and then pressed 
successfully on their masters".
In 1971, William Plowden concluded his research to answer the above
o Oquestions as follows:
"...... to explain official policy as a whole as the product of
successful lobbying would be profoundly to misunderstand the character 
Of British Government and the ways in which decisions
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on policy are - and have been made ......  traditionally ’motor
car policy' rested on the principle that government need not have a 
motor car policy (insofar as having a policy meant defining 
national objectives and working toward them) ..... The history of 
the motor car, at least until 1970, is a story of choices not made, 
not even defined, by Government - and consequently made by 
default".
However, Mick Hamer in 197  ^wrote,
"The road lobby is the strongest and most politically active
23pressure group seeking to shape the future of this country.
It is understanding of the mechanics of political processes at both 
national and local levels is unparalleled amongst lobbying groups
....  What may give cause for concern is not that the lobby exists,
but whether or not the extend to which it influences government 
thinking is genuinely in the public interest".
Anti-road lobbies have gained wide-spread public support in the mid-
1970s. They normally concentrate their en ergies in opposing trunk-
road schemes, particularly motorways. For instance, John Tyme in his
book "Motorways versus Democracy" describes the trail of motorway
2 binquiries he has resisted. However, as opposed to motorways which 
are generally“ located in rural areas, it is urban road construction 
that was largely abandoned. Motorway construction has progressed 
steadily even after the mid-70s albeit at a slower pace.
In this research (see chapter 8) it is shown that national political 
and pressure group activities were not directly responsible for the 
low implementation of urban transport plans.
3.4 TECHNOLOGY - THE STATE OF THE ART IN BOTH TRANSPORT AND FORECASTING
Almost as soon as the Buchanan Report was published a school of 
thought developed which continued to question the validity of that 
report. For instance, Reynolds in 1966 stated,
"Although one cannot but admire the imaginative contributions of 
Professor Buchanan and his team, closer inspection has revealed 
serious d o u b t s . T h i s  attempt to apply the proposals of Traffic 
in Towns has revealed gaps which have not been filled by subsequent 
work or developments.
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Though the concept of environmental area seems valuable and is likely to 
endure, it was inadequately analysed in the report and its application 
remains somewhat obscure. Moreover, although in the longrun adequate re­
sources for substantial road investment (assuming that it is justified) 
could conceivably be made available if alternatives were sacrificed, the 
concept of optional traffic and the question of what proportion to 
accommodate by road investment or eliminate by restraint seem nonetheless 
insoluble.
Equally seriously..... resources cannot be provided by rhetorical state­
ments on the impossibility of accommodating hypothetical estimates of 
future traffic volumes; and it is by no means certain that these will 
occur".
Since the late-60s, a number of non-traditional solutions have been pre-
27scribed to solve urban transport problems and suitable institutional 
changes, for instance the enactment of Transport Act 1968 have been made. 
This might have resulted in the implementation of alternative solutions.
Also a number of researchers have identified serious forecasting de-
28ficiencies in the urban modelling processes. Mackinder reported in 
1979 that,
"Over the last fifteen years some transport planning techniques have
been abandoned, some have been modified or made more complex, and mar
29others have continued to be used inspite of criticism".
In chapter 9 of this thesis, I have assessed the effect of predictive 
inaccuracies as a reason for the low implementation of plans and I have 
examined the effectiveness or otherwise of "non-traditional" solutions 
referred to above. These include measures to subsidise or otherwise 
favour public transport, parking-restraint and traffic management measures.
3.5 NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
In one sense local authorities are wholly subject to central control, for 
Parliament is theoretically omnipotent. Parliament may allocate functions 
to the councils or take them away. It may prescribe how those functions 
shall be carried out and may change the strucutre of local government as 
it chooses.
3.9
However neither Ministers nor the departments have an overall control of 
the work of local authorities. All formal control must be specifically 
authorised by statute.
.1 have identified in chapter 2 a large number of statutes and circulars 
that could have affected the implementation of plans. Many accounts 
exist of the ways in which particular pieces of legislation affect aspects 
of transport provision however none of these provide an overall assessment 
of the effect on the implementation of plans.
Statutory powers may be vested directly on local authorities or through 
Ministers of State. They, acting through their departments, can control 
the implementation of transport plans in variety of ways. Griffith de­
scribed the working relationship between government departments and local 
authorities as,
"formal, informal, statutory, non-statutory, legal, extra-legal,
financial, official, personal, political, functional, traglcal-
30comical-historical-pastoral".
Ronald Newman undertook a particularly dramatic case-study of road plann­
ing in Oxford to illustrate an agency-depending relationship between 
Central and local governments.11 A number of other authors including 
Deegan and Williams have also claimed that at times central government 
department1s treat local authorities more as out-posts rather than as 
independent organs of government.11'11
However Boaden provided evidence based on variations in service provisions 
between one town and another to claim that,
"Central control is less apparent in policy out-comes than might have 
34been supposed. Variation in such outcomes is not to be explained 
simply by the divergent size of authorities, nor by their divergent 
domestic resources. It may thus be legitimate to treat local 
authorities or at any rate, county boroughs as authoritative 
allocators and some of the determinants of their allocations as lying 
among as yet unexplored local features". •
j have assessed the influence of national institutional factors and 
allowed for them throughout this study.
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3.6 CONCLUSION
Analysis of recently published results indicate one or more of the 
following factors, which are loosely grouped into five categories, to 
have possibly affected the implementation of plans.
(i) Variation in local social objectives, e.g.: as reflected by 
politicians, bureaucrats and pressure groups;
(ii) Economic factors, national and local;
(iii) Conflicting value systems as manifest in national political and 
pressure groups ;
(iv) Technology, the state of-the-art in both transport and forecasting;
(v) National institutional factors
* * * *
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"The conurbation transport and landuse surveys ... were started 
by my predecessor and by myself. ... All of them are of very long 
term because they are not just traffic surveys, they are transportation 
and landuso surveys and they will be of very great importance. It will 
not be possible to determine the full range of transport services in the 
conurbations until these studies are carried out ..."
Minister of Transport: 16th November 1965
Debate on Queen's Speech
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the objectives of preparing 
landuse-transport plans and to formulate a new measure for assessing the 
fulfillment of these objectives.
4.1 OBJECTIVES OF PREPARING TRANSPORT PLANS
It is always difficult to define the precise benefits of a particular 
piece of planning, to measure its contribution to subsequent national 
wealth and happiness.^ It may fulfill the ambitions of a particular 
politician or further the career of a particular consultant but I seek 
more public criteria than these. A characteristic of contemporary 
road transport is that over the long term, actual demand adjusts to 
supply, so that in retrospect most transport investments look either 
beneficial (on the basis of before and after studies) or essential 
according to wider social criteria. It is thus a poor test of transport 
planning merely to ask whether projects recommended and implemented did 
prove successful. It seems more reasonable to judge plans by the 
objectives of the politicians and their paid professional advisors who 
participated in preparing them. These objectives normally form part 
of the terms of reference for any study. The terms of reference 
declared in a sample of published plans are presented below in order 
to identify the objectives.
4.1.1 Merseyside Area Landuse/Transportation Study
The project report to the Merseyside Area Landuse/Transportation Study 
contains the following terms of reference:
"The proposed study of long term needs would provide the Committee 
(on Merseyside Traffic and Transport) with an outline of the location 
and nature of the prime transportation requirements associated with 
a selected landuse plan for 1991 and a suggested phasing of 
implementation ...3. The transportation policy plan will identify 
areas where present or future transportation deficiencies exist.
It will indicate the desireable balance between public and private 
transport. Whilst actual
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(physical locations and configurations will not be specified, the 
kind of facilities and the type of public transport service to be 
provided will be determined. That is, the need for a widened street, 
a three-lane dual carriageway or a new motorway will be established. 
Similarly, whether the demand for public transport is large enough to 
justify exclusive bus-lanes or to support express bus services or 
rapid rail transit will also be established. The location of major 
motorway junctions and transit stops will be shown ...."
4.1.2 Tyne Wear Plan - Transport Plan for the 1980's
The following are some of the policies and goals that were agreed
4between the consultants and the Technical Steering Committee.
1. A high quality inter-urban road system will be developed.
2. A high quality road system within the urban areas »/ill be 
developed, with particular attention to the requirements for 
the movement of buses and commercial vehicles.
3. The ability to enjoy the benefits of the motor car will be sought, 
with due regard for road safety and protection of the quality of 
urban life.
4. Public and private transport will receive equal attention in the 
assessment of mobility.
5. The transport plan is to provide for full co-ordination of public 
transport, traffic management, road construction and parking policy, 
all in accordance with an appropriate landuse plan.
6. The public transport element of the plan must provide a good quality 
service in which bus and rail services are fully integrated.
Any rail services that are in the plan will be fully modernised 
and improved.
A financial constraint was also accepted, and based on information from 
the Ministry of Transport it was agreed that the total transport plan 
should be made within a budget of £180 to £200 million at the then 
current prices.
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4.1.3 South East Lancashire North East Cheshire: A Highway Plan 1962
The introduction to the SELNEC Highway Plan states that,
"Following a meeting of the Clerks and Surveyors to the County and 
County Borough Highway Authorities in South East Lancashire and North 
East Cheshire, the Divisional Road Engineer (North Western) suggested 
in November 1958, that as a first step towards the formulation of a 
long-term highway programme for classified roads, the problems 
involved should be examined by a Committee consisting of the Surveyors.
«5This course was agreed by each of the Authorities.
4.1.4 Oxford Central Area Study
"We were appointed in September 1966 by the City Council acting in 
association with the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the 
Ministry of Transport to undertake a study to determine appropriate 
environmental standards for the Central Area of Oxford and to decide 
on the rood and traffic system that would be most suitable for achieving 
these standards. In particular, we were asked to examine possible 
routes for a relief road for the central area, including the Meadow 
Road as proposed in the City Development Plan Review."
Oxford Central Area Study 
December 1968
4.1.5 Bath: A Planning and Transport Study
The terms of reference for this study are,
"To consider the traffic problems in the City as a whole, to advise 
on the primary (highway) network and environmental area system, to
give special attention to the problems arising in the central area and
7to consider the balance between private and public transport."
4.1.6 In-house Studies
A number of studies completed in-house by the officers to the authority 
do not state explicitly any terms of reference. However the 
recommendations imply that the only objective of most studies was to 
prepare a future highway plan for the study area. For instance, the 
Outline Transportation Plan for the City of Southampton states that,
"The report puts forward transportation proposals for Southampton and 
indicates how these fit in to the international, national, regional 
and sub-regional transportation pattern. The principles of two 
recommended inter-related road networks (regional road network andQ
city road network) are described."
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In the publication, Traffic in Nottingham : A Traffic Plan for the 
City, it is stated that,
"The Traffic Plan was selected as the first subject of the city's 
replanning to be presented because traffic is the major urban planning 
problem that must be solved most urgently, and whose solution will
make other planning objectives easier to obtain .....  The major subject
gof the present Report is the Primary Highway Network." 1
An in-house study in which the aims are explicitly stated is the 
Hertford Ware and Hoddcsdon Transportation Study. This was conducted 
by the officers of the Hertfordshire County Council. The aims of the 
Btudy are,
(i) To forecast the volume and nature of demand for personal 
and goods transport in the study area when the vehicle 
ownership of the planned population has reached saturation 
level and at intermediate stages.
(ii) To assess alternative ways of meeting the expected demand 
and their effect on landuse.
(iii) To plan a phased network of primary roads and environmental
areas as a basis for building development, re-development and 
budgeting for expenditure on roads.
(iv) To provide information and techniques which can be used 
elsewhere in the County.
Based on evidence such as that above, I conclude that the primary 
objective of transportation studies, completed in the past two decades, 
was to forecast the local traffic growth over the study period, normally 
ovei 15 to 20 years and to SPECIFY in detail a PLAN for efficiently 
catering for it through infrastructure investment, essentially roads. 
Plowden, Atkins and a number of those who submitted evidence to the 
Environment and Home Office Sub-Committee on Urban Transport Planning 
also confirm my view of the primary objective of transportation
studies. 1 0,1 1 ,1 2
It has been observed that the preparation of transport studies
resulted in secondary benefits such as the enlightenment of planners. 
Such "spin-offs" were rarely mentioned at the time the studies were 
commissioned, and ore in any case rather intangible.
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The first test of success of transport studies should be an assessment 
of fulfillment of the primary objective, in other words a measure of 
similarity between the investment pattern (plans) that the studies 
recommend and subsequent actual investment. This is called an 
implementation measure. It records directly whether the plan was 
acceptable. It also indicates indirectly whether the plan was robust, 
in the sense that the projects it contained were still seen to be 
beneficial some years after the plan's completion.
A transport plan specifies a sequence of discrete investments or 
projects. A measure of implementation could record how CLOSELY the 
recommendations were followed, whether they were followed at the 
specified RATE or whether in the specified ORDER. 1 have however 
disregarded the last of these measures because most transport plans 
do not give an ordered programme of work for implementation. Even in 
the few cases where such a programme was given, (for instance lists 
were readily available in the case of conurbation studies) it is 
always difficult to interpret meaningfully the delays associated with 
the implementation of individual projects. I have derived separate 
measures for the first two criteria. These are called the 
"quantitative11 and "rate" measures respectively.
4.2.1 Quantitative measure of implementation
Where a high proportion of actual investment in new infrastructure 
is for projects contained in the long-term plan, there would appear 
to be continuing confidence in the plan. Conversely, where many 
projects undertaken during the plan period lie outside the plan, it 
is possible that the latter is too inflexible to accommodate changes 
in socio-political and economic goals. An informative measure i? 
thus:
LEVEL OF NEW INFRASTRUCTURE DOTH RECOMMENDED AND IMPLEMENTED 
Q  = LEVEL OK ALL NEW INERASTRUCTURE IMPLEMENTED IN THAT PERIOD
giving MQ = 100 when only planned facilities were built. MQ will be
zero when the plan has been totally disregarded and all capital
projects undertaken were outside the plan.
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. .0 LEVEL OF NEW INFRASTRUCTURE BOTH RECOMMENDED AND IMPLEMENTED
MR -  lO O x__________________________________________________________
LEVEL OF ALL NEW INFRASTRUCTURE RECOMMENDED FOR THAT PERIOD 
and employ it as a test of plan realism.
MQ and MR have the same numerator. They have been expressed in terms 
of "levels" of investment. These levels can be defined in either 
physical or financial terms, each having particular difficulties of 
application. Using financial units, MQ and MR become FMQ and FMR 
respectively, where, for example.
COST OF THOSE PROJECTS PLANNED AND IMPLEMENTED 
FMR = 100 x -----------------------------------------------
COST OF ALL PROJECTS PLANNED FOR THAT PERIOD
The difficulties associated with quantifying physical measures are 
more severe than those associated with the financial ones. A convenient 
physical measure would be one actually quantified in the recommendations 
of transport studies, capable of accumulation over the full range of 
projects and usable with available data. None of the popular physical 
measures (such as lane-miles of highway, route-miles of bus service, 
capacity of Metro) satisfy all these conditions. Moreover, simple 
physical measures cannot handle important variations in quality such 
as speed, safety or comfort. For the above reasons, I have primarily 
directed my attention to the two financial measures of plan imple­
mentation, FMQ and FMR.
4.3 THE FINANCIAL MEASURES FMQ AND FMR
The cost of projects planned - the denominator of the financial rate 
measure FMR, is normally given in the published plan. Where a programme 
of expenditure is not published, the relevant local council will normally 
have sufficient details. It is in the evaluation of the numerator of 
FMR that difficulties arise.
To apply financial measures it is necessary to allow both for inflation 
and for differences between the actual costs of particular projects and 
those assumed in the plans. Corrections for inflation are standard 
practice: the national highway price index given in figure 4.01 has 
been used in calculating FMQ and KMR. Residual discrepancies after 
correction for national inflation are due to regional or project- 
dependent variations in the inflation index and to the difficulties 
involved in accurately costing the projects. These discrepancies can 
be kept within reasonable bounds by the use of the following hybrid 
approach to the calculation of FMQ and FMH.
4 . 2 . 2  R a to  m e asu re  o f  im p le m e n ta t io n
As t h e  r a t e  o f  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  p r o je c t s  i s  r a r e l y  h ig h e r  th a n  t h a t
w h ic h  was p la n n e d  i t  i s  a ls o  u s e f u l  t o  c a l c u la t e  th e  r a t e  m e a su re :
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Examination of the schemes completed in any sizeable study.area will 
usually reveal a group that were undertaken directly according to 
plan. For this group, actual costs suitably scaled for inflation can 
be compared with the plan estimates. If they agree closely, all the 
estimates for that type of scheme within the study area are accepted 
as satisfactory for the calculation of implementation measures. If 
however, there is substantial disagreement, physical measures of 
implementation will be less misleading than direct financial ones. 
These physical measures are then converted into pseudo-financial 
ones for purposes of calculation. In this respect, the usual 
practice is to allow 10 per cent of the estimated cost of schemes 
for contingencies. I have also used this cut-off point as an 
acceptable level of disagreement before pseudo-financial measures are 
applied.
The Merseyside Area Landuse/Transportation Study includes examples of 
both situations.1 1 For surface level roads completed between 1966 and 
1976, the ratio of estimated costs to inflation corrected actual costs 
is 0.99, an excellent match. For the Second Mersey Tunnel and for 
public transport infrastructure, however, the corresponding ratios 
are so far away from unity that the estimated costs for completed 
schemes must be substituted for actual costs if meaningful 
implementation measures are to be calculated.
FIGURE 4.01 -HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION COST INDICES1^
YEAR 1963 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78
INDEX 76 79 79 83 85 88 92 100 107 112 137 O
ccrH 212 199
COCM c~\ccCM
Apart from costing discrepancies, three other situations require special 
treatment in the calculation of measures of implementation. Procedures 
for handling three of these situations - "committed schemes"; partial 
implementation; and changes in road status - are discussed below.
The category of "committed schemes" normally appears in a transport 
plan. The STATUS QUO assumed by the planners is usually whatever exists 
at the beginning of the plan preparation period plus a number of schemes 
specified by the client os being already in the pipeline. I contend that 
the assumptions about the length of the pipeline are often unrealistically 
high and that any committed projects not already commenced by the 
publication date of a transport plan should be regarded as part of the 
plan itself. This view is in agreement with a 1 ihiber of authors who 
have submitted evidence to the Environmental and Home Office Sub­
committee on Urban Transport Planning during 1972-73«
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Transport planners are in a strong position to dissuade their 
clients from spending on supposedly committed schemes if they conflict 
with the plan. In this respect it is worth noting that the financial 
losses involved in withdrawing schemes that have pot reached the 
exchange of contract is not excessive. Moreover, the rate of imple­
menting committed schemes in the two to three years following plan 
publication is normally little higher than the rate of implementing 
the new schemes of the plan proper (see figs. 5*05 to 5.07).
In the calculation of implementation measures, no
distinction is therefore admitted between committed and other schemes 
except where implementation has started before the plan is published.
Secondly, some plan recommendations are so modified before imple­
mentation that a decision is required as to whether the project 
actually carried out belonged to the plan or not. A completed scheme 
has been treated os belonging to a plan only if it does not create 
substantially different pattern of traffic flows to those intended in 
the plan. In practice these plan modifications do not create too 
much difficulty in assessing implementation rates. Major changes in 
location of new road or track are regarded as abandonment of the plan; 
changes in scale of new infrastructure is automatically allowed for by 
use of financial rather than physical implementation measures.
Occasionally, responsibility for a new road is so changed as to 
transfer it from local to national status or vice versa. Clearly 
such a road must be treated consistently, and in this exercise it 
has been assigned its final status where the project has been at 
least partially implemented.
There is one circumstance under which any measures of implementation 
will be noisy and of little meaning, namely where the plan contains 
an area with only a few distinct schemes, e.g: the small-town studies 
given in Fig: 5*07 Here, I do not recommend division of the 
results for further analysis.
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.4 CONCLUSION
The objective of transport, studies is to forecast the future growth 
in travel demand and to specify means of efficiently catering for it 
by infra stricture investment. The success of transport plans may be 
measured on the basis of this objective. Two measures were 
constructed for this purpose. Firstly, the quantitative measure 
which is a ratio of the level of new infrastructure both recommended 
and implemented to the level of all new infrastructure implemented 
in a given period. Secondly, the rate measure which has the same 
numerator as the first but the denominator is the cost of all 
projects planned for that period.
i
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5. Oj
Secondly, 1 will suitably divide the results so that further 
analysis to identify the factors that significantly affected the 
implementation of plans, may be completed in subsequent chapters.
5.1 SELECTION OF STUDIES
Nearly 120 transportation studies were completed in England over the 
past two decades. Of these half were published before 1972. 1
have limited my quantitative analysis to studies published in England 
before 1972 for reasons given later in this chapter (see page 5-9 ).
A list of 61 studies within this category is given in figure 5*01 (table). 
A sample of 18 studies was selected from this list to reflect the overall 
distribution of studies through time - pre 1964, 1964-66, 1967-1969 and 
197O-72 (see Fig. 5«02 (table)). A check was also kept at the same time 
to ensure that a reasonable distribution of studies by population of the 
study area is obtained (see Fig. 5»03 (table)).
With respect to the last table, it is worth noting that the percentage 
of studies selected from towns with population less than 100,000 is 
significantly lower (19%) than the percentage selected from the other 
two groups. 1 did not wish to adjust this imbalance for the following 
two reasons.
Firstly, a large proportion of small town studies were published in the 
early 70s. Therefore if I were to select a higher percentage of small 
town studies it would have created an imbalance in the distribution of 
studies by time period.
Secondly, as explained in the previous chapter (see pageH°S)( 1 
wished to avoid a preponderance of small town studies in my sample 
because of the unreliability in detailed analysis of FMR based on 
towns with only a few district schemes.
I n  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  f i r s t l y  I  w i l l  p r o v id e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  e v id e n c e  based
on im p le m e n ta t io n  r a t i o s  t o  show  t h a t  la n d u s e  -  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  p la n s
w e re  p o o r ly  im p le m e n te d , b u t  w e re  n o t  e f f e c t i v e l y  s u p e rc e d e d .
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DETAILS OF 61 STUDIES PUBLISHED BEFORE 1972 - FIGURE 5.01 
STUDIES SELECTED FOR CALCULATION OF IMPLEMENTATION RATIOS ARE MARKl3-> WITH AN *
NAME OF STUDY POPULATION IN THOUSANDS
PRE 964
OVER 300 300-100 LESS THAN 100
1 . Liverpool Merseyside Conurbation Traffic Study
2. Tyneside Major Highways Programme
3. South East Lancashire North East Cheshire
(SELNEC) Highway Plan *
1964 - 1966
4. Bath Traffic Survey lit
5. Halifax
6. Leicester *
7. West Midlands ♦
8. St. Neots Area Transportation Survey 9
9. Ealing Transporation Survey
10 . Kendal Traffic Plan Survey •
11 . Portishead Traffic Survey •
1 2 . Portsmouth *
13. Nottingham *
14. Playmouth and District Landuse Transportation •
Study
15. Eastbourne Transportation Study .
16. Leamington Spa Transportation Survey •
1967 - 1969
17. Blackpool Transportation Study .
18. Bournemouth «
19. Brentwood .
20. Brighton Landuse Transportation Study •
21 . Bristol Eastern Fringe
•
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FIGURE 5.01 - CONTINUED
NAME OF STUDY POPULATION IN THOUSANDS
1967 -1969
OVER 300 300-100 LESS THAN 100
22. Carlisle 0
23. Cheltenham
24. Colchester
t
25. Coventry (Phase 1) *
26. Exeter (Phase 1 )
27. Hertford, Ware & Hoddesdon *
28. South West Hertfordshire •
29. West Hertfordshire •
30. Hitchin, Letchworth, Baldock *■
31 . Hull
32. Maldon §
33. Merseyside Area Landuse Transportation Study *
34. Oxford Central Area Study *
35. Sheffield - Rotherham LUTS •
36. Swindon major highways plan «
37- Southampton Outline Transportation Plan *
3«. Teesside Survey and Plan *
39. Torbay •
4o. West Yorkshire Transportation Study •
41. Windsor Traffic Survey .
42. Worcester Landuse Transportation Study •
43- Worthing •
1970 - 1972
44. Abingdon Transport and Environment Study *
45. Didcot, Abingdon Wantage Transportation Study *
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FIGURE 5.01 - CONTINUED
NAME OF STUDY POPULATION IN THOUSANDS
1970 - 1972 (Cont.)
OVER 300 300-100 LESSTHAN 100
46. Barnsley
47. Cambridge Transportation Study *
48. Canterbury
49. Corby
50. Coventry Solihull Warwickshire Sub-Regional *
51. Study
52. Doncastor Transportation Study .
53. Grimsby Landuse Transportation Study •
54. South Hampshire Sub-Regional Study
55. Harlow
56. High Wycombe
57. Tyne Wear Landuse Transportation Plan ★
58. Warwick - Leamington Transportation Study
59. Weston Super Mare •
60. Wigan .
61. Slough Transport Plan *
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FIGURE 5-02 (Table)
PERIOD NO. OF STUDIES 
PUBLISHED
NO. OF STUDIES 
SAMPLED
PERCENTAGE
SELECTED
PRE - 1964 3 1 33
1964 - 1966 13 4 31
1967 - 1969 27 7 26
1970 - 1972 16 6 33
TOTAL 61 18 30
TABLE COMPARING NO. OF STUDIES PUBLISHED IN A TIME PERIOD 
VERSUS STUDIES SAMPLED IN THE TIME PERIOD.
FIGURE 5.03 (Table)
POPULATION GROUP 
IN 103
NO. OF STUDIES' 
PUBLISHED
NO. OF STUDIES 
SAMPLED
PERCENTAGE
SELECTED
OVER 300 14 6 43
100 - 300 21 8 38
LESS THAN 100 26 5 19
TOTAL 61 18 30
TABLE COMPARING NO. OF STUDIES PUBLISHED IN A POPULATION GROUP 
VERSUS STUDIES SAMPLED IN THE GROUP.
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5.2 DISCUSSION OK PRKEJ MI NARY RESULTS
figure 5*04 (table) gives cumulative implementation ratios in 1978 for 
the 10 sample studies including those shown in figures 3*5 to 
5.7*1 An example illustrating the calculation of cumulative 
implementation ratios based on the implementation of individual 
schemes contained in the SELNEC Highway Plan is given as £ 5«7 
at the end of this chapter. A similar methodology was used for 
evaluating the other 17 sample studies. Summary tables for these 
are given in Appendix 1 at the end of this thesis. In fig. 5*04 (table) 
and also in figs. 5*5 to 5*7, the fortunes of trunk roads are distinguished 
from those of other roads. The following features are worth noting from 
the figures and table.
firstly, the overall KATE measure of implementation (FMR) of non- 
trunk (other) roads is low. Although the QUANTITATIVE implementation 
measure (FMq ) of non-trunk roads for all the studies showrn in Fig. 5*4 
(table) is 98 percent, the corresponding KATE measure is only 28 
percent. Thus the non-trunk road plans were poorly implemented, but 
were not effectively superseded.
Secondly, in contrast to other roads, the trunk roads had quite high 
rate measures of implementation. It should be noted that although 
trunk roads are shown in Fig. 5,Lj-(table) the studies themselves 
generally had no responsibility for trunk roads.
This difference in implementation between trunk and other roads 
illustrates the important difference in "success" between central and 
local road planning.
Thirdly, the implementation ratios for non-trunk roads in historic 
cities are particularly low. Where little investment took place, 
the quantity measure FMQ can be misleading. However, looking at the 
rate measures (FMK) alone, the three areas designated historic, had an 
average FMK approaching "zero" up to 1978.
In the rest of this chapter, I will suitably modify the format of 
FMR relating to non-trunk roads so that in subsequent chapters, 
further analysis may be undertaken to explain the reasons for the wide 
variation and in most cases low measure of implementation of non-trunk 
road plans.
FIG. 5.4 (tabic)
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF ENGUSH TRANSPORTATION STUDIES
Cumulative measures of 
implementation up to 1978 
(to nearest 5 per cent)
Trunk Others
FMQ FMR FMQ FMR
Metropolitan Area Studies
1. Tyne and Wear Plan 1972 (without public 
transport works) 90+ 40 90 25
2. Merseyside Area Land-Use/Transportation 
Study 1969 (without public transport 
works) 90+ 90+ 90+ 60
3. South-East Lancashire North-East Cheshire 
Highway Plan 1962 90+ 70 90+ 20
County Borough (pre-197^) Town Studies
4. St. Helens Traffic and Transport Plan 1971 90+ 90+ 90+ 15
5- Coventry Transportation Study (Phase 1) 
1968 90+ 90+ 90+ 20
6. Southampton Outline Transportation 
Study 1968 90+ 60 90+ 20
7. Teeside Survey and Plan 1968/69 90+ 60 90+ 55
8. Portsmouth Future Road Pattern 1965 90+ 90+ 90+ ko
9. Nottingham: Traffic in Nottingham 
1965-2005 90+ 90* 10- 10-
10. Leicester Traffic Plan 1965 90+ 90+ 20 10-
Historic Town Studies
1 1 . Cambridge Transportation Plan 1572 90+ 90+ 10- 10-
12. Oxford Central Area Study 1968 90+ 90+ 10- 10-
13. Bath: A Planning and Transport Study 1965 90+ 90+ 10- 10-
Small Towns and Rural Area Studies
14. Abingdon Transport and Environment Study 90+ 90+ 10- 10-
15. Slough Transportation Study 1971 90+ 10- 90+ 35
16. Didcot/Abingdon/Wantage Transportation 
Study 1970 90+ 90+ 10- 10-
17. Hitchin/Letchworth/Baldock Transportation 
Study 1968 90+ 10- 10- 10-
18. Hertford, Ware and Hoddcsdon Transportation 
Study 1968 90+ 60 20 15
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5.3 SELECTION OF STUDIES FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS
For further analysis, J had to restrict my sample to those plans 
published by county borough councils in England prior to 1972.
In other words considering Great Britain as a whole, I have excluded 
plans relating to counties, non-county borough, urban and rural 
districts, London, Scotland and Wales and generally plans published 
after 1972. The reasons for this are as follows. '
5.3*1 Reasons for excluding plans covering county areas
Prior to the local government re-organisation in 197^i county councils 
and county borough councils were the major local highway authorities.
Most urban transport studies were completed by county borough councils 
singly or in partnership with neighbouring authorities. The resulting 
(county borough) transport plans contained the whole of the 
administrative area of the town in one plan thus making it simpler 
to analyse. Plans by county councils on the other hand are more 
complicated to analyse because these plans are published in sections 
covering parts of their administrative areas during different time 
periods.
For instance, Cheshire County Council published as part of the SELNEC 
Highway Plan its long-term highway strategy for North-East Cheshire.
This plan was..published in 19&2. But plans for the Wirral Peninsula
in Cheshire was covered by the Merseyside Area Landusc Transportation
, 2Study, published m  19»9 • It will be unrealistic to piece together a 
number of plans published at various times in carrying out implementation 
analysis for a given administrative area. Furthermore, trunk roads which 
are essentially determined according to a national strategy, play a 
prominent role in meeting the local transport requirements in counties.
5.3.2 Reasons for excluding plans published by lower tier authorities
Non-county borough, urban and rural district councils sometimes produced 
transport plans for their areas to persuade the county councils to 
implement them. It is unrealistic to relate the success of implementation 
of these plans with changes in local factors affecting these authorities 
since these are not the highway authorities responsible for the 
provision of infrastructure. Also the plans produced by these autho­
rities normally contain only a few distinct schemes and therefore the 
results are not suitable for division into further analysis.
5.0G
5.3-3 Reasons for excluding plans published by Creator I.orulon Council
The relevant study in this respect is the Greater London Transportation 
Study. However this study was not published in 1972; the latest time 
set for inclusion in the sample. The reason for this time limit will 
be explained later.
Secondly, the responsibility for provision of transport in London is 
more complex compared with those of the former county borough councils. 
For instance the llritish Rail plays an independent but important role in 
determining the local transport needs in parts of London. It is 
therefore unrealistic to combine the implementation ratios of former 
county boroughs with that of London.
Thirdly, the task of calculating implementation ratios for a plan 
published for London is too formidable for it to be undertaken as part 
of this research project.
Finally, being the national capital, I suspect that transport decisions 
in London are not allowed to be determined by local factors to the 
same extent as those of provincial cities. Therefore the addition of 
London to the sample is likely to unnecessarily increase the 
variations in a correlation analysis.
5*3.^ Reasons for excluding plans published by Scottish and Welsh Authorities
Landuse and transport planning functions in Scotland and Wales are 
undertaken by the respective Secretaries of State for these countries.
In England until the early 70s, Central Government decisions relating 
to the provision of roads were made by the Ministry of Transport while 
landuse planning functions were undertaken by the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government. Therefore if implementation ratios calculated 
for urban plans in all these three countries are combined, some of the 
variations in implementation could be attributed to the differences in 
the central decision-making processes. My analysis would be. further 
complicated as a result. Partly for the above reason and partly 
because of the paucity of urban transport studies published in Scotland 
and Wales in the pre-reorganisation period, I wished to avoid 
including Scottish and Welsh plans.
A further reason for excluding Scottish burghs from my analysis is 
that financial returns of roads works completed in that country are 
not readily available in a format sufficiently detailed to calculate 
implementation ratios.^
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5.3.5 • ton,sons for excluding plans published after 19 7 2
In the last four sub-sections I explained my reasons for excluding 
plans published by county councils, lower-tier authorities, London, 
Scotland and Wales from further analysis. This has resulted in my 
analysis being restricted to plans published by former county 
borough councils in England. However these county boroughs were 
abolished in 197 *^ and most of their transport planning functions 
transferred to the new county councils.
Therefore, I have restricted the analysis of implementation ratios 
to the period up to 197^. Normally, completion of projects contained 
in a plan would take about two years from the date of commencement 
of construction. Therefore, I have decided to exclude county borough 
plans published after 1972 from implementation analysis.
5• '* FURTHER ANALYSIS OF COUNTY BOROUGH PLANS
In chapter three, several key factors affecting the implementation of 
transport plans were identified. In £ 5*2, it was shown that non­
trunk road schemes published in urban transport studies were poorly 
implemented (low FMR) but were not effectively superceded (high EMU). 
Implementation analysis is a powerful tool for isolating and weighting 
the influence of the various factors on the implementation of trans­
port plans. In the next nine chapters, I will use implementation 
analysis to explain the influence of the various individual factors 
in bringing about, low rate measure of implementation of transport, 
plans for county boroughs.
Fig. 5«b6(table) gives cumulative rate measures of implementation 
up to 197^ (FMR^ ^) for 23 county borough transport plans which are 
contained in the transportation studies given in Fig. 5.^ (table).
The Tyne Wear Plan contains the recommendations for the county
3boroughs of Newcastle upon Tyne, Sunderland, Tynemouth and Gateshead. 
The Merseyside Area Landuse - Transportation Study (MALTS) contains 
the plans for Liverpool, Bootle, Birkenhead and Wallasey. The 
South East Lancashire North East Cheshire (SELNEC) Highway Plan 
contains the plans for the county boroughs of Manchester, Oldham,
Li.Bolton, Salford, Rochdale and Bury. Middlesborough is a single 
county borough contained in the Teeside Survey and Plan. The 
administrative area of Middlesborough was extended in to include
FIG. 5.08 (TABLE)
CUMULATIVE RATE MEASURES OF IMPLEMENTATION
UPTO 1974 (FMRl9?4) FOR 23 COUNTY BOROUGH TRANSPORT PLANS
TOWN FMR1974
SELNEC HIGHWAY PLAN
1 . MANCHESTER 0.30
2. BOLTON 0.69
3. BURY 0.38
4. SALFORD 0.22
5. OLDHAM 0.48
6. ROCHDALE 0.51
MALTS LUTS
7. LIVERPOOL 0.69
8. BIRKENHEAD 0.66
9. BOOTLE 0.30
10. WALLASEY 0 .5 1
TYNE WEAR PLAN
11. NEWCASTLE 0.22
12. SUNDERLAND 0 .19
13. TYNEMOUTH 0.37
14. GATESHEAD 0.24
FREE-STANDING TOWN STUDIES
15. ST. HELENS O .63
16. SOUTHAMPTON 0.35
17. BATH 0.00
18. LEICESTER 0.08
19. COVENTRY 0.32
20. PORTSMOUTH 0.50
21. MIDDLESBOROUGH 0.22
22. NOTTINGHAM 0.05
23. OXFORD 0.00
5 .1 0
the neighbouring urban areas thus creating the Teeside County 
Borough. For the purposes of calculating the implementation 
ratios, the status quo is maintained by considering only those 
schemes that were contained in the former county borough area. 
However the socio-political changes associated v'ith this minor 
re-organisation in Teeside is included in subsequent analysis.
For instance, consideration has been given to the change in 
party-political control of the local council that have resulted 
from this re-organisation. FMR1974 f°r ® other free-standing 
town studies are also included in the list to complete a sample 
of 23 county borough plans for further analysis.
These values of FMR would not have been significantly different 
had an earlier date for instance 1972, been chosen as the cut­
off year. Statistical tests comparing the differences in FMR1970 
FMRjg^g and were completed for this purpose. The
statistical test given in page 1 1 . 1 2  of this thesis is of a 
similar nature and gives further evidence. In that page, it is 
shown that the difference of means of FMR1972 anr5 FMRjgy^ is no* 
significant at the 5 per cent level considering a sample of 14 
studies.
5.5 CONCLUSION
In Chapter Three, several key factors affecting the implementation 
of transport plans were identified. Implementation analysis is 
a powerful tool for isolating and weighting these factors. In 
the next nine chapters, I will isolate the effect of various 
factors on the implementation of county borough transport plans.
NOTES
The data for the calculation of FMQ and FMR are based on several 
publications, personal contacts, site visits and Ordnance Survey 
and other maps. The most important publications are:
(a) MINISTRY OF TRANSFORT: Roads in England - 1962 to 1977 HMSO 
London. Published annually, these publications give progress 
reports and costs of all major highway schemes in England. 
Between 1975 and 1977 details were given only for trunk roads 
and since then the series has been replaced by the annual 
publication Policy for Roads, the first of which is - Policy 
for Roads: England 1978 (CMND 7132), HMSO, London.
(b) Various County Councils in England: Transport Policies and 
Programme - 1975 to 1978. These annual publications give a 
five-year rolling transport programme normally and estimates 
of expenditures for proposed and recently completed county 
schemes within their administrative areas.
(c) Transportation studies as described in Table II.
Traffic Research Corporation Ltd (1969) MERSEYSIDE AREA LANDUSE 
TRANSPORTATION STUDY 
Liverpool, 11 Rumford Street
"SCOTTISH ROADS" annually published by the Secretary of State for 
Scotland only provides information on lengths of road completed 
and not highway expenditure.
S.E.L.N.E.C. HIGHWAY PLAN
CALCULATION OF IMPLEMENTATION PATIOS
P I Q U R E  5 . 0 4  ( T A B L E )
I T O T E :  P L A N S  F O R  T H E S E  P R O P O S A L S  ' R E  0 1  V Î T  A T  T H E  E N D  O F  F I G U R E  5 . 0 4 ( T \ B L E )
S.E.L.N.E.C. HIGHWAY PROPOSALS 
PROGRAMME
FOR FIRST 10 YEARS 1963- 1972
S ch ed u le  A —  T ru n k  R o ad s
S ch ed u le  B — C lassified  R o ad s
S ch ed u le  C — T o w n  C en tre  D ev e lo p m en t P lan
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»SCHEDULE C.
Additional Programmc of Sch-.-mos neces&my for Town Centre Development
AUTHORITY
Scheme
No. DESCRIPTION
TOTAL
COST
I'M
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
DUR Y 3S1 New Route-Rochdale Road to Knowsley St. 0.200 0.100 0.100
CHI'.SHIRK • Stalybridge Town Centre 0.200 0.100 0.100
LANCASHIRE 525 A .668 Diversion. Rndcliffc 1.014 0.500 0.514
MANCIIliSTli t 615 City Centre Road (Part)
(
7.000
lalance
1.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
OLDHAM • Town Centre Area 0.341 0.311
715 A.62 Manchester St. Widening 0.100 0.100
ROCHDALE 753 Town Centre Relief Road (Part) )
0.700 0.300 0.400754 Whitworth Rond Diversion (Part) )
STOCKPORT 852 A.626 Market Area By-pass 0.800 0.400 0.400
TOTALS £M - 0.100 0.100 0.700 0.RC0 0.541 1.100 2.500 2.514 2.000
Town Comro Schemes - Total Expenditure 1964 - 1972 a £10.355M.
SUMMARY
Total Expenditure 1963 • 1972 [(B) + (C)] « C93.1MM.
Total Cost of Classified Rond Programme « £242.18SM.
Ralunce to he done «after 1972 * C149.071M.
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH METHOD
6.1 LIMITATIONS OF POPULAR RESEARCH METHODS
6.2 THE RESEARCH METHOD EMPLOYED IN THIS THESIS
6.3 CONCLUSION 
6 .4 NOTES
6.01
"Despite the thousands - tens of thousands more likely - of articles 
and books in which concepts have been explicated, models constructed, 
hypotheses framed and data reported and analysed, there are not half 
a dozen general and non-triviul scientific propositions which an 
urban political scientist can offer the waiting world. Admittedly, 
he is hardly any worse off than his fellow social scientist, but 
this is rather cold comfort."
- Edward C. Banf-'eld : 1975
In chapter three, it was explained that the lack of useful metho­
dologies in the immediate area of my research was the reason why 
the literature search was extended to include the general area of 
urban political and social sciences. The above quotation suggest 
that even in this extended field, the research methods are not fully 
developed. In the absence of agreed methods, researches to date 
have been dominated by case studies.
6.1 LIMITATIONS OF POPULAR RESEARCH METHODS
Case studies have the following six limitations:
Firstly, they normally concentrate on conspicuous events, actors 
and outcomes. Consequently the result is of little theoretical 
or general value. Peter Rossi in calling unequivocally for systematic 
studies stated that,
"case history after case history of communities will lead nowhere 
2and has led nowhere."
Secondly case studies are not very useful in assessing the comparative 
importance of factors identified in the study process. For instance,
3
Kenneth Newton in 197^» in a mood of self-criticism wrote,
"Without a comparative study we cannot tell (a) how Birmingham 
(referring to his casé study on Democratic Processes and Decision
4
Making in Birmingham ) compares with other cities in terms of the 
number and strength of local pressure groups, or (b) whether these 
groups seem to have any effect on public policy, or (c) in what areas 
are they effective or ineffective, or (d) what sorts of factors might 
explain these local findings ..... Until we have some idea of how 
cities fit into the general pattern, case studies of particular 
cities are very limited in the kind of generalisation they can 
provide."
6.02
Later works tried to 90 beyond this limitation of case studies by 
comparing a number of communities but it soon became clear that it 
was difficult to generalize on the basis of three, four or even five 
studies.
Thirdly, not all relevant factors are amenable for analysis by case 
studies. Dearlove attempted to assess the significance of officer 
participation in policy formulation in the Royal Borough of Kensington 
and Chelsea. He concluded that,
"Many of the officers were interviewed but it proved impossible to 
break through the cultural cliche that they were simply servants 
advising the all-powerful, policy-making councillors whose decisions 
they readily implemented."^
Fourthly, interviews made as part of case studies normally relate 
to past events which may be as much as 20 years old. The accuracy 
associated with recalling such events is questionable. The short­
coming is serious in the case of local government where most councillors 
and leaders of pressure-groups are part-timers who are likely to be 
more concerned with their main occupations.
Fifthly, urban policy-making is complex and values change fast.
Policies that are highly acclaimed today may be laughed out-of-court 
tomorrow. Key decision-makers associated with plans for the provision 
of urban motorways when interviewed for case studies are likely to 
have significant reservations about discussing decisions which were 
not implemented and therefore seen as failures in retrospect.
Finally, it is often difficult to allow for cumulative effect or for 
double counting of influencing factors using the case study approach.
I will further discuss this point in chapter l4.
It is interesting to note that a number of authors, prior to embarking 
on case-studies, have cited the first three of the above criticisms.
However they justified their approach on the basis that their
7objectives could not be realised by any other means.
6.03
At the other end of the spectrum of urban policy-making studies; 
lies the highly complex multivariate-analysis which attempts to 
relate a dependent variable to a large number of independent 
variables. This method of analysis) known more colloquially an 
"dredging for co-relations" has become fashionable with the advent 
of cheap computing facilities. A typical analysis of this nature
used 52 independent variables to explain variation in service
. . 8provisions in an unspecified number of English county boroughs.
In this respect it is worth noting that the reliability of a
statistical analysis reduces as the number of independent variables
increases. It is theoretically possible to fit a pcilincmial curve to
any set of data when the sample size is equal to the number of
independent variables!
6.2 THE RESEARCH METHOD EMPLOYED IN THIS THESIS
The method I have used in this research utilizes the versatility of 
the case-study approach with the rigor of statistical analysis.
Davies in recommending this method stated that,
"This is not to imply that the case-study approach does not have a 
q
valuable role to play ..... (However) the techniques associated 
with the case-study approach almost inevitably produce a biased 
picture of the relative importance of casual factors, the biases 
conforming to those present in the grammars of meaning of the 
participants. Statistical model-building can incorporate biases of 
its own. The techniques explain as much as possible using the 
variables ..... and so can overstate (their) importance. Whether or 
not they do so depends mainly on the degree, to which the researchers 
subject themselves to the testing and development of a precise causal 
argument compatible with a wide and well-organised range of other 
(often non-quantitative) evidence rather than merely dredge for 
likely relationships. There are no reasons for claiming that any 
one technique is superior to others."
In this research, data is drawn from two sources - case studies and 
published statistics (updated as necessary with new surveys).
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At the other end of the spectrum of urban policy-making studies; 
lies the highly complex multivariate-analysis which attempts to 
relate a dependent variable to a large number of independent 
variables. This method of analysis, known more colloquially as 
"dredging for co-relations" has become fashionable with the advent 
of cheap computing facilities. A typical analysis of this nature 
used 52 independent variables to explain variation in service
8provisions in an unspecified number of English county boroughs.
In this respect it is worth noting that the reliability of a 
statistical analysis reduces as the number of independent variables 
increases. It is theoretically possible to fit a polincmijl curve to 
any set of data when the sample size is equul to the number of 
independent v&riablcsl
6.2 THE RESEARCH METHOD EMPLOYED IN THIS THESIS
The method I have used in this research utilizes the versatility of 
the case-study approach with the rigor of statistical analysis.
Davies in recommending this method stated that,
"This is not to imply that the case-study approach does not have a
g
valuable role to play (However) the techniques associated
with the case-study approach almost inevitably produce a biased 
picture of the relative importance of casual factors, the biases 
conforming to those present in the grammars of meaning of the 
participants. Statistical model-building can incorporate biases of 
its own. The techniques explain as much as possible using the
variables ....  and so can overstate (their) importance. Whether or
not they do so depends mainly on the degree, to which the researchers 
subject themselves to the testing and development of a precise causal 
argument compatible with a wide and well-organised range of other 
(often non-quantitative) evidence rather than merely dredge for 
likely relationships. There are no reasons for claiming that any 
one technique is superior to others."
In this research, data is drawn from two sources - case studies and 
published statistics (updated as necessary with new surveys).
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For testing the influence of these national factors, I have 
employed various non-statistical techniques as appropriate. On the 
otherhnnd, hypotheses relating to local factors are sometimes 
supported by analytical methods but always tested using statistical 
methods.
In order to complete the statistical analysis, I needed a wide 
statistical base which was fortunately obtainable for transport.
This research involves initially the testing of a number of hypotheses 
in relation to each key-factor measure taken in turn. Finally, the 
more important factors are tested using multiple regression techniques 
for their cumulative effect on the implementation of plans.
6.3 CONCLUSION
Recently, researches in urban political and social sciences have been 
dominated by case studies. This approach has a number of limitations, 
specially related to the general validity of their findings. On the 
other hand, analysis of social phenomena by complex statistical 
methods, disregarding causal explanations has also its disadvantages. 
In this thesis, I have used case studies to formulate hypotheses 
which are then tested by quantitative methods.
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7.1
The principal purpose of this chapter is to examine if there was a 
central Government shortage of funds which led to the low imple­
mentation of urban transport plans.
Recommendations contained in urban transport plans call for expensive 
infrastructure investments, usually on roads. The provision of trunk 
roads is the responsibility of the Minister of Transport. Also 
substantial Exchequer grant assistance is given to local authorities'
to undertake non-trunk road and public transport schemes.1 At times 
of unforeseen national economic problems, the Government might 
decide, amongst other fiscal measures, to reduce transport investment.
For instance, in July 1965, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
announced measures to help eliminate the balance of payments deficit
2and maintain the strength of sterling. These measures included 
£55 million worth of road schemes deferred, in order to reduce 
Exchequer expenditure by about £7 million in that year. In this 
respact, the following hypothesis is examined:
HYPOTHESIS I : Reductions in Exchequer grant assistance was NOT a
substantial reason for the low implementation of urban 
transport plans.
To examine this hypothesis, the Government's expenditure plans in 
the sixties covering the period until mid-70s is compared with the 
out-turn of expenditures for the same period. There are no published 
documents giving details of the planned expenditure. Therefore, in the 
following section, an assessment is made of capital requirements for 
long term plans, the Ministry had for the development of local and 
national highway network. Until the enactment of Transport Act 1968, 
local public transport infrastructure provision was not grant aided.
Hence this will not be included in this assessment which refers to 
the Government's intentions in mid-60s.
7.1 ASSESSMENT OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ROADS
Initially two estimates are made from separate sources in order to 
arrive at a realistic assessment.
7.1.1 Estimate of budgeted capital : Method I
"In the SELNEC transportation study, they refer to the advice of the 
Ministry as to the capital sums likely to be available for investment 
in transport infra-structure over a period of 13 years. Is this 
particular allocation of money to SELNEC an exception to the generalised 
allocation that applies to the grants as a whole?"
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"The practice has been where an authority is undertaking a trans­
portation study, to give it on estimate of the order of magnitude 
of expenditure likely to be in the event to be reasonable because 
otherwise one would tend to get completely unrealistic proposals.
The basis for this is to project a trend level of expenditure in 
national terms taking into account the expected growth of the gross %
national product and what is seen as the expected emphasis on 
transport over some years ahead, and then to allocate the money 
broadly among authorities by reference to the working population in 
the areas ......."
This answer was given by a principal finance officer at the Department
of the Environment in response to the question raised by the Chairman
3of the Expenditure Committee on Urban Transport Planning.
The consultant's to the Oxford Central Area Study reported that,
"We obtained from the Ministry of Transport projections of the likely
4total transport investment in Oxford. The financial limit upon 
which a grant would be made up to the year 1981 is estimated to be 
£6^ million and up to year 1991, a tentative total of £16 million, 
both figures being subject to a fluctuation of plus or minus 20%.
These levels of capital outlay are governing factors in the choice 
and stages of new transportation systems."
The above quotations attest that forecasts of the probable level of 
centrally approved expenditure were incorporated by most local 
authorities directly in their transport plans.
I have estimated that the population-weighted average highways capital 
rate used by the Ministry to base their advice was £12.21 per annum 
(1966/67 values) per head of working population. In other words,
capital budget ry provisions, the Ministry allocated for any study 
covering a given number of years
= £12.21 x working population x study period covered by the plan
My calculations are based on a sample of 28 studies. They were selected 
from the studies which were in progress in the sixties. Later studies 
conducted in a substantially changed legal and socio-economic environ­
ment are thus avoided. From this reduced population, a sample was 
selected to reflect a uniform geographic distribution of studies and by 
population of study area. In this respect, it is worth noting that,
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Bath - A planning and transport study, which overtly ignor ed the 
Ministry's recommendation ■ regarding expenditure levels was removed 
from the population prior to sampling. The total working population in 
England and Wales, based on 1966 Census was 21.4 million. On this 
basis, it is estimated that the Government anticipated to spend in 
the region of
£12.21 x 21.4 x 106 x 10 = £2613 million
on highway construction and improvement in England and Wales in a 
decade from the mid-sixties. The last sum, on a pro-rata basis for 
the 9 year period 1965/66 to 1973/7** would be;
£2613 x 9_ = £2351 million 
10 ---
7.1.2 Estimate of budgeted capital - Method II
This method is based on estimating the planned expenditure on trunk 
and principal roads separately.
Trunk road capital estimate s In i960, the Ministry of Transport 
evolved a "Master Plan" which set out a target for the construction 
of 1000 miles of motorway and the construction or the modernisation 
of nearly 1700 miles of associated trunk road network within England 
and Wales by early 1970s.^ The progress report on roads for 1965 
issued by the Ministry stated that
"For the inter-urban road system Minister's intention i3 to complete 
the 1000 miles of motorway in England and Wales in the early 1970s.
Of this total, 340 miles were open to traffic at the end of March 
1965 and in the three years 1965 to 67 another 220 miles will ha/e 
been completed. The Ministry plans that over 300 miles of trunk road 
should have been built or reconstructed in the period 1965 to 70 
.... Expenditure in England and Wales on the construction of motorways 
and trunk roads in 1965/66 is estimated at some £90 million and in
1969/70 that it should amount to some £130 million ....  Despite the
improved conditions re-.ulting from the construction of new roads by 
that time, it is estimated that in 1970 about 2250 miles of trunk
road will be seriously overloaded, ns against 1250 at present ....
the Minstry is now preparing a plan for the further improvement of the 
inter-urban road system in the decade from 197° ....... The Ministry
aims to complete the preparation of the plan in the second half of 
1966. It will include schemes already planned."
Figure 7.01 (table) is prepared on the basis of information,
relating to trunk roads, given in the last paragraph.
FIGURE 7.0t (Table)
ESTIMATE FOR TUE 'MOOO HILE MOTORWAY PROGRAMME" AND TUE ASSOCIATED
TRUNK ROAD NETWORK (1965/66 price basis)
(A) PERIOD OF COMPLETION
i. Total length of the 1000 mile programme completed by 
1964/65 = 340 miles
ii. Period of completion for the 340 miles above = 5 years
iii. •• Rate of completion 70 miles per year
iv. Length programmed for completion in the 3 year 
period 1965/66 to 1967/68 = 220 miles
v. Rate of completion planned for the mid-sixties =
70-75 miles/year
vi. Assuming a rate of completion of 70-75 miles per year, 
estimated date of completion of the 1000 mile programme 
and associated trunk road network 
=—  6 years from (and including-) 1968/69
= 1973/74
(B) COST OF CONSTRUCTION
i. Planned expenditure for the period 1965/66 to 1969/70 
= £ (90 + 100 + 110 + 120 + 130) million = £550 million
in 1965/66 values
ii. Assuming the same rate of increase of £10 million 
per annum in expenditure
Planned expenditure for the period 1965/66 to 1973/74 
= £ (550 + 140 + 150 + 160 + 17Ô) million = £1170 million 
in 1965/66 values = £1230 million (1966/67 values)
iii. Assuming no increase in rate of expenditure after 1969/70, 
Planned expenditure for the period 1965/66 to 1973/74 
= £ (£550 + (4 x 130) million
= £1070 million in 1965/66 values 
= £1125 million in 1966/67 values
. . It is concluded that the Ministry planned to invest
between £ 1 ,12 5 and £ 1,230 million on completing the 1000- 
mile motorway programme by about 1973/74.
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Principal road capital estimate : Ministry of Transport's annual 
roads progress report for 196*i/65 stated that,
"Local authorities have been invited in a circular issued on 
30tn April 1965, to consider the urban rood schemes they would wish 
to put in preparation for commitment during the curly years of 
1970s, within a planning level for England and Woles of £575 million
(grnnt)^ ......  The total value of these schemes, including the
local authorities own contributions would be about £820 million 
........ Expenditure by central and local government on urban road
schemes in England and Wales amounted to £55 million in 196*1/65.
Dy 1969/70, this is expected to increase to over £135 million. Over 
the five year period the urban road programme will thus be more
than doubled.......  The urban-road programme cannot be expected to
maintain such a rate of expansion indefinitely ....... an indication
of the level of investment in the 1970s for which it is realistic 
to plan has already been given. While this will be sufficient to 
maintain the momentum of the present urban road programme, it will 
not permit a programme of a radically different order of magnitude 
to be carried out."
The following analysis (see Fig. 7.02 - table) of the long 
term intentions of the Ministry, regarding urban highway provisions 
is presented on the basis of the last quotation. Referring to the 
last line of Fig. 7.02 - table , the total trunk and principal
road expenditure planned for the 9 year period from 1965/66 to 
1973/7^ is estimated to be in the range £2 ,150 to £2,550 million.
This compares with an estimated value of £235^ million by Method I. 
(See page 7 0S).
FIGURE 7 ' 0 Z  (Table)
ESTIMATE FOR THE PRINCIPAL ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME 
(1965/66 price basis)
(A) PERIOD OF EXPENDITURE
(i) Rate of expenditure during 1964/65 = £55 million per annum
(ii) Increased rate of expenditure planned
during 1969/70 = £135 million per annum
(iii) Compounded rate of increase of expenditure
per annum over the 5 year period from 1964/65 
to 1969/70 =**=■ 16 per cent
(iv) Assuming no further increase in expenditure after 
1968/69,period required to spend the £820 million
= 820 —n - 6 years
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(v) Assuming a rate of increase in expenditure of 
16 percent per annum, additional period after 
1969/70 required to spend the £820 million 
=4.1 years (say 4 years)
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the Ministry 
intended that the budget of £820 million should be spent 
between 4 to 6 years from 1968/69.
(B) COST OF CONSTRUCTION
(i) Planned expenditure for the period 1965/66 to 1969/70 
assuming a compound rate of increase of 16 percent 
per annum = £55 (1.16 + 1.35 1,1 1.56 + 1.8 1 + 2.10) million 
= £438.9 million (say £440 million)
(ii) Range within which planned expenditure for the 4 year 
period from 1970/71 to 1973/74 is likely to lie 
= £135 x '4 million to £820 million = £540-£820 million
(iii) Range within which the budgeted expenditure for the
9 year period from 1965/66 to 1973/74 is likely to lie 
= £(540 + 440) million to £(820 + 440) million 
= £980 million - £1260 million (1964/65 prices)
= £1030 million - £1320 million (1966/67 prices) 
Therefore range within which total trunk and principal 
road expenditure planned for the 9 year period from 
1965/66 to 1973/74 (estimated by Method II) is likely to 
lie
= £(1030 + 1120) to £(1320 + 12 30) = £2150 million to
£2550 million
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7.2 APPROPRIATION OK BUDGETS AND EXIT.NDITUHKS (See Fig. 7.0i - Table)
In this section, firstly the budgeted sum of £2150-£255° million from 
the previous section will be apportioned on the basis of working 
population, amongst county boroughs and county councils, the two main 
groups of authorities who were locally responsible for the provision 
of highways in the provinces and the Greater London Council.
Secondly the budgets will be compared with the cumulative out-turn 
expenditure for the period 1965/66 to 1973/74 incurred by the various 
authorities.
7.2.1 Appropriation of Dudgets
The planned expenditure in Figure 7.03 (table) was computed
on the following basis.
The working population living in county borough areas in England and 
Wales (including London) based on 1966 census was 6.1 million, living 
in county areas was 11.3 million and in the Greater London Council's
n
administrative area was 4.0 million respectively.
Therefore on the basis of working population, the capital expenditure 
planned for the period 1965/66 to 1973/74 in
(i) County borough areas in England and Wales (excluding London)
n  ^ x IOO = 28 percent of total planned
(6 .1 + 11.3 + 4.0) expenditure range
(ii) County Council areas in England and Wales = 53 percent of total
(iii) Greater London administrative area = 19 percent of total
The division between trunk and non-trunk road programmes is made on the 
basis that the county borough councils' long term highways budget 
calculated on the basis of last paragraph was expected to support 
negligible amount of trunk road programmes. The following evidence 
by James and Wardle of the Department of the Environment given to the 
Expenditure Committee on Urban Transport Planning supports my last 
statement.
COMPARISON OF BUDGETED AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURES FOR LONG TERM MAJOR 
UIGIIV.'AY CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES !
1965/66 TO 1973/74 (1966/67 price basis)
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FIGURE 7.03 (Table)
TYPE OF AUTHORITY
PLANNED 
EXPENDITURE 
C MILLION
ACTUAL 
EXPENDITURE 
£ MI),LION
ACTUAL AS 
% OF PLANNED 
EXPENDITURE
County borough councils 
(excluding London - 
Nearly all on principal 
roads')
614 - 727 329 45 - 54
Greater London Council
(i) Trunk roads within
administrative area 67 44 66
(ii) Principal roads 336 - 4l0 170 4i - 51
Greater London area total 403 - 477 214 45 - 53
County councils excluding
London
(i) Trunk roads 1058 -1163 1247 107 - 108
(ii) Principal roads 00 0 1 —k cs 464 254 - 580
County councils area
total 1138 -1346 17 11 127 - 150
Trunk and principal 
roads (England ft Wales) 
total 2155 -2550 2254 88 - 105
of which .
Trunk roads (England ft 
Wales) total 
Principal roads 
(England & Wales)
1125 -1230 1291 105 - 115
total 1030 -1320 963 73 - 93
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(i) Trunk roads within 
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(ii) Principal roads 80 - 183 464 254 - 580
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- (Hr. Wardle) "It does not follow that because it is the A1, it 
is necessarily a trunk road. When it comes to the boundaries 
of Newcastle it may become a principal road."
- (Dame Irene Word) "But why? This is a big road which goes from 
South to North; you cannot divide that up? - Indeed, yes - 
....... If the A1 is not a trunk road there may be lots of other
areas which - ? - " (Mr. Janes) "There are sections of trunk
roads which tie within county boroughs and they generally become 
principal roads within county boroughs. The extent to which these 
are important is gradually declining because more and more of them, 
and especially motorways bypass county boroughs."
(Chairman) "V.'e have a similar situation in my constituency. It is 
an understood thing, I would have thought."
Also, for instance, referring to recommendations contained in the 
Merseyside Area Landuse Transportation Study (MALTS), of a total of 
C2O7 million for recommended highway schemes, £20 million was for
trunk roads, £4.7 million was for non-principal roads and the rest
gwas for principal roads. Of the £20 million for trunk roads, less 
than £1 million was for trunk roads proposed within county boroughs 
and thus counting towards the cost of transport provided for these 
areas.
Road budget in London: A difficulty as to whether London should be 
counted as a county or a county borough arises in the formation of 
Figu~e 7.0^ (table). The highway network within the Greater
London area consists of a significant amount of trunk roads and a 
larger number of principal roads. Therefore in Figure 7*03, 
highways expenditure in London could have been added to equivalent 
figures for the rest of the county councils in England and Wales. 
However, the roads in London had an actual to planned expenditure 
ratio substantially lower than that for roads in other county 
councils. The Combin ation of London’s-* road expenditure with that of 
other county councils would have thus prevented a fuller appreciation 
of the actual to planned expenditure ratio for the county councils 
outside London. Therefore the planned and actual expenditure in 
London is first removed before the remaining budget is shared between 
county boroughs and counties according to their working population.
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The major road programme for London is also estimated on the basis 
of working population (see Figure 7.04 - table)
An estimate was also made of the trunk road programme from details of 
schemes in Greater London administrative area contained in the 1000- 
mile motorway programme and associated trunk road network.
FIGURE 7 . 0 k  (Table)
AN ESTIMATE OK THE HIGHWAYS PROGRAMME FOR GREATER LONDON 1965/66 *i.
period
£67 million
18.7 percent
v. Total planned expenditure for NON-TRUNK, major rood
construction and improvement in London for the period 
1965/66 to 1973/7*1 = £(403 less 67) to £(477 less 67) million = 
£336 - £410 million
With reference to Fig. 7.0 (table) , it is worth noting that in 
November 19671 the Greater London Council announced a road plan 
(essentially similar to Plan 3 of the London Transportation Study) 
for the period 1966/67 to 1981/82 estimated to cost £1350 million 
including commitments.10 However, they did not release any phasing 
of this expenditure. In the event, the following calculation (see 
Fig. 7.05 - table) is completed to show that the calculations in 
Fig. 7.04 (table) above are in the right order of magnitude compared 
with the 1967 plans of the Greater London Council.
TO 1973/74 (1966/67 price basis)
i. Trunk and motorway programme in London for the 
1965/66 to 1973/74 =
ii. Total planned expenditure for major road 
construction in England and Wales - 
1965/66 to 1973/74 = £2155 - £2550 million
iii. Working population in London as a proportion 
of working population in England and Wales =
_______ ^________  x 100 =
(6 .1 + 4.0 +11.3)
iv. Total planned expenditure for major road
construction in London - 1965/66 to 1973/74 = 
18.7% of £2155 £2550 = £403 - £477 million
7.n
AN ESTIMATE OF THE HIGHWAYS PROGRAMME FOR GREATER LONDON 1065/66 
TO 1973/74 BASF,» ON FLANS RELEASED BY G.1..C. ON NOVEMBER, 196?
i. Cost of major road construction and
improvement plans for 1967/68 to 1981/82 
(including commitments) released by the 
Greater Condon Council on November 1967
(1967/68 price basis) = £1350 million
FIGURE 7.05 (tnblc)
ii. Estimated cost of the single major trunk 
road programme (the Outer London Orbital 
Motorway) contained in the 1967 programme 
but not in the 1000-mile trunk road 
programme referred to in Fig. 7.05
(table) = £ 450 million
iii. balance for other major road construction
for 10 years from 1967/68 = £ 90O million
iv. Budget for a 9 year period (similar to the 
period 1965/66 to 1973/74) on a pro-rata
basis = {900 x 9_ = £ 506 million
16
= £482 million in 1966/67 price basis which 
compares with my estimate of £403-£477 
million in Fig. 7*05.
Calculation of expenditure in Fig. 7.0.4 (table) " Actual
expenditures on highway construction and major road improvements was 
calculated from information supplied in the annual publication 
"Highway Statistics" . 11 In this publication the information is given 
in terras of individual local authorities. I have accumulated this 
information by type of local authorities for the period 1965/66 to 
1973/74. For accumulation over the period, the published values were 
converted to 1966/67 price basis using the road construction price 
indices (RCPl) given in Fig. »4.01 (table) of thi3 thesis.
7.3 COMPARISON OK HUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES
Figure 7.03 (table)- gives the actual and budgeted cumulative
expenditures for the period 1965/66 to 1973/7/‘.
7*3.1 Trunk Road Programme :
The lOOO-mile motorway programme was announced in i960 for completion
12 ,  v by the early seventies. It was estimated in Fig. 7.01 (table)
that the intention was to complete this programme by about 1973/7 «^
However the programme was substantially completed ahead of time in
197l/72. The exceptionally fine summer of 1970 was one of the
. , 13contributing factors for this early completion. In relation to
this fine summer, the Minister said that,
"The probability of this happening was realised quite early in the 
year, but it was decided not to disrupt the sensible programming of 
road schemes merely to ensure strict conformity with annual 
estimates."
The effect of that fine summer weather is however not reflected in 
the principal road programme. The total expenditure on principal 
roads in 1970/71 was £129 million which is not substantially different 
from the respective expenditures in 19&9/70 and 1971/72 of £116  
million and £126 million.
7.3.2 Principal Road Programme - HYPOTHESIS ONE:
The principal road programme for the period 1965/66 to 1973/7/* 
amounted to nearly the same as the trunk road programme (see Fig. 7.03: 
table, last two rows). Of the principal road capital expenditure,
75 percent was to be paid as a specific grant by the Government while 
the balance was financed by local authorities from other sources. 
Evidence is provided below for hypothesis one which states that,
HYPOTHESIS I : Reductions in Exchequer grant assistance was NOT a 
substantial reason for the low implementation of 
urban transport plans.
An indirect evidence for this hypothesis was already provided in 
the last sub-section (7.3.1) where it was shown that financial resources 
to support the construction of trunk roads, even in excess of the 
budgeted programme was made available when necessary and that the IOOO- 
mile motorway programme was finished earlier than anticipated.
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The total principal road programme for the period 1965/66 to 1973/74 
was estimated to be in the region of £1030 to £1320 million. The 
cumulative expenditure for this period on new construction and 
improvement of principal roads was £963 million, 73-93 percent of 
the programmed expenditure. The above measure of implementation 
indicates that budgetory provisions made for principal road grant 
assistance was substantially spent for this purpose. However, the 
principal roads programmed for construction in Greater London and 
the county borough areas achieved a low measure of implementation 
(see Fig. 7.04: table) while the principal road proposals 
in county council areas, not contained in the long term programme 
greatly benefited from the principal road grant assistance. In the 
rest of this section, evidence is provided to show that,
"the Minister of transport consistently encouraged the county 
borough authorities to apply for the principal road grants but 
the encouragement resulted in poor response"
while in the next section (£ 7.4) evidence is provided to show 
that,
"grants ear-marked for the provision of urban roads and subsequently 
NOT taken up by the county borough authorities were spent in the 
seventies for the provision of inter-urban (rural) roads."
Evidence of Minister's encouragement and poor response by county
boroughs: In the early sixties, the Ministry of Transport appreciated
the need for landuse-transportation studies as a fundamental aid to
urban-planning in London, the conurbations and the larger free-
. 14standing towns. Results of these studies were to be directly 
incorporated in a new type of urban development plan. An important 
function of this development plan was the identification of "action 
areas", that is to soy of those areas where large scale activity would 
be concentrated in the next ten years. It was intended by the 
Government that this process would help the programming of urban 
road schemes by phasing them with urban redevelopment, to occur 
simultaneously.
?!
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Also, the Ministry of Transport met half the cost of transportation 
studies and supplemented the five year rolling programme for principal 
roads with a preparation list to receive the major urban 
road programme planned for commitment during the early years of the
151970s. This urban principal road preparation list was planned 
eventually to contain £1,000 million worth of schemes.
The object of the arrangements described in the last two paragraphs 
was,
"..... to provide greater flexibility in planning and to stimulate 
the timely and thorough preparation of large and complex urban road 
schemes.
The following statement made by the Minister in 1967 clearly indicates 
that he was fully aware of the slow rate of consumption of the 
allocated road funds.
"An increasing proportion of the programme is being devoted to urban 
17roads .... . It is envisaged that the schemes in the preparation
list will be included in the programme in time for a start within a
period of some five to eight years (at the outside) from 1971 .....
Much earlier starts will be possible for schemes fully prepared more 
quickly while any schemes not ready within the eight year period 
may loose their place in the programme so that other high-priority 
schemes which are ready to start can be included."
In 1969, the Minister reaffirmed his intentions to devote additional 
funds for the urban highway construction programme. He stated 
that,
"Over recent years, an increasing proportion of highway funds has
•l8been allocated to inter-urban roads. .....  The benefits
obtainable from these inter-urban roads will not be fully utilised 
unless there is a complementary system of improved urban highways.
But the main purpose of the urban road programme is to alleviate 
traffic congestion, which is likely to spread more widely to all parts 
of the urban areas as a result of increasing car ownership.
Congestion entails serious loss of economic benefit; it is also 
detrimental to the social amenity of urban areas; an extensive 
programme of rood building is essential if this congestion is to be
contained .......  In the future an increasing proportion of Hoad
Programme will be devoted to urban principal roods."
i
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Even when the road schemes prepared for a town did not command 
local support, the Government departments were willing to retain 
for some years, the allocation of the highway grants for a City.
For instance, the Department of the Environment encouraged the
Nottingham City Council to submit new road schemes when schemes
19contained in Nottingham's Primary Highway Plan failed to gain 
Minister's approval at the Planning Inquiry after the combined 
resistance of the Civic Society, the Chamber of Commerce and other 
local pressure groups.
Notwithstanding this background of past encouragement, by 1970, 
the Minister of Transport first accepted that sufficient progress 
was not being made in the provision of urban highways. In the 1969/70 
issue of the "Roads in England", the Minister referring to urban 
principal road schemes stated that,
"The timing of each scheme will depend on the state of readiness,
cost, and benefits and the level of resources available, but
construction schemes selected for the preparation list is expected
to start during the 5 to 8 year period beginning in 1971, although
recent experience suggests that these urban road schemes will take 
. 20longer to prepare than originally envisaged ........ There are
about £1100 million worth of urban principal road schemes in 
preparation."
Additionally, in March 1970, a list of inter-urban (rural) principal 
roads was announced for preparation. This preparation list, the 
first of its kind, was compiled frim proposals put forward by local 
highway authorities from all parts of the country. The total 
estimated cost of the schemes, including some already in preparation 
was £100 million. A further £100 million of inter-urban principal 
road schemes were already in the FIRM PROGRAMME by that time.
After nearly a decade of encouragement by the Government to persuade 
the urban authorities to claim their highway grants, the introduction 
of the INTER-URBAN (rural) preparation list was the Ministry's 
safeguard to ensure that urban highway funds not token up could be
spent elsewhere to help highway construction. This lost statement
l
-will be substantiated in section 7«(t.
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Irrespective of the formation of an inter-urban principal road 
preparation list, encouragement to take-up the URBAN highway grants 
was still forthcoming from the Ministry. In referring to the 
PRINCIPAL ROAD PREPARATION LIST (this was formed in 1971 by combinding 
the URBAN ROAD and the INTER-URBAN PRINCIPAL ROAD preparation list) 
the Ministry of Transport reiterated in 1971/72, that expenditure
would be concentrated in urban schemes and that at least 80 percent
22of the schemes would be in urban areas.
Also provisions were taken by the Highways Act 1971 to reduce
procedural delays and to extend the powers of highway authorities 
23in providing new roads.
The theme of encouragement was continued until the local government
24re-organisation in April 1974. In 1973, the year before the re­
organisation it was reported in "Roads in England" that,
"The Secretary of State is directly responsible for trunk road
25schemes ...... But increasingly all roads have to be seen as
contributing to one system of movement. It remains for local 
authorities to take the initiative in promoting principal road 
schemes."
An overall change in National policies regarding local road
construction did not take place until 1975 when the Labour Party was
in control of the Government. A consultation document to review the
26Government's Transport Policy was issued in April 1976. In that 
year, tho Secretary of State's advice to the new local authorities 
in relation to road building was,
.... . to make the best use of existing road facilities especially
in the conurbations and large towns."
It is unlikely that the outcome would have been substantially different 
from the present even if the National Policy during the late seventies 
would have been to encourage urban highway construction. Soon after 
Local Government Re-organisation in 197^* the new County Councils 
reviewed their "Inherited Road Schemes." The result of these reviews 
have been to delete a large number of schemes inherited from the 
former county borough authorities. For instance, the Greater Manchester 
Council (GMC) reported that,
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"In the relatively short space of time, GMC has, assuming all the 
schemes now the subject of consultations are eventually abandoned,
reduced the value of its inherited schemes from £8l0 million to
27£365 million. Work being undertaken at the present time is 
likely to reduce this further. As a consequence the blight being 
caused by protecting schemes which have no hope of being implemented 
in the foreseeable future has been considerably reduced with benefits 
for areas and properties so affected."
7.4 TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM URBAN TO 1UJHAI. ROAD CONSTRUCTION
Inter-urban (rural) roads in this respect are mostly trunk end 
principal roads. As agents to the Minister of Transport, the 
County Councils greatly influence the provision and maintenance of 
trunk roads. Prior to the re-organisation they were the highway 
authorities for principal roads in rural areas. Since the re­
organisation the county councils are the highway authorities for
the former county borough areas contained within the county council's
28administrative areas.
7.4.1 Transfers to trunk road lists
The 1000-mile motorway progranmie was completed, with the projects 
almost as planned, by 1971/72 which is nearly two years ahead of 
the estimate of anticipated completion time. In Figure 7.C3 (table) 
it is shown that the trunk road expenditure for the period 1965/66 to 
1973/74 exceeded the planned expenditure by some 5 to 15 percent 
(£6l to £166 million). The completion of the 1000-mile motorway 
programme was followed by a second plan to provide for a steady 
expansion of the scale of the road programme to complete a network 
of 3*500 miles of high standard strategic trunk routes of which about 
2000 miles will be motorways. Opportunity was taken in this plan to 
provide as trunk roads a selection of schemes recommended in earlier 
transportation studies for completion as urban principal roads.
Figure 7.06 illustrates these transfers from principal to trunk road 
list that took place in Stockport, contained in the S.E.E.N.E.C. 
Highway Plan.
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The public inquiry for a section of the M63 trunk road between 
Cheadle Heath and Portwood was held in 1978. This proposal was 
initially recommended in the S.E.L.N.E.C. Highway Plan as the Stockport
East-West bypass - principal road, to be provided by Stockport 
29County Borough Council. The principal objectors at the above 
inquiry were the Greater Manchester Transport Action Group and the 
Friends of the Earth. The objectors claimed at the inquiry that,
".....  to substantiate their traffic forecasts, the RCU (North
Western Road Construction Unit) produced an origin-destination survey 
carried out in 1976 for the Regional Traffic Model. Examination of 
this revealed that 74 percent of the west-bound traffic east of 
Stockport had the destination in Stockport and that through national 
or regional traffic from the East amounted to 154 VPD (vehicles per 
day) - 1 percent of the total trips. There seems to be no doubt 
that the Government decided to take over this section of the A56O 
road ns a trunk road without investigating the extent of use by 
national through traffic. It is, to say the least, quostionnable fer 
the Secretary of State to use the power delegated by Parliament to 
extend, improve or re-organise the national system of routes for 
through traffic to construct a new road with such limited use for 
through traffic."
7.4.2 Transfer of funds to provide rural principal roads:
The Principal Road Preparation List, during 1971 contained £2000 
million worth of road schemes in preparation of which nearly 80 
percent were in urban areas. In Figure 7.06 (table) 
the planned expenditure as described above, for the provision 
of inter-urban and urban principal roads, is compared with the 
out-turn.
From the above comparison, it appears that county councils made use 
of, at least £38 million in excess of what was planred during 1970, 
for the provision of rural principal roads during the period 1970 to 
1974 while the urban road budget was being underspent.
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FIGURE 7.06 (table) 
contd.
Value of Greater London Council's 
major road construction improvements 
planned and out-turn 
(i: G.L.C.'s planned expenditure is 
assumed to be in proportion to 
the working population, i.e. the 
total urban principal road 
programme is divided in the 
ratio of 4.1 : 6.0 which were 
the working population in G.L.C. 
and county borough areas in 
England and Wales during the 
1966 Census)
PLANNED
EXPENDITURE
262
OUT-TURN
57
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7.5 CONCLUSION
During the early sixties, the Ministry of Transport proposed a 
1000-mile motorway programme for England and Vales for completion 
by early seventies. This plan was implemented successfully.
In urban areas, particularly the conurbations and larger free­
standing towns, the Ministry was willing to provide grant assistance 
for an extensive programme of road construction. However, despite 
consistent encouragement by the Minister, the county borough councils 
who were the highway authorities for most of these urban roads, 
failed to promote the schemes. In the event, the capital grant 
allocations that were ear-marked by the Ministry for the prevision 
of major urban roads was largely spent during the seventies on the 
provision of inter-urban trunk and principal roads. Therefore, 
central Government shortage of funds was not a prime reason for the 
low implementation of urban transport plans.
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Several Royal Commission and Parliamentary Committee Reports were 
published and Rills affecting transport provisions were enacted 
within the last two decades.* The chief means for pressure groups 
to lobby at national level are by submission of evidence at 
Commissions and Committees before a bill is drafted or during the
O
time it. is in Committee.“ Lobbies will normally agitate for certain 
measures to be introduced to favour their interests or clauses 
harmful to their interests to be deleted.
In this chapter, the following hypothesis ore examined and found 
to be on balance supported by the available evidence.
HYPOTHESIS I: National pressure groups greatly influenced the
contents of transport legislation enacted in the period 
from 1962 to 1975.
HYPOTHESIS IIsPol icy changes won by national pub lie transport pressure
groups were used until the mid-seventies only to a limited 
extent to produce alternatives to traditional solutions 
based on road construction.
Alternative solutions introduced did NOT greatly 
affect tile implementation of traditional plans in 
urban areas, at least until the mid-seventies.
Prior to examination of the above hypotheses, it is necessary to look 
into the stance adopted by the two major political parties and the 
public at large on the issue of .large scale urban road 
provision.
8.1 POLITICAL AND PUBLIC RESPONSE IN THE SIXTIES
Ve begin with an analysis of the situation before the enactment of 
Transport Act 1968. Prior to this enactment., highway construction 
and improvements were supported from public funds while public 
transport provisions attracted little public finance. Highway 
construction had the support of all major political parties.
8.1.1 Political response:
Roy Gunter, in 196*1, o r  behalf of the Labour Party declared that,
"I hope we shall look into the future and ensure tViat those who own 
private cars - everybody has a right to a private car, if he wants 
it - are properly and adequately dealt with on the roads."3
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In 1966, Peter Walker, on behalf ol' the Conservative Party Assorted 
similar views when he said that,
"You must see the car as an important social development bringing 
much pleasure to many people, so you must pursue an active policy 
to cope with it not a negative attitude."
Edward Heath, in the came year re-itcrated Walker's assertion,
"Some people would like to push u n  into a frame of mind which it is
considered cntl-social to own a car, selfish to drive one; and
. 5positively sinful to take it into built-up areas. Of course traffic
in towns create a problem .....  My approach to this problem is
not to restrict, to hamper or to confine the motorist. Instead,
we must learn to cope with the car and to care for the motorist."
Even as recently as 1970, Anthony Crossland answered unambiguously 
for Labour,
"It would bo profoundly anti-democratic for any government to be
straight anti-motorcar or to try to limit the number of cars ....
The better off classes must not give the impression that they are 
trying to pull the ladder up behind them."
In this respect it is also worth noting that already evidence has 
been provided in Chapter seven to show that successive Central 
Governments, irrespective of their controlling party, have encouraged 
urban road building until at least the mid-seventies. During the 
period under consideration, the Labour party was in Government for 
the period 196^ to 1970 and then returned to power in February 197/*. 
The Conservative party was in power from 197O to 197/*.
8.1 .2  Public response
During the sixties, public response to highway programmes were of 
general acceptance, indeed welcome of the schemes.^ The need for 
road schemes was taken as policy and not for argument at an Inquiry.^ 
Economic and traffic engineering arguments were barely canvassed 
by objectors. Public inquiries - if there were sufficient objections, 
would take only a few days. Objectors were nearly always the people 
directly affected. An official spokesman explained the scheme and 
answered questions raised by the objectors. The emphasis was on 
informality.
lloth the British Hoad Federation and the anti-road lobbies arc 
agreed that it is only since the mid-seventies that it has taker, an 
inordinate time to consider the various issues involved in road 
schemes. In a statement prepared by the British Hoad Federation 
and released by the Transport. 2000 in 1980 it in stated that,
"..... the first motorway scheme, the M6 Preston Bypass, too!? five and 
a half years to plan and build, the Ml80 Scunthorpe bypass toe!? eight 
and a half years from 1971 to completion, and tho A12-A13 section of 
the M25 will take 13 years from inception in 1969 before it opens 
in 1982.9
Clearly, many of the objectors have a legitimate local interest but 
their activities do not usually cause undue delay. It is the- action 
of some of the national groups that cause unwarranted delay."
8 . 2  iliSTOHY OF NATION At, TRANSPORT PRKSSURF, GROUPS
The note above identified the following anti-road lobbies as 
particularly active in opposing ror.de and the vehicle - Transport. 2000, 
Conservation Society, Friends of the Earth and the Civic Trust.
' The Trade Union Congress has also plcyed a major role in safeguarding 
the interests of public transport workers.
Tho moat powerful road lobbies in U.K. are the British Hoad Federation
(DRF) and its two allied organisations the Hoads Campaign Council
10(HCC) and the British Industry Roads Campaign (BIKC). BRF if; 
actively supported by kindred interest groups including the Automobile 
Association (AA), the Royal Automobile Club (RAC), the Road Haulage 
Association (RHA), Asphalt and Coated Macadam Association (ACMA),
Motor Agents Association (MAA) and the Society of Motor Manufacturers 
and Traders (SMMT).
8.2.1 British Road Federation
The British Road Federation (BRF) was founded in 1932 to represent the 
road transport interests of vehicle manufacturers, construction 
companies and their suppliers of materials and machinery including the 
oil companies and a significant part of British Manufacturing Industry 
and Co::uicrce in their role as road- users. The Federation has 
created two allied organisations, the Roads Campaign Council in 1955 
and tho British Industry Roads Campaign in 1970« The three organisations 
together are dubbr-d as "The Road Gang" and have been identified during 
the iiivties by Mr.;. Barbara Castle and other members of parliament as 
tin? moot vociferous lobby In the country.
(3 .0 3
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At urban level, the main policy objective of BRF and its allies is
the establishr.ieni of an estimated 1000 miles of primary rood network
Itin the conurbations and cities. The lobby for this purpose i g  
essentially based on the development of informal social contacts and 
the subsequent briefing of local members of parliament, councillors 
and their officers. The Federation also provides with statistical 
evidence and other information to support their claims.
In the sixties, when the tradition of representative government was
strong and public involvement was only sporadic, the Federation's
efforts paid handsome dividends, especially in the provision of
12inter-urban (rural) roads.
BRF is currently concerned at the lack of progress in building urban 
motorways. With its centrally organised structure, the Federation is 
at. a disadvantage to resist the present day environmental lobbies with 
a strong network of local organisations. It now has formed local
branches to present their cases locally in the conurbations 
and other towns.
8 . 2 . 2  Transport 2 0 0 0
Transport 2000 was formed in 1973 and include in its members several 
cause groups such as the Civic Trust, Conservation Society,
Council for the Protection of Rural Environment and Friends of the 
Earth and interest groups such as the Notional Union of Railwayman, 
Scottish Association of Public Transport and the Transport and 
Salaried Staff Association.1"5 Its aims are declared as:
Ci) To relate transport use and planning to the principles 
of social equity; the protection of environment and the 
more efficient use of resources.
(ii) To pursue the development and promotion of roil transport 
within an integrated transport system.
(iii) To press for a comprehensive and long term approach to 
transport by the Government and the E.E.C.
(iv) To promote public discussion and participation in the 
provision of transport services.
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It has 24 divisional groups, each of them relating to a group of 
administrative counties - for instance, the Thames Valley Group 
covers the Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire areas, each 
divisional group having several sub-groups.1 ’
Their activities at local level include representing their cause at 
development plan and highway inquiries and organising campaigns in 
favour of pedestrians, cyclists and public transport users.
8.2.3 Friends of the Earth Ltd:
Friends of ttie Earth Ltd. (FOE) is an independent British member, 
founded in 1970, of a family of 12 environmental activist groups.
It has 100 local groups in Britain, with whose help it pursues specific 
campaigns which in the transport field are aimed towards the greater 
use of public transport as a means to use energy and othor resources 
efficiently. It is closely associated with Earth Resources Research 
Ltd., a London based environmental research agency which was established 
in 1973.
8.2.4 Civic Trust:
Founded in 1957» the Civic Trust encourages the protection and
improvement of the environment, particularly in towns, cities and
17villages. It supports at present a network of nearly 1400 civic 
and 15 preservation societies which are voluntary bodies with a total 
membership of more than 300,000.
At national level, the Civic Trust waa closely associated with the 
drafting of the Civic Amenities Act 1967 and the Town and Country 
Planning Amenities Act 1 9 7 4 . The 1967 Act created the concept of 
conservation areas while the 1974 Act gave further protection to such
areas. The Trust lays claim to focussing attention on the damage and
19disruption caused to city centres by heavy lorries.
In the sixties, it supported in principle, the provision of ring roads 
to remove through traffic from urban areas. For instance, it 
supported the principle of an inner ring road for the City of York, 
to reduce traffic from thj conservation areas. In 1968, it organised
a study group, to justify a longer but less intrusive inner ring road
20.21for St. Ives. Subsequent knowledge and experience together with
changing climate of public opinion have persuaded the Trust, in the mid­
seventies to favour a public transport based policy as more likely to 
nave the urban environment.
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8 . 3  TRANSPORT LEGIS LATION AND THE NATIONAL l/JBBIF.S
In this section, evidence is presented to support the first hypothesis 
that,
HYPOTIESIS 1 : National pressure groups greatly influenced the 
contents of transport legislation enacted ir. the 
period from 1962 to 1975»
8.3 .1  Influence of pressure groups on the production of "BucUnan Report"
One of the first to echo professional concern on the destructive 
effect of the car on the community was Colin Buchanan. But it 
should also be noted that the present day anti-road lobbies brand 
his work - 'Tragic in Towns', which introduced tiie principle of urban
2transportation studies officially m  U.ll. as a road-builders' charter.
"Traffic in Towns" steering group, chaired by Crov.-ther and the working 
group chaired by Buchanan worked on the assumption that,
"Before very long, a majority of the electors in this country will 
be car-owners. What is more it is reasonable to suppose that they 
will be very conscious of their interests as car-owners and will give 
them a high priority. It does not need any gift of prophecy to
foresee that the Governments of the future will be increasingly
2.5preoccupied with the wishes of the car-owners."
The above view is in accord with those of the pressure groups who 
provided technical assistance in the production of the report.
Amongst the pressure groups acknowledged in this respect are the 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (U.S.A.) and the British Road 
Federation. No prominent anti-road lobby existed when "Traffic in 
Towns" was published.
The Buchanan Report was adopted by the Ministry ns the basis for future 
transport planning one' wa3 recommended to local authorities in January 
1964. The British Rood Federation conducted its own publicity 
campaign to,
" g iv e  t h e  w id e s t  p o s s ib le  c i r c u l a t i o n  t o  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  th e
B u cha nan  R e p o r t ,  and t o  d r iv e  home i t s  le s s o n s . "
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Of particular interest is the "People and Cities" conference held by Bill1' 
in 1963 to introduce the subject of urban motorways to the more prominent 
politicians and planners. Buchanan was the principal speaker at the 
conference which was opened by the then Mini stcr of Transport, Mr Mai pics 
BHK later released in its conference report a statement made by Buchanan 
to the Federation's Chairman.^
"It's all very well, I've written my book, you've bad your conference; 
what wo have to do in keep up a full head of steam and nee that the 
pressure which has been generated is kept up until we get results."
l ' o r  in s ta n c e  i t  p u b l is h e d  an  a b r id g e d  v e r s io n  o f  th e  B uchanan  R e p o r t
c a l l e d  "B u c h a n a n  and A f t e r "  and h e ld  a num ber o f  e x h ib i t i o n s  on  th e
s u b je c t  t o  in t r o d u c e  th e  B ucha nan  R e p o r t  t o  l o c a l  h ig h w a y  authorities.^
8.3.2 Influence on the enactment of Transport Act 1968
One of the powerful self-interest lobbies, the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC) was the first to be critical of the Buchanan assumptions, 
relating to the implications of the growth of private motoring, 
particularly in urban areas. The Congress did not believe in the 
inevitability of the growth. In the "Transport Policy", issued in 
1965 they agreed that,
"Traffic flow can be influenced by public policy and in particular
by how much is spent on road construction......  It will become
more and more evident that the bus industry needs a general 
SUBSIDY as car ownership increases and no section of the industry 
operating fare-stage services should remain in the CONTROL OF PRIVATE
SHAREHOLDERS. The first move in the direction of a general subsidy
2.9was made in the November Budget of 1964." (my capitals)'
Section 96 of the TUC's Transport Policy called for the physical 
co-ordination of passenger transport. They agreed that,
"there is a wide range of opportunities for IMPROVING the quality of 
the PUBLIC TRANSPORT service and making it more attractive to the 
public if the various AGENCIES can be persuaded TO WORK MORE CLOSELY 
together ...... the situation demands that such scheme be SUHiRVlSED
BY AREA AUTHORITIES." (my capitals)
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Provisions to the above effects were subsequently introduced by the
Labour Government in the 1968 Transport Act. It contained the
30following main elements in the urban field. ' Firstly, it introduced 
financial reforms to eliminate bias against public transport 
expenditure - both capital and current. Secondly, there was the 
creation of passenger transport authorities (PTA's) to co-ordinate 
transport operations and the passenger transport executives to 
operate conurbation-wide public transport, under the general direction 
of the PTA. The National Bus Company was created to take over public 
transport operations from private operators from outside the conur­
bations. Thirdly, the Act increased the planning powers of the local 
authorities to include traffic management measures as part of a 
comprehensive transport policy. The intention was to make public 
transport attractive by introducing measures such as bus-lanes.
It is worth noting that in 1972 the Ministry introduced a number of
bus-demonstration projects to encourage local authorities to adopt 
3 'ouch measures.
8.3.3  Influence on the enactments of highway legislation in early seventies:
"As a matter of urgency we (the Conservatives) shall REVIEW the entire 
working of the ROAD PLANNING LAND ACQUISITION AND CONSTRUCTION 
PROCEDURES." (my capitals)
The British Road Federation had this pre-election pledge in a letter 
from Edward Heath, and this and other extracts from the Prime 
Minister's reply to questions from the British Road Federation (BRF) 
Chairman, Lord Chesham, are reproduced in the BRF's July, 1970 
Bulletin.
"We shall undertake this review in consultation with the professional
engineers and the contracting companies ....... We have always taken
the view that the road programme was one which the county could not 
afford to cut. Under the Conservatives even when public expenditure 
had to be curtailed, road building continued to increase."
The Conservatives were elected to power in 1970. The pledges given 
to the BRF wore fulfilled by the enactment of the Highways Act 1971 
and the appointment of the Urban Motorways Committee in the same
year
0.0°
The Highways Act 1971 reduced the maximum period, for lodging public
objections, from three months to six weeks. The Act also required
the objectors to include with the objections a statement of the grounds
of objections. Objectors who wished to suggest an alternative route
were required to give within 14 days sufficient information about the
•>3.alternative route to enable it to be identified.
Referring to t.he roads programme and the 1971 Act, Michael Hescltine, 
the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Environment 
stated that,
"There are politically overwhelming pressures to increase the (road)
3-Iworks programme in view of benefits to both commerce and amenity. 
........ A 55-yard centre line variation clause and reduction in
periods for objection from three months to six weeks should help to
get uncontroversial schemes through more quickly. .......  The road
construction industry has an exciting future but people living in 
the line of the new roads deserve our uttermost compassion."
The Report of the Urban Motorways Committee resulted in the White 
Paper, "Compensation and Development - Putting People First" and 
subsequently to the Land Compensation Act 1973. The effect of the 
1973 Act was to allow highway authorities to be more flexible than
35xn the past in locating roads, particularly through built-up aieas.
8.3.4 Influence on the Environment and Home Office Sub-Coranittee on 
Urban Transport Planning:
A call for a national transport policy, an end to the urban roads 
programme plus an urgent re-examination of all trunk and principal 
road schemes not yet at contract stage was first made in the ALL PARTY, 
House of Commons Expenditure Committee report on urban transport 
planning, published in January 1973«^^
The above recommendations resulted because of persuasive evidence 
given by environmental lobbies and passenger transport operators to 
that Committee. Even in this instance, the environmental case was 
argued on a personal basis by individuals such as Mayer Hillman and 
J.M. Thomson while the Association of Public Transport Operators made 
the plea on behalf of public t ransport.None of the anti-road 
lobbies, which are presently widely publicised, gave evidence to the 
Committee.
The Surveyor commented on the publication of this Expenditure 
Committee Report ns follows:
"The report is bound to spark a long debate on transportation,
34inside and outside the House of Commons. It will clearly be 
seen as evidence of parliamentary support for the growing anti-road 
lobby. Just how much notice the Government will take of tl» 
recommendations, however, remains to be seen. The Committee is 
solely a parliamentary one, with no executive functions."
The recommendations of the Committee, particularly those relating to 
road construction, were not implemented by the Conservative government 
of the day.
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8.3.5 Influence of national pressure groups during the mid-seventies
In February 1974, a National Motorways Action Committee was set up,
with a steering committee consisting of representatives from anti-
• 4 0road lobbies such as Friends of the Earth and Transport 2000.
During 1976 and 1977 a number of major trunk road inquiries, such as 
those at Airedale, Winchester and Archway, were challenged and 
disrupted by this Committee together with the Conservation Society
led by John Tyme.41 The publicity gained by such disruptions
resulted in the Government publishing the "Report on the Review of
42Highway Inquiry Procedures" in 1978.
The new Highway Inquiry Procedures allowed the anti-road lobbies a 
number of concessions of which the important ones are as follows:
(i) The Lord Chancellor and not the Secretary of State for 
Transport, as was the previous practice, will nominate 
the inspectors for road inquiries.
(ii) More and better information on the road proposals will be 
supplied to the objectors.
(iii) An opportunity will be given to participants who want to
re-open an inquiry in the light of exceptionally new 
43evidence or issues.
In addition to the above review, the Secretary of State for Transport
set-up an Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (ACTRA -
Chairman: Sir George Leitch) to review the way the Department of
44Transport assessed the need for major new roads. Report by
45ACTRA, also called the Leitch Report, was published in 1978.
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A number of anti-road lobbies and environmental groups submitted 
evidence which were highly critical of the Department of Transport’s 
assesment procedures. The Leitch Report supported a large number of 
these criticisms. The Committee found the Department's methodology 
as crude and its vision of its job very narrow. The Leitch recommen­
dations were substantially adopted by the Secretary of State for 
Transport) William Rodgers.^
The evidence given in this section support hypothecs 1 which states 
that national pressure groups greatly influenced the contents of 
transport legis lation enacted in the period from 1962 to 1975.
8.4 EFFECT OF POLICY CHANGES ON TRADITIONAL PLANS
In this section, evidence is provided for the second hypothesis which 
states that,
HYPOTHESIS II s The policy changes won by national pressure groups 
did NOT greatly affect the implementation of urban 
transport plans, at least until 197**
Considering the low rate measure of implementation, one can hardly say 
that the effect of the pro-roads lobby increased implementation. 
However, it could be that the rate measure of implementation was 
reduced by the successes of the public transport and environmental 
movements. The principal success prior to 1974 was the inclusion of 
power to subsidise public transport infrastructure in the 1968 
Act.
Within the sample selected, only the two conurbation studies, M ’LTS 
and the Tyne Wear Plan, contain any significant public transport 
infra-structure proposals as part of their recommended plans.
In MALTS only 6% of recommended expenditure was allocated for public
47transport infrastructure. Moreover, highway expenditure in the 
plan was determined independently of public transport provisions, the 
former being largely based on capital finance availability as 
indicated by the Minstry of Transport, the unfulfilled transport 
needs being provided for by public transport.
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In the Tyne Wear Plan, the recommended public transport infra­
structure provisions was estimated to cost £2t.O million, 
representing about 10 percent of a total recommended transport 
capital expenditure. However, it should be noted, that additional 
funds were promised by the Ministry of Transport in the case of this 
study to provide for a higher level of public transport.
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that public transport 
provisions contained in transport plans did not greatly affect the 
implementation of road plans.
It is sometimes claimed that after about 1972 when the Labour Party
was swept into power in a large number of county borough councils,
the existing road plans were rejected in favour of public transport
50and traffic management schemes. The examples frequently quoted in 
these cases are those of the "Zone and Collar" scheme in Nottingham 
and the "Park and Ride" schemes in Oxford. However in both these 
cities, the recommended road plans were rejected at public inquiries 
and public transport and traffic management measures were introduced 
by the outgoing Conservative councils as interim measures.
8.5 CONCLUSION
During the sixties, national politicians and public alike supported 
road construction. In such a climate of opinion, road lobbies led 
by the British Road Federation were successful in meeting their 
objectives. The Trades Union Congress was the first lobby to persuade 
the Government to introduce measures in support of public transport. 
These provisions were used to a limited extent to produce alter­
natives to traditional road solutions. However these alternatives 
did not greatly affect the implementation of road plans. National 
anti-road and environmental lobbies were not responsible for the low 
implementation of plans prior to 197^5 such influence as they have 
had have been more recent.
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Opinion has been expressed by several people that errors in the 
assumptions about, traffic demand, available resources, costs of 
provision and road performanco significantly affected the 
implementation of transport plans.^<^,3 Tho purpose of this 
chapter is to show that these errors were not significant n s  
reasons for the low implementation of plans.
9.1. INPUTS TO TRANSPORT STUDIES
"We concluded since it is obviously the desire of the society to 
use the motor vehicle to the full, that the only practical basis 
for a study of the present kind was to accept this desire os the 
starting point.
This concept first recognised by the Traffic in Towns (Buchanan 
Report) Working Party is the corner-stone of most transportation 
studies. The clearest exposition of this concept vas given by 
Professor Buchanan in an article written in 1964.5 
"We ... always returned to the view that the motor-vehicle is in 
incredibly useful method of transport, offering advantages possessed 
by no other invention to date nor, as far as we could see, by 
anything in the foreseeable future. This led to our "fundamental 
standpoint" of accepting the motor vehicle as beneficial and thpn 
seeking to understand, what, needed to be done to cities in a 
creative and constructive way to enable it to be exploited within 
them. The case for restriction would have to emerge, we agreed, 
from the demonstrated impossibility or great difficulty or great 
expense, of meeting the full demand for the use of motor vehicles.
I remain absolutely convinced this was a sound approach, and that 
. had we started in any other way, our study would have carried no 
confidence with the public. I would expect any local authority 
studying the problems of its area to proceed broadly as we did, 
that is, to investigate how far, it is possible to go with the 
motor vehicle and to allow for the case for restric ion to emerge 
in the negative 'feed back' manner described. There is nothing to 
prevent the local authority, at any stage, costing out alternative 
methods of discharging the movements, provided they can think of 
them. In practice, this is likely to boil down to one main issue - 
how much of tho JOURNEY TO WORK load can be discharged by PRIVATE 
CARS and how much must be carried by PUBLIC TRANSPORT" rmy capitalsi
9.02
Fi{)* 9»02 is my interpretation of the above statement, as 
applied in transport planning.
DEMAND MANAGEMENT
POLICY-MAKING IN URBAN TRANSPORT PLANNING : flG 9.01
I will discuss, in sub-sections 9«2 to 9.5 * the effect of 
variation in predicting the inputs on the implementation of plans, 
essentially new road construction.
9.2 ASSUMPTIONS ON AVAILABLE BUDGET AND COST PER UNIT OK IIOAD CONSTRUCTION
These two inputs directly determine the amount of new construction.
The budget available for plan implementation is determined outside the 
transport planning process, essentially by the Central Government.
I allowed in chapter seven, that the budget v/as calculated on the 
basis of "£ per head (of worker) per annum." It was also shown (see 
Ch. 7 ) that lack of trarsport capital did not significantly affect
the implementation of plans. "Cost per lane" of highway has remained 
fairly constant in real terms since the preparation of plans (sec Nig.
9.03 ). Therefore we are justified in concluding that the errors in
estimating the "new construction" that can be provided within the 
fixed budget did not significantly affect the implementation of plans.
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9.3 ASSUMPTIONS ON THE UNIT CAPACITY OF ROAD NETWORK
The capacity is determined by three factors: the capacity of roads 
between junctions, tho capacity of junctions and the efficiency of 
the network. The link and junction capacities ore governed by 
national standards. However the network efficiency may be 
increased by traffic management techniques.
9.3.1 Assumptions about new roads and junction capacity:
The capacities of new roads were calculated on the basis given in 
"Roads in Urban Areas: 1966"® This manual, especially Tables 1-4 
and 1-5* specified the road design standards necessary to carry the 
predicted traffic efficiently and economically. Eg; the capacity of 
a dual-2-lane urban motorway with grade separation and no frontage 
access was specified to be 3000 P.C.U.'s per hour for one direction 
of flow.
Technical memorandum H5/75* issued in 1975 by the Department of the 
Environment, however modified the standards given in Roads in Urban 
Areas.^ Using the revised memorandum, the capacity of the motorway,
mentioned above, would be 3600 vehicles per hour, equivalent to 
nearly 4,300 P.C.U.'s per hour assuming an average vehicle mix - a 
43 percent increase.
Opportunity was taken, with the introduction of small roundabouts, to 
increase the capacity of roundabout junctions, including those 
priority junctions which were changed to mini-roundabouts.10
However, the changes to roads and junction standards were issued after 
the Local Government Re-organisation. Therefore, the changed standards 
are unlikely to have influenced design decisions taken before
1975.
When the revised standards were issued no specific reasons were given 
for the changes however they were generally associated with 
improvements in driver ability and vehicle construction. These 
variables were not taken into consideration in the "Roads in Urban 
Areas" standards. Therefore one could argue, that irrespective of 
the memoranda issued in 1975* the improved capacities would bo 
reflected on the ground. These improved conditions could have 
encouraged the highway authorities to delay the implementation of 
plans. However, this argument cannot be justified for the following 
three reasons.
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Firstly, any improvements in vehicle performance and driver ability 
should have been reflected equally on trunk roads, yet 
I have already shown that trunk road plans were being implemented 
faster than the planned rate. Secondly, there is a v/ide 
variation in the implementation of plans. This suggests that the 
reason for the variation cannot be universal, such as efficient 
driver behaviour. Lastly, I will show in the next sub-section, 
that the unit capacity of road networks has not significantly 
improved since the mid-60's.
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the planners did not make 
significant errors through ignoring future increases in. road capacity, 
due to improved performance: the improved capacity assumed in the 
technical memoranda was not a significant reason for the low 
implementation of plans.
é
9«3«2 Value of traffic-management as a means of increasing capaci'.y:
Traffic management has long been recognised as a means of achieving 
efficient flow of traffic. The Transport Act 1968, widened the powers 
available to local authorities to manage traffic.11 Thi3 Act extended 
the principle of Exchequer grants to expensive traffic management 
schemes, thus putting them on a comparable footing with major highway 
construction. Road Circular 1/68 - Traffic and Transport Plans, 
illucidating on the intentions of the new provisions^ stated,
"Meanwhile (in the short term) much more can be done to tackle the 
objectives through the use of traffic management .... To this end, 
the Minister is asking urban authorities to prepare Traffic and 
Transport plans ...i. Most authorities will find it convenient to 
relate their plans to some specific date in the mid-1970 s".12
It Í3 reasonable to believe, that the extended traffic management 
powers and the subsequent call by the Minister to prepare Traffic 
and Transport Plans, gave the necessary initiative for the local
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authorities to introduce ambitious measures to efficiently manage 
the capacity of their road network (traffic management to increase 
capacity or supply management), to control traffic demand (demand 
management) and to re-assess their long term plans in the changed 
circumstances.
Nottingham City Council, in introducing their "Zone and Collar 
Experiment" in 1973, pointed out that, "Many improvements to the 
flow of traffic have been made in Nottingham over the last ten years 
using traffic management measures. 1,1 These include one-way systems, 
peak hour clearways, waiting restrictions, junction improvements and 
linked traffic signals. Often the substantial increases in road 
capacity hove simply transferred the problem to other locations, 
which in turn, require improvement."
The above view, that traffic management is generally an inefficient 
v?ay of increasing road capacity is also held by other transport 
planners.*5 In the rest of this sub-section I will first present 
a resume of work done by Thomson to estimate the success of traffic 
management in Central London.16,17 j will then extend his method to 
a sample of 9 towns in order to quantify the significance of traffic 
management in increasing the capacity of road networks.
Thomson's work was based on speed and flow data, completed bi­
annual ly, by Greater London Council and the Transport and Road 
Research Laboratory. He estimated that the capacity of Central 
London's road network was increasing at 1.85 per cent per annum 
between 1952 and i960 and that the rate of increase then fell to
1.10 percent between 1961 and 1966. (Duriilg 1965 and 1966, no 
increase was detectable). During this latter period of low growth 
in capacity however the rate of implementation of traffic management 
substantially Increased (following the formation of London Traffic 
Management Unit in 1961). Moreover, during this latter period as 
well as traffic management there was an accelerated programme of 
junction improvements.
Based on network capacity calculations and other evidence Thomson 
concluded that, "the true capacity (after allowing for road 
building, improved vehicle performance and parking restrictions) of 
Central London's (road network) has been falling as a result of
traffic management ....  No one will dispute that it is sometimes
efficient to make people turn left when they want to turn right or 
to travel round three sides of a block instead of one .... But. 
the experience in Central London reminds us that there are always 
costs involved in restricting freedom of movement and that these 
costs should not be incurred unless there are clear, over-riding 
benefits to be gained therefrom."
Capacity estimates for the major road networks in a sample of eight 
towns are derived in Figure 9.03. For each town, a set of evening 
peak and off-peak flows, together with respective speeds are given 
for each of 3 years - 1967» 197* and 1976, in columns 1 to 4 of the 
Figure. This data was supplied to me by Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory (TRRL) partly from their published records and partly from 
their unpublished works on urban congestion surveys. 19>20,21
In columns 5 to 6« the statistical method advanced by Thomson is used 
(see Notes toFigure 9.09 for an explanation of the application) to 
derive speed-flow equations for the respective years. The equations 
for each town are given in column 9. The network capacity for each 
town, for each of 3 years, at an arbitrary speed of 30 mph is given 
in column 10. The rest of the information was provided by me to 
assess the effectiveness of traffic management in increasing the 
capacity of networks.
This assessment is based on the 1967 and 1971 capacity figures only.
I ignored the 1976 figures from the following discussion for two 
reasons. Firstly, I wish to explain the low-implementation of plans 
only up to 197(*» Secondly, the data supplied by the Transport and 
Road Research Laboratory include improvements to network caused by
r e m o v a l  o f  o n  s t r e e t  p a r k i n g .  T h e s e  m e a s u r e s
were more popular after the 70's than before. A large amount of on­
street parking space in urban areas has been replaced by expensive 
off-street car-parks. The latter measures are too expensive for them 
to be classified as traffic management.
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9.1.0
(1) COLUMNS 1-4 WEHE SUPPLIED DY TRRL.
(2) IN COLUMN 5, THE 1976 EQUIVALENT FLOW IS DERIVED FROM A LINEAR SPEED- 
FLOW EQUATION. THE CONSTANTS FOR THE EQUATION, FOR EACH TOWN ARE 
DERIVED FROM THE 1976 PEAK AND OFF-PEAK SPEED-FLOW VALUES
EG: USING 1976 VALUES FOR LIVERPOOL
1976 PEAK: 29.0 = A + (BX 16555) 1
OFF-PEAK: 32.3 = A + (BX1210) 2
SOLVING EQUATIONS 1 & 2,
B = -0.00742, A = 41.28
V = 41.3 - 0.00742Q 3
WHERE V = SPEED IN KI’H AND
Q = FLOW IN PCU PER HOUR
USING EQUn 3 ?
1967 PEAK EQUIVALENT FLOW (COLUMN 5) WHEN SPEED = 27.7 KPH IS
Q = - 27.70 - 41,28 = 1830 PCU PER HR.
0.00742' »
S
(3) IN COLUMN 6, I ASSUMED THAT AT A FLOW OF 500 PCU (LOW FLOW) T’lE AVERAGE 
TRAFFIC SPEED IS THE SAME IRRESPECTIVE OF THE NETWORK CAPACITY 
(RECOMMENDED BY J.M. THOMPSON: PAGE 7 2 3, TRAFFIC ENGINEERING AND CONTROL 
APRIL 1967, AS REASONABLE IN URBAN AREAS WHEN NEW ROAD CONSTRUCTION IS 
LIMITED)
IN THIS COLUMN, THE CAPACITY CHANGE SINCE THE BASE YEAR TO 1976, IS 
MEASURED AS A RATIO OVER 500, FOR BOTH THE PEAK RESULT AND THE OFF-PEAK 
RESULT, AN AVERAGE TAKEN, AND THE FLOWS SCALED UP (OR DOWN) BY THIS 
AVERAGE VALUE.
EG: 1830 - 500 = 1.104 5 1399 ~ 500 = 1.191 
1705 - 500 1255 - 500
(4) IN COLUMN 7, (1.104 + 1.19l)/2 = 1.147.
(5) IN COLUMN 8, THE SIX "SCALED FLOWS" VALUES ARE ESTIMATES THAT WOULD SET 
THE SPEEDS FOR ALL YEARS EQUAL WHEN FLOW = 500 PCU/HOUR
EG: 1.147 (1705 - 500) + 500 = 1882
NOTES OK FIG U R E  9 .0?» ( T a b l e )
q . n
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(6) COLUMN 9 : THE 6 PAIRS OF VALUES IN COLUMN 4 AND COLUMN 8 ARE USED 
TO KIT BY REGRESSION ANALYSIS, A SPEED-FLOW EQUATION FOR THE 1976 
NETWORK.
EG: THE 1976 EQUATION FOR LIVERPOOL IS GIVEN IN THE LAST 
ROW FOR LIVERPOOL, UNDER COLUMN 9.
: V = 41.0 - 0.0072 Q.
THE EQUATIONS FOR THE OTHER TWO YEARS, 1971 AND 1967 ARE DERIVED AS 
FOLLOWS.
SLOPE OF EQN. FOR GIVEN YEAR
= SLOPE OF 1976 EQN. x AVERAGE RATIO GIVEN IN COLUMN 7 
FOR THE EQN. YEAR
EG: THE SLOPE FOR 1971 EQN. = 0.0072 x 0.938 ± 0.0068L1VbKrUUL
THE INTERCEPT IS THEN CALCULATED, USING THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE
AVERAGE SPEED IS THE SAME FOR EACH YEAR WHEN THE FLOW IS 500 PCU
PER HR.
EG: THE INTERCEPT, "A" FOR 1971 LIVERP00L IS GIVEN BY
A - (0.0068 x 500) = 41 - (0.0072 x 500)
IE; A = 40.8 KPH *
THE 1971 "SPEED-FLOW" EQUATION FOR LIVERPOOL IS 
V = 40.8 - 0.0068 Q.
(7) VALUES IN COLUMN 10 ARE CALCULATED FROM THE RESPECTIVE EQUATIONS IN 
COLUMN 9.
(8) DETAILS FOR COLUMNS 11, 12 AND 15 WERE SUPPLIED BY TRRL.
(9) IN COLUMN 14, NETWORK CAPACITY = FI OW IN COLUMN 10 x LENGTH OF C'WAY 
IN COLUMN 11.
EG: NETWORK CAPACITY FOR LIVERPOOL 1971 =
1588 x 113.6 = 180 x 103 PCU.KM/HR.
(10) IN COLUMN 16, TIE NETWORK CAPACITIES FOR 1971 AND 1976 ONLY ARE
ADJUSTED, IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR INCREASED ROAD AREAS, OVER AND ABOVE 
THE 1967 VALUES THAT HAVE RESULTED DUE TO NEW CONSTRUCTION AND "ON­
STREET" PARKING RESTRICTIONS.
EG: REFERRING TO ROW 2 OF "DATA-BLOCK" FOR LIVERPOOL, CAPACITY
LESS INCREASED ROAD AREA.LIVERPOOL (1971) COLUMN 16
= 180 X  (1364 X  10J) - (22.4 X  114,6 x 24) 
(1409 x 103) - (21.5 x 1 13 .6  x 24) 
= 174 x 103 PCU. KM PER HR.
•I HAVE ASSUMED THE AREA OF ROAD LOST TO A PARKED VEHICLE TO BE 
8 METRES x 3 METRES =. 24 SQ. METRES
0 . 1 2
Columns 11-15 contain supplementary data which allows calculation 
in column 16 of "net" capacity. In this context, the not capacity 
is the actual capacity adjusted for new construction and removal 
of parked vehicles since 1967» Thus any increase between 1967 and 
1971 should be attributable to traffic management measures only.
The net-capacity of the network, at a speed of 30 mph is given in the 
last column of Figure 9.09 Taking the 8 towns together the network 
capacity (see Figure 9.10) increased from 79*000 PCU-Kin/llr to 82,000 
between 1967 and 19 7 1, an increase of just under 1 percent per year 
which is extremely small.
Formal tests as indicated in Figure 9*10 show the increase to be 
statistically insignificant.
In fact the above method will over-estimate the growth in capacity du 
to traffic management since such measures entail diversions. These 
in turn will increase road distance between any two given points.
For instance Thomson estimated that between the average origin- 
destination pair, the length of journeys in Central London increased 
by 5 percent between i960 and 1967 (i.e. nearly 1 percent per 
annum).
If the 1971 capacity for the 8 towns was corrected downwards to allow 
for increased journey distance, there would be no increase in real 
capacity over the 5 years.
A separate estimate of network capacity for Oxford City Centre was 
completed by me from link speed-fiow measurements supplied by the 
City Engineer. These estimates are for 1966 and 1971» From this 
analysis, it would appear that traffic management reduced the city- 
centre network capacity over the 5 year period by nearly 30 percent!
From the calculations for the 8 towns, from the figures for Oxford 
and from comments elsewhere, I conclude that there is no significant 
increase and towns may indeed have suffered a reduction in network 
capacities due to the traffic management measures. Hence the under- 
implementation of plans are unlikely to have resulted from growths 
in the unit capacity of networks.
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FIGURE  9 . 1 0  ( T a b l e )
SIGNIFICANCE TEST RY PAIliED DIFFERENCES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT IN li TOWNS
CAPACITY AT 3 0  KPH SPEED
TOWN
1967:
X103PCU-KPH
1971«
X103pcu-KPH
d
CO/7-C0I6 -1
6 7 8 9
1. LIVERPOOL 160 174 14 196
2. MANCHESTER 205 204 -1 1
3. LEICESTER 53 78 25 625
4. LUTON 45 44 -1 1
5. HEADING to 48 8 64
6. PRESTON 39 47 8 64
7. CHESTERFIELD 33 30 -3 9
8. WATFORD 55 32 -23 529
11 Ob O 657 27 1489
n = ' 8 8 8 8
’ T =  78*8 = 8 2 .1 3.38 186.133.38
(S 182.75
» 13.52
H : / * .  = 0 ) o d
", * ° > 
where d = difference of population means
SoKPH = 3.38 0.66
13.53/ /"«-I
with 8 -1 = 7 d.f
Since tQ | j = 2.37« the value of t^OKPH not significant at 
the 0 .0 3 level and the difference in capacity between the 2 years 
is not significant.
Note: The differences are nlso insignificant, even if no adjustments 
wore made for new construction. (Col. 14 of Table 9.01)
9.4 ASSUMPTIONS ON DEMAND MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS
Buchanan identified four means of influencing the demand for the 
operational use of cars - road pricing, a system of permits or 
licences, parking policy and subsidising public transport.22 Of 
the four methods, he envisaged a parking policy (with the public 
authority retaining complete control of parking space provided, its 
location and parking charges) as being of immediate importance.
In the long run, Buchanan suggested that, "the most potent factor 
in maintaining a 'ceiling' on private car traffic in busy areas is
likely to be the provision of good, cheap, public transport ....
but the attraction to private cars are very great and there can be 
no denying the difficulties of providing public transport services 
so intrinsically convenient that they will attract optional car 
traffic off the roads in appreciable quantities."
The latterday transport planners however did not test as part of 
their study, the effectiveness of applying the various traffic 
restraint and modal split policies. They implicitly assumed that 
sufficient demand management measures would be introduced to provide 
the desired level of service for the private car.2^ I will show 
in the rest of this section that this assumption proved to be 
impractical.... Generally, demand management policies were found to 
be ineffective in producing that desired modal split. In this 
respect it is worth noting that demand management does not include 
total restriction to travel. The latter was never intended to be 
imposed.
Demand management became fashionable in the early 70's. Kenneth Orski 
reported on demand management techniques in the United States as 
follows.
"A qui fit revolution is under way in the United States in the field of 
urban transportation. For 30 years, the dominant goal of U.S. 
transportation policy was to expand the highway network in response
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to the ever increasing usage of motor vehicles ..... (But) they now 
realise that existing transportation facilities ....  present an
enormous, and often vastly underutilised resource, which if managed 
effectively could accommodate our future travel needs for many years 
to come. Out of this new awareness has evolved the concept of 
Transportation System Management (TSM) ..... In short, TSM argues .... 
that the efficient operation of the transportation system requires the
management of transportation DEMAND as well as of transportation 
supply" (my capitals).
In U.K., the Transport Act 1968, granted the necessary statutory powers 
and the financial incentives for local authorities to control 
traffic demand.2^
Several innovations have been introduced since the 1968 Act, in parti­
cular to attract private motorists on to the buses. I will assess the 
effectiveness of these measures in the following order - road 
pricing, licensing, provision of attractive public transport and 
parking restraint.
9.4.1 Road Pricing!
This involves taxing specified vehicles using selected routes, in 
order to reduce congestion. This proposal was examined by the Smeed 
Panel in 1964.26 It is attractive as a single measure that, could 
relieve congestion considerably and is flexible to apply. However, 
it cannot be easily or quickly introduced because of the elaborate 
administrative machinery and electronic equipment necessary. No 
authority in the United Kingdom has proceeded with road pricing on 
any substantial scale.
9.4.2 Licensing:
This can take the form of cordon control governing entry into a 
controlled zone or area control in which checks would be made on 
vehicles throughout the control zone.
A desk study of supplementary licensing in Central London was 
completed in 1974 and was found to be practicable.2® However, 
neither this nor any other system was ever introduced in practice 
in any Western European Country.
It was reported, based on a licensing system introduced in Singapore, 
that although peak flows were reduced in the City Centre, the 
reduction mode insignificant changes in perceived travel times.29
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9.^.3 Provision of attractive public transports
Various measures to promote public transport as an attractive 
alternative to the private car have been attempted in the post- 
Buchanan period. In this respect, medium sized towns have opted 
for measures to INCREASE THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF BUSES, while in 
some conurbations, RAPID TRANSIT has become popular..
The more popular measures in this respect are illustrated below 
(see Figure 9.12). I will provide evidence to show that these 
measures did not significantly attract the private motorist back 
to the bus.
PROVISION OF ATTRACTIVE
PUBLIC TRANSPORT (See Para 9.4.3
PAGES 9.12 to 9.16)
MEASURES TO INCREASE 
THE ATTRACTIVENESS Of BUSES
----1
RAPID TRANSIT
(See Page 9.15)
PALIATIVE
heasui.es
BUS PRIORITY 
MEASURES
(At Junction C Links) 
(See Page 9.13)
COMPREHENSIVE INNOVATIONS
PARK 6 RIDE SUPER BUS ZONE £ COLLAR
(See Page 9.14) (See Page 9.14) (See Page 9.15)
FIGURE 9.12
9.16
DUS PRIORITY MEASURES are implemented at junctions and on Links.
Limited priority to buses at junctions are given by:-
i. permitting them to make movements which are prohibited to
general traffic, e.g. special right-turn facilities for buses 
ns in Manchester and Peterborough,
ii. tlie provision of special signal phases as in Gateshead and
iii. facilities for buses to avoid weaving and other complex 
manoeuvres as in Marble Arch, London.
Between the junctions, buses are given priority in mixed traffic 
flows as in Southampton or by the provision of bus-lanes.
Exclusive bus-ways are a speciality of Runcorn New Town.
Increasingly many towns have introduced pedestrianisation of 
their high streets,with vehicle penetration reserved for buses and 
taxis; c.g. Oxford, Leeds.
Bus Demonstration Project Reports issued by the Department of the 
Environment assess the success of the earlier innovations.3*
However these, as most other reports, concentrate on assessing the 
"trovel-time-savings" to bus-users as opposed to the effect of the 
measures on modal-split. One of the few researchers who concentrated 
his effort on assessing the effect of bus-priority measures on modal 
split is Ian Hcggie of the University of Oxford: Transport Studies 
Unit.32
Reggie concluded as follows on limited-priority schemes. "What is 
quita clear is that they have had very little impact on car users: 
either in making car use appreciably more difficult or in persuading 
them to leave their cars at home."33 Similarly, the NATO Committee 
on the challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) which completed a number 
of researches and recommended several ways of implementing bus priority
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measures in Europe one! America accepted that, "Increases in bus
patronage have generally not been large .....  nor has there been
much shift from car to bus travel."3^
Y/here PARIC-ANO-RIDE operates, car users are encouraged to park on the 
outskirts of the town and ride a frequent and inexpensive bus-service 
to the centre. In Oxford, the Park-and-Ride service is further 
enhanced by the provision of "bus-only" lanes and by enabling buses 
to penetrate into pedestrian areas.
On Park-and-Ride, Reggie concluded that, "It has managed to persuade 
some motorists to park on the outskirts of the city and use the shuttle 
bus.35 Their reason for using the service nevertheless imply compulsion 
more than persuasion. It is not the cheap and attractive service that 
appeals but the price and availability of city-centre parking space.
Park-and-Ride therefore goes hand in hand with car restraint ....
The only qualification about Park-and-Ride is that it is an expensive 
and inefficient way of persuading motorists to stay out of central 
urban areas." Based on a survey of Park-and-Ride usage at Botley 
Road and Pear Tree, in Oxford, Reggies' conclusions are that in terms 
of reducing interference with urban traffic the benefits of the Park- 
and-Ride facilities are minimal.
The SUPER-BUS experiment, conducted in Stevenage New Town embodied a 
number of improvements to the conventional bus service. Those are the 
rationalisation of the route to make the service semi-express, 
simplifying the fare structure and reducing fares, increasing 
frequency, providing shelters at bus-stops and linking these improve­
ments with a special livery (yellow and blue) and extended publicity.
The results of the super-bus experiment in persuading the motorist has 
been disappointing. Two morning peak hour surveys, carried out on 
week days after the introduction of Super Buss Stages I and II 
recorded 21 and 35 permanent shifts, representing 1.2 and 1.9 per­
cent respectively of all car driver trips in the area served by Super- 
Bus. The bulk of the benefit of improved service was enjoyed by 
existing users of public transport.
Tho Zone and Collar experiment was tested in Nottingham.37 it wos 
based on imposing delays on private car traffic in order to restrain 
them from making morning peak hour trips and instead to attract car 
users to the buses. Delays were imposed to private traffic by signal 
control at the exits from defined residential zones onto the city-bound 
arterials and by control of the approaches of these arterials to the 
city-centre. Buses were given unrestricted passage and their 
services generally enhanced.
A Report on t.he "Zone and Collar" experiment was submitted by the 
Director of Planning and Transportation to the Environmental Committee 
of the Nottinghamshire County Council in December 1976. The Report 
concluded that, "The research undertaken as a result of the experiment 
indicates that, even had the scheme been modified to improve conditions 
to bus passengers comparative to those of car users ....... there
would hove been no substantial change in mode of travel.... It is
recommended that the experimental scheme in the form it was imple­
mented be discontinued ....  (and) the remaining parts of the
experimental scheme be removed at a provisionally estimated cost of 
£1^,000 and charged to the Bus Demonstration Capital Provision in the 
1976/77 budget." The recommendation was accepted by the Council.3®
Further evidence to support the view that bus priority measures were 
generally unsuccessful in persuading the private motorist is also 
provided by Webster. Ho estimated that in urban areas bus travel 
has been declining at about 3i' percent per annum over two decades 
sine" the mid-1950's.39
The most ambitious Rapid Transit scheme in Britain is the Tyneside 
Metro.^ The system is designed to provide good penetration to the 
centres of Newcastle, Gateshead and South Shields and to provide 
convenient interchange facilities with the main-line stations, 
buses and public car-parks. The overall objective of the Metro is 
to reduce total journey times and to make public tr-.nsport an 
attractive alternative to the private car by the use of high 
performance vehicles, by co-ordination of public transport network 
and by tho reduction of central area and other walk times.
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The infrastructure costs of the Metro were estimated to be ¿72 
million in 1971 but this has escalated to nearly £ million 
in 9 years. 11 Professor Peter Hall, writing on the viability of 
mass transit, likened the performance of the Metro with that of the 
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) in San Francisco. ,t2 The latter is 
known to have had little effect on modal split. Professor Hall 
concluded, "Areas like Tyneside or any other British conurbation are 
far more like the San Francisco Bay Area than like Hong Kong. For
them, capital-hungry investments are likely in the not very long run 
to be as disastrous as for the Californians ...... Was it worth it?
William Rodgers and his worried officials at the Department of 
Transport must be asking the same question now about Tyneside - for, 
as with Concorde, once, it may yet be cheaper to abort the whole 
plan."
Before concluding this section, three further points are worth noting. 
Since the provision was made in the 1968 Act, public transport 
subsidies in U.K. have been growing at an alarming rate. In 1972 
payments by local authorities for public transport subsidies totalled 
£13 million while for 1975, the figure was £102 million. ^  Since
then, successive Governments have been attempting to limit the amount 
of subsidies. Secondly, in a Transport and Road Research Laboratory 
Study completed in 1980, the authors concluded that "when fares are 
reduced and/or service levels improved, public transport patronage 
increases due mainly to existing users making more intensive use of 
the system; it is unusual for such measures to attract appreciable 
numbers of car d r i v e r s . T h i r d l y ,  measures to attract car users
to public transport were not introduced in earnest before the labour 
landslide at the local elections in 1972.
Based on all the evidence in this sub-section, I conclude that 
measures to improve public transport were unsuccessful as a means to 
produce the desired modal-split.
9.^.4 Parking Restraint:
All the above discussions on demand management point to town-centre 
parking restraint as the only viable means of inducing a inodal-3plit 
in favour of public transport. However, Professor May identified 
a major loophole of parking c o n t r o l . " ( I t ) is the inability to 
control privately available parking associated with individual places 
of employment which ....  represent $ to $ of non-residential parking
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slock in many city centres. As experience in London indicates, 
this can result in any reduction in the use of public parking being
out-weighed by growth in private parking ......  Consultations on
the proposals (to control private off-street parking) raised several 
objections, the enforceability of the controls were questioned, as 
were the problems of fringe parking, and it was suggested that 
controls would be unfair, specifically on those who had a greater 
need for parking space, and more generally on those who had 
previously been required by planning legislation to provide the spaces 
which would now be removed or taxed. This last factor particularly 
led to the proposals being abandoned."
With respect to the failure of parking restraint, the comments by
the Director of Planning and Transportation of Nottinghamshire are-also
worth noting. He stated that, "the primary reason for the failure of
the 'Zone and Collar' experiment in Nottingham is the amount of
private off-street parking within the City." In this context, it should be
noted that Nottingham has a low proportion of private off-street
car-parks (only 38 percent of the total
Oxford is one of few cities which has been even partially successful 
in pricing the motorist out of the city centre. Presently, (Feb 1982) the 
daily charge in Oxford city-centre car-parks is £1.80 which compares with 
50 pence in the nearby town of Swindon. However, Heggj.e having 
studied the effect of traffic restraint on private and public transport
trip-making concluded that, "the car-user who cannot park .....  will
simply go somewhere else where he can. Foot loose land-use 
activities that rely on his custom will then follow him there."
Based on the evidence given in section 9«^i I conclude that demand 
management was generally unsuccessful in reducing the demand for 
vehicle usage. Therefore successful demand management is not a 
significant reason for the low implementation of plans.
9.5 ASSUMPTIONS ON UNCONSTRAINED DEMAND
In this section, I will show that error in predicting unconstrained 
traffic demand is not a significant reason for the low-implementation 
of plans. I will first support this claim with some subjective 
evidence and follow it with a statistical test.
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In a letter written to me in 1978, the Technical Director of 
the Merseyside County Council's Joint Transportation Unit 
stated that, "Following the completion of the MALT (Merseyside 
Area Landuse Transportation) Study, reaction to it within 
Merseyside has been mixed. In many respects, there has been some 
considerable disenchantment which arises not so much from the 
principles of the study but from the fact that there has been such 
dramatic declines in population and employment in Merseyside since 
the original growth assumptions were made in the mid-sixties that 
many of the findings are now completely out of dote."
Despite such poor assumptions, however, Merseyside is one of the 
few areas which had a large proportion of its transportation plan 
recommendations implemented. For instance, I have shown in 
section 5'h- that FMR 1974 for the MALTS was O'GS- 
In contrast there are a number of studies which ore fairly accurate 
in their predictions of traffic demand, whose recommendations were 
poorly implemented. For instance, Leicester Traffic Plan 19r5, 
predicted the 1975 car-ownership and population to within 10 percent 
of actual values, yet it only achieved very low measure of 
implementation (FMR 1974 = 0.09)
Successive Governments have encouraged the provision of highways, 
particularly in the inner-city areas of conurbations, to promote 
economic activity. For example, in his Statement to the Parliament 
in 1978, William Rodgers, when he was the Secretary of State for
Transport said: "......  there is a need for a road-system that
would support major national objectives - the industrial strategy,
regional development and the REGENERATION OF INNER-CITY AREAS .....
THE ROUTES TO THE MAJOR PORTS ARE NOT YET COMPLETE..... CERTAIN OF
THE ASSISTED AREAS STILL LACKED ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS". (•‘■•V capitals)'10 
Because of such encouragement and because of the comprehensive re­
development opportunities that were available, the inner-cities in 
conurbations, generally achieved a higher level of implementation 
than elsewhere. However, it is essentially these cities, which had the 
worst landuse and traffic predictions, due to the complexity of their 
traffic movements and their rapid loss of economic activities, which 
was against the national trend in economy and car-ownership.
9.5»1 Subjective evidences
9.21
In a letter written to me in 1978, the Technical Director of 
the Merseyside County Council's Joint Transportation Unit 
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Merseyside has been mixed. In many respects, there has been some 
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principles of the study but from the fact that there has been such 
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particularly in the inner-city areas of conurbations, to promote 
economic activity. For example, in his Statement to the Parliament 
in 1978, William Rodgers, when he was the Secretary of State for
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conurbations, generally achieved a higher level of implementation 
than elsewhere. However, it is essentially these cities, which had the 
worst landuse and traffic predictions, due to the complexity of their 
traffic movements and their rapid loss of economic activities, which 
was against the national trend in economy and car-ownership.
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For this, I will test "predictive accuracy" of unconstrained demand 
against cumulative rate measure of implementation (FMR). All 
measurements will cover the period from the base year of the 
studies to 197^. (The base year is the year used for future 
predictions in the study).
One is initially tempted to measure the predictive accuracy of studies 
in terms of vehicle flows, but this approach has four main dis­
advantages. Firstly, consultants normally, did not predict traffic 
flows for intermediate years as part of their planning studies.
Some published studies do not even provide numeric values for base 
and design year traffic flows. Secondly, it is time-consuming and 
expensive to collect "out-turn" traffic flow information on all the 
links for the 23 towns contained in the sample, and the process of 
converting this traffic flow data to a common basis for comparison 
is fraught with difficulties. Thirdly, the base-year traffic flows 
may not be directly comparable with future traffic flows because of 
the re-distribution of traffic. Fourthly, car-ownership is e> better 
predictor of underlying traffic demand, then are traffic flows because 
the latter may be highly constrained by congestion.
"Total vehicle ownership" within a town for a base-year, and its 
variations throughout the design period can easily be derived from 
the immediate outputs given in a study. For the following reasons, 
the variable, "total vehicle ownership" was found to be a suitable 
surrogate for unconstrained demand. Firstly, most studios identified 
it to be the most important predictor of future travel demands. This 
is explicitly stated, for example, in Oxford Central Area Study and 
* the Tyne Wear Flan.^ 1^ 0 Secondly, prediction of "vehicle ownership" 
needs as its input all the other exogenous variables most likely to 
be affected by predictive inaccuracies.
It is sometimes claimed that "total vehicle owners'/.ip" is not a 
satisfactory predictor of traffic demand because the former will not 
reflect the demand for "internal-external" movements and "through 
movements." However, I would argue that the demand for "internal- 
external" movements would be partially reflected by the attractiveness 
of an urban area ns a destination which would */» turn be related 
particularly to "commercial vehicle ownership" within a town.
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A second factor that essentially determines the demand for 
"internal-external" movements is the vehicle-ownership within the 
economically dependent sub-region of on urban area. My 
examination of vehicle-ownership patterns within sub-regions 
suggests that this ownership closely follows and is only 
marginally higher than that of the adjoining urban areas. As 
for through traffic, it only formed a small proportion of total 
vehicle flow in the former county boroughs (= large urban areas). 
"Through-traffic" would have been further removed from county 
boroughs by the Government's policy of providing trunk roads as by­
passes around major settlements. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that variation of total vehicle ownership within a large 
urban area is a suitable surrogate for unconstrained traffic demand 
within the area.
In this analysis, I will define the predictive accuracy of a study 
ns
ACTUAL INCREASE IN VEHICLE TRAVEL 
PREDICTIVE ACCURACY(PA)197/i = ™ p SINCE BASE YEAR TO 197 *
PREDICTED INCREASE IN VEHICLE TRAVEL
DEMAND SINCE BASE YEAR TO 1974
In terms of-the surrogate variable "total vehicle ownership" (TVO), 
PREDICTIVE ACCURACY(SPA)l97/t
The base year, the total vehicle ownership at that time and 
predictions for future years are given in the respective studies. 
Where the population and vehicle ownership prediction curves are 
available for a study, the curves are used to estimate the 
predicted TVO for the town. In the absence of growth curves, the 
predicted population for 1974 was estimated by lint .r interpolation 
from the nearest predicted values while the relevant Road Research 
Laboratory growth curve, current for the base year was used to 
interpolate the 1974 vehicle-ownership rate from the intermediate 
values published by the Study. The total vehicle ownership is the 
product of total population and vehicle owners’, ip rate per head of 
population.
ACTUAL INCREASE IN TVO SINCE 
BASE YEAR TO 1974
PREDICTED INCREASE IN TVO SINCE 
BASE YEAR TO 1974
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The low implementation resulted in congestion in urban areas which 
curbed the underlying demand being reflected as growing traffic 
flows. The planners did not take account of the effect of congestion, 
in predicting future traffic flows. In reality, this apparent satis­
faction due to curbed demand could not have been a significant reason 
for the non-implementation of plans because similar satisfaction 
would have resulted and more money could have been saved if the 
plans for trunk and rural principal roads were not implemented.
I have shown that the plans for the latter roads were implemented 
at a faster rate than planned.
The scale of infrastructure provisions were largely planned, on the 
basis of unconstrained demand. Predictions of unconstrained demand 
proved to be incorrect. However, I have provided subjective and 
statistical evidence to show that variations in unconstrained 
demands did not significantly affect the implementation of plans.
Therefore, I conclude that predictive accuracy did not significantly 
affect the implementation of plans. j
I
/
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1.0.1
The financial capability of local authorities to undertake non­
trunk road and public transport infrastructure schemes was greatly 
enhanced until 197^, by the provision of specific Exchequer grants
have to meet a sizeable proportion of the cost of implementing 
their plans. The cost was normally financed by a long term loan 
though at times, a proportion is financed from revenue income and 
various internal funds of local authorities. At times of 
financial stringency it is usually easy to continue to do without 
items not yet possessed. The needs for capital work must be 
particularly pressing and very well understood - and agreed - before 
such work is undertaken. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
if there was a shortage of funds with the county borough authorities 
which led to the low implementation of urban transport plans.
10.1 SATISFACTION OP NEEDS AND AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES
"The Council faces a financial crisis of doomsday proportions ...
The Council must find an additional £9^ million next April including
- claimed the Labour leader of Manchester City Council.2 
The Tories replied that,
"Manchester will have to stop providing a 'Rolls Royce service' 
without the ability to. pay for it."
The above quotation is an example of the dichotomy of public policy 
as defined by two major parties. The Labour Council was willing to 
face financial crisis and was still looking for further sums of 
money to support their services. The Tories on the other hand were 
encouraging the cut-back of services.
Boaden, analysed 1968 data on educational expenditures in county 
boroughs in England. The above behaviour of Manchester supports 
Boaden's conclusion based on a different sphere of activity.
"(Difficulties with) finance may well be less salient to the 
setting of policies (than political objectives) in this field despite 
its very considerable expenditure."?
of up to 75 per cent. However, the local authorities themselves
a deficit of nearly £22 million for this year."
The Committee of Enquiry of Local Government Finance (1976) noted 
that,
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"The complaint most forcefully made to us about the control of 
local authority spending was a simple one./* It was said that 
local authorities decided first what they intended to spend.
Only thereafter did they consider what rates they must levy to meet 
the Bill. This process was not considered to be budgeting in the 
sense that individuals understood it. Local authorities were accused 
of being concerned primarily with the expansion of services and 
secondarily with the means of financing that expansion. Large 
projects were said to have been undertaken in many instances without 
adequate thought for the effect that the capital debt incurred would 
have in increasing current expenditure."
The Committee's comment on this complaint was that,
"Councillors cannot see their expenditure decisions directly 
reflected in the local rate.5 There are a number of reasons ...
The true cost of the expansion of local government services has 
been no more apparent to the public than to Councillors. This lack of 
awareness has encouraged the electorate's expectations of what local 
authorities ought to provide. These expectations were brought to bear on 
local councillors while the restraining financial pressures, which 
normally affect councillors when making decisions that involve the 
spending of public money, were reduced."
Based on the foregoing statements it can be hypothesised that,
HYPOTHESIS I: In normal times, if a local authority is politically 
disposed to provide a particular service, they are 
willing to find the resources to do so.
Cut-back in local capital finance has NOT been a 
major cause of under-implementation of transport plans 
in urban areas.
Presently no established methodology exists to compa'e the financial 
abilities of individual authorities. In the following sections, 
examinations will be undertaken to see if -
(i) there was any overall shortage of local authority finance 
nationally until 197*», which led to reduction in services;
(ii) there is any statistical relationship between local variations 
in wealth of authorities and their respective rate measure 
of implementation.
10.3
10.2 EVIDENCE FOR HYPOTHESIS ONE BASED ON COUNTRY-WIDE TOTAL 
EXPENDITURES
This evidence will be based on the examination of
(i) local capital expenditure patterns, and
(ii) revenue expenditure patterns 
since 1966.
10.2.1 Evidence based on variations in capital expenditure patterns.
The need for large scale highway provisions and improvements 
particularly in the conurbations was generally accepted by local and 
central governments in the late 1950s. Conurbation Highway Committees 
were formed in 1958 to frame co-ordinated highway plans for the West 
Midlands, South-East Lancashire, North-East Cheshire, Merseyside, 
Tyneside and West Riding. These committees consisted of local 
authorities represented by their Chief Engineers, the Divisional 
Controllers from the Ministry of Transport and others representing 
local transport interest.^ The Reports of the respective Committees
were published in the early sixties and construction works on large
<scale urban roads began in earnest by the mid-sixties. For instance, 
the Steering Committee on Merseyside Traffic and Transport recommended 
highway schemes to the tune of £270 million (1964 costs) to be comp­
leted by 1982 of which £30 million was to be spent for the period 
1965/70.7 The actual out-turn expenditure for the period 1965/70 
on the provision of Conurbation Highways and Traffic Committee 
recommended schemes was £26 million. This represents a rate measure 
of implementation (FMR) for the period of 87 per cent - a high rate 
measure.
The Buchanan Report, published in 1963, confirmed the need for 
increased public expenditure on the provision of urban highways.8 
The local authorities generally were now well disposed to find the 
additional resources necessary to support an extensive highway 
construction programme. Figure 10.01 (graph) illustrates this rise 
in local TRANSPORT capital expenditure of 72 per cen* over the 
period 1966 to 1970 compared with a rise of less than 10 .0 per cent 
in local government TOTAL capital expenditure.^ The third graph 
in the same figure illustrates that principal road construction 
activities in county borough councils had a dramatic rise of 163 
per cent between 1977 and 1970.
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During 1966, transport capital expenditure was less than 10 per cent 
of local government total capital expenditure (see fig. 10.01). 
Therefore the rise in transport capital expenditure index up to 1970 
is not greatly reflected on the pattern of total capital expenditure 
variations. Similarly for the period 1970 to 1974, the local 
transport capital expenditures have declined again without proportionate 
decline in other capital expenditures. Therefore it is reasonable to 
conclude that the rise and subsequent fall in transport capital 
expenditure is not due to cut-back in total capital expenditures.
10.2.2 Evidence Based on Variations in Revenue Expenditure Patterns
The repayments of outstanding debts is a burden on revenue income.
In this section it will be shown that shortfall in revenue income 
did NOT influence the implementation of urban transport plans. The 
following three points are advanced in support of the above statement.
Firstly, as given in table below and in more detail in Figure 10.03 
(graph) county borough councils as a whole, in England and Wales 
have steadily increased their revenue expenditures until 1974,
/
REVENUE EXPENDITURE BY COUNTY BOROUGH COUNCILS - ENGLAND AND WALES
(EXCLUDING LONDON) 1966 PRICE BASIS
—
Financial Year
Total Expenditure Roads Revenue
£ Millions £millions %  of total-
1964/65 6?5 49 7.2
1966/67 738 53 7.2
1970/71 819 56 6.8
1973/74 996 64 6.4
Therefore it is unrealistic to suggest that the local authorities 
suffered from a general shortage of funds.
Secondly, it should be noted (see Fig 10.02 and 10.03 - graphs) that 
ONLY highway revenue expenditures are in an EVER reducing proportion 
to total expenditures since 1965. This has happened irrespective of 
the natural rivalry between spending departments to maintain their
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proportionate share of the total budget. The decline in highways 
revenue has occurred independent of any apparently urgent need for 
increase in another service. Even the need to support an increasing 
housing expenditure (see Fig 10.02) cannot be justified as a reason 
for decline in road expenditures since the former rise did not 
begin until 1966 while the decline in road expenditure began earlier. 
Rather it appears (see Figs 10.02 and 10.03) that the reductions in 
transport revenue expenditures, year after year, have been generally 
absorbed by other services as necessary. Therefore it is unrealistic 
to suggest that the proportion of revenue income for highways and 
public lighting was consistently reduced - this in turn leading to a 
shortage of. capital - because of the need to increase the support 
for more urgent services such as housing. It is more likely that the 
demand for revenue support was not forthcoming because the roads 
capital was not being expended at the planned rate.
Thirdly, it is shown in page 7 (Fig. 7*03 table) that the total 
capital expenditure planned by county borough councils over the 9-year 
period 1965 to 1974 for implementing the transport plans was -iot more 
than £727 million. The local authorities' share of this expenditure 
will be nearly 30 per cent of the Capital Costs, namely about £220 
million. —
Assuming 15 per cent per annum for repayments and maintenance charges, 
the authorities revenue expenditure would have increased by about £33 
million per annum had all the transport plans by county boroughs been 
implemented as intended. As only about 25 per cent were implemented, 
the corresponding revenue requirement was about £9 million. The 
difference of £24 million per annum, representing less than 4 per cent 
of total revenue expenditures, could easily have been found, if the 
enthusiasm of the mid-sixties, when the urban transport plans were 
launched, had continued.
However, it may be argued that the wide variation in implementation 
(irrespective of the low average) could have occurred because 
comparatively poor authorities suffered a shortage of funds to 
implement their plans while the richer authorities aciiieved a high 
rate measure of implementation. In the next section variation in 
implementation of a plan will be co-related with a respective measure 
of poverty of an authority.
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10.3 ANALYSIS OF RATE MEASURE OF IMPLEMENTATION (FMk) AGAINST A MEASURE 
OF POVERTY
The measure used hero for the assessment of poverty of individual 
local authorities was initially defined by central Government for 
calculation of the resources element of rate support grant (RSG).10 
Using this formula, the county borough authorities can be ranked in 
terms of their poverty depending on a factor (say, the Resources 
Element Factor - REF) arrived by:
( ACTUAL NET PRODUCT OF A PENNY RATE )REF = / 1 — ■ -■ ■ - ■ ■ —  ■ ■ — 1 ... * " " " "'* " \( STANDARD PENNY RATE PRODUCT OF AN AUTHORITY )
The net product of a penny rate is a figure readily available for all 
authorities and is a yard-stock of their ability to undertake 
expenditure paid by their own efforts.1* The standard penny rate 
product of the authority is arrived at by multiplying the average 
penny rate product per head of population for England and Wales by
, 1?the population within the local authorities administrative area.
A positive value for REF indicates comparative hardship for an 
authority to finance its services from local resources. A negative 
REF indicates relative wealth compared with the average county borough. 
Thus in fig lO.oHtable) Oldham with O .36 is the poorest town within 
the sample while Oxford is a typically rich area with -0.33.
In Fig. 10.4 (graph) a scatter-graph of FMR.VS.REF is given. A simple 
linear regression analysis of FMR.VS.REF shows a positive correlation 
= 0.29) confirming that the implementation of urban transport plans 
was not significantly influenced by the availability of local authority 
finance. It is interesting to note that there is a positive, significant 
(at 3 %  level and 21 degrees of freedom) correlation between the measure, 
of poverty REF and FMR. This could be explained by the belief generally 
held in the sixties that highway construction stimulates industry in an 
area. Also population affected by road schemes in poorer areas such as 
Liverpool are less likely to be successful in resisting the schemes (see 
Ch 13 for local pressure group resistance). Therefore poorer authorities 
sometimes achieved a high measure of implementation.
10.4 CONCLUSION
Capital expenditures are paid for from a long term loan serviced from 
revenue income. Therefore shortage of capital funds arises from 
inability of an authority to service them from revenue funds.
Since 1965, revenue expenditures of county borough councils in England 
and Wales have risen greatly. Highway provision is the only service
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to have continuously failed since 19&5 to maintain a proportionate 
share of revenue. The increase in the share of local authorities' 
total revenue needed to implement the transport plans is small. 
Therefore considering the country as a whole, shortage of local funds 
is unlikely to have been a substantial reason for under-implementation 
of transport plans.
This conclusion is supported by linear regression analysis which 
shows that there is no significant correlation between the poverty 
of particular authorities and their cumulative rate measure of 
implementation.
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EFFECT OF LOCAL POLITICAL CONTINUITY ON IMPLEMENTATION
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11.4 EFFECT OF POLITICAL PRESSURES ON CHIEF ENGINEER CONTINUITY
11.5 CONCLUSION
11.6 NOTES
* * #
"Our own political questionnaire included a number of questions to bo 
answered only by those authorities operating "on a party basis" .....
Those which did reply represented 86 percent of the county boroughs .....
All county boroughs with over 200,00opopulation are 'party authorities'
•.....  There is no doubt however, that in party authorities, in all
important matters, a combination of factors gives the majority
party a whip hand .....  In many authorities operating on party lines,
the party groups makes a more significant contribution to general
policy initiation than any 'constitutional committee' .....  Sometimes
the fluctuation of power is quite rapid. Examples have been quoted of 
changes of party controls at regular intervals even at each triennial
election.....  We have no doubt from our own observations that annual
elections do result in frequent disturbance of long-term planning."
The foregoing conclusions were reached by the Committee on the 
Management of Local Government after its research on politics in county 
borough councils.*
The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine the disturbance in local 
political continuity as a reason for the low implementation of plar.a.
I will take this opportunity to test a further view held by some 
researchers, that the disaffection of local labour politicians to the 
provision of urban'motorways, which happened in the early 70s is the 
prime reason for the large-scale rejection of plans.
11.1 INFLUENCE OF LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES IN MUNICIPAL DECISION MAKING
"You don't vote against the group. We all feel strongly about that. 
If you're not at least loyal, you're nothing. I wouldn't vote 
against it. I wouldn't vote with the Party, I'd stay right away.
I'd walk the corridors or in the streets - anywhere but where the 
voting was taking place".
Birmingham Labour Alderman: Cited by Newton (1976)2
"You can't vote against the group. You can't do it. That wouldn't 
be right. You can't do it - the group's a family. It can have its 
own disagreements, but if anyone puts their nose into things you tell 
them 'Get out, its none of your business'. I can criticize tho 
family in its own home, but I would never do that outside for 
strangers to hear".
Birmingham Conservative Alderman: Cited by Newton (1976)^
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The party groups are the backbone of city politics in Britain. 
Referring to the role of political parties in the municipal 
decision making process, Newton noted that "the old saw about 
'keeping politics out of local government' was voiced by only two 
respondents.^ The other sixty-four took party organisation as 
given and most of them then proceeded to make it clear that they 
felt very strongly indeed about the need for party unity in 
public. Often a fierce sense of duty and loyalty to the group
was expressed .... . Quite often the group was described as a
"family', and it was said that 'one doesn't wash one's linen in 
public."*1
Dearlove supported the sentiments above when he referred to the 
usual caution given by the leader of the Royal Borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea, to prospective local council candidates - 
"You realise that there's a party system in operation on the 
Council and that the party group makes decisions, and that subject 
to conscience you will be expected to abide by the decision of the 
party? Members of the Selection Committee have to know if the 
candidate will support the party on all issues which are njt those 
of conscience ..... Voting against any committee or party decision 
in the open council is forbidden and does not occur"5
Similar evidence to show the influence of party politics in local 
transport policy-making is also given by a number of other writers 
including MacEwen, reporting on Bath and Grant reporting on policy 
formulation in the cities of Southampton, Portsmouth and 
Nottingham.
In the next section, I examine the importance of continued control 
that must be exercised by a political party in the local council in 
order to successfully implement its long term transportation plans.
2 CONTINUITY IN POLITICAL CONTROL AND POLICY MAINTENANCE : HYPOTHESIS I
The publication of a land use-transport study is the initial stop for 
the construction of a network of transport capital schemes. Each of 
these schemes has to complete a network of preconstruction activities 
involving some five to eight years of preparatory work. 8,9 
Committee and sometimes full Council approval is required before 
several of these activities can be performed. Also the Council has 
extensive powers to prevent the progress of a capital scheme or to 
change approved plans, particularly if it has not entered into an
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including MacEwen, reporting on Bath and Grant reporting on policy 
formulation in the cities of Southampton, Portsmouth and 
Nottingham.
In the next section, I examine the importance of continued control 
that must be exercised by a political party in the local council in 
order to successfully implement its long term transportation plans.
11.2 CONTINUITY IN POLITICAL CONTROL AND POLICY MAINTENANCE ! HYPOTHESIS I
The publication of a land use-transport study is the initial stop for 
the construction of a network of transport capital schemes. Each of 
these schemes has to complete a network of preconstruction activities 
involving some five to eight years of preparatory work. 8,9 
Committee and sometimes full Council approval is required before 
several of these activities can bfe performed. Also the Council has 
extensive powers to prevent the progress of a capital schome or to 
change approved plans, particularly if it has not entered into an
expensive contract with an external body. Hence, the continued 
support of the sponsoring council over a period of fifteen or more 
years is essential for the full implementation of a transport plan.
A change in the party political control of the council during this 
period way result in the rejection or time-consuming modifications 
to the partially implemented plan. For instance, the Report,
"Future Roads Pattern" for the City of Portsmouth was completed 
in This was the only post-war year during which the
Labour Party controlled this Council. When the Conservatives 
regained control of Portsmouth City Council in 1965, they approved 
this document. However, the two link roads leading from the Inner 
Ring Road into Southsea were soon deleted, as politically unacceptable 
resulting in delays of about eighteen months to the implementation 
of Phase One - M275 North/South Motorway: Tipner Link, of the approved 
Plan.^O Thus the change in Council resulted in major modifications 
to the plan content and to delayed implementation. This pattern 
is repeated in many places.
It can thus be hypothesised that,
*
HYPOTHESIS I: The success of implementation of a long-term
transportation plan will depend on the continued 
—  control of the county borough council, by the local 
political party, under whoso authority the plan was 
prepared.
The statistical evidence for this hypothesis is based on showing
the existence of a significant co-relation between the indeperlent
variable, "Political Continuity" (POLNTG) and the dependent variable
FMRLGN (log of FMR, the financial measure of the rate of e
implementation) the definitions of which are given below.
POLNTC = LOG (POLITC) where e
(NUMBER OF YEARS UP TO 1973/74, THE PARTY WHICH PUBLISHF.D 
THE STUDY WAS IN POWER, SINCE THE FIRST YEAR OF PLAN)
POLITC
(NUMBER OF ELAPSED YEARS UP TO 1973/74, SINCE THE FIRST 
YEAR OF PLAN)
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FMULGN « LOG (FMR) where e
(COST OF NEW INFRASTRUCTURE, DOTH RECOMMENDED BY THE STUDY 
UP TO 1973/74 AND IMPLEMENTED)
FMR --------------------------------------------------------------
(COST OF NEW INFRASTRUCTURE, RECOMMENDED BY THE STUDY UP 
TO 1973/74)
Evaluation of FMR was discussed in chapter 4. In the next sub­
section 11.2.2 I justify the selection of the logarithmic 
function "POLNTC".
11.2.1 Measurement of »POLITC"
In the definition of "POLITC" the year of publication,is taken to 
be the year, the plan received approval in Council. Normally, the 
first year of implementation of the plan follows soon afterwards.
In a few cases, the first year of implementation of the recommended 
schemes occured before the publication of the plan. For instance, 
the construction of the first tube of the Liverpool-Wallasey tunnel, 
under the River Mersey began in 1967, within one year of the 
commencement of the Merseyside Area Land Use Transportation Study 
(MALTS). The MALTS report was not published for a further 2 years.** 
Under these-circumstances, the first year of plan implementation and 
the year of publication of the study was taken to be the date of 
construction of a recommended scheme. In this respect it should be 
noted that in defining implementation ratios (see Sections k . Z - l  ) 
it was explained that a committed scheme should be taken as a 
recommended scheme if the construction work on the scheme has not 
begun by the date of commencement of the study.
Apart from the year of publication, three other situations require 
special treatment. Procedures for handling these situations - 
existing commitments, absence of a readily identifiable controlling 
group and plans prepared without political commitment by the local 
council - are discussed below.
Commitments entered before transfer of power: For on incoming 
political party, acceptance of council work would be rather like 
coming into Act III of a play, where much has already been 
established and must be taken for granted, so that certain actions 
must follow on irrespective of what new councillors might think 
should be council policy. For instance, the construction of 
individual road schemes normally takes in excess of \ \ years. A 
political party which has newly acquired the control of the local 
council has to accept any contractual obligations of on-going road 
schemes.12 Therefore, in counting the number of years for which a 
party was in power, the out-going party was assumed to be in control 
for one year after it had actually lost power.
Absence of readily identifiable controlling group: In Tynemouth, 
for instance, the majority was held by independent councillors for 
the whole of the period from the commissioning of Tyne Wear Study to 
Local Government re-organisation.13 In this case and in Rochdale 
where there was a coalition government, I conducted detailed studies 
to determine the continued support given to the implementation of 
the plan and hence to determine a representative value for "POLITC".
In this respect, care should be taken to identify pseudo-independent
groups such as citizens, rate payers and progressives who are in
— iLfact splinter groups of the Conservative Party.
In my sample of 23 councils, a total of 171 council-years was 
contained, from the publication of the respective studies, to the 
abolition of the county borough councils in 197,i. During this period, 
there was no absolute majority in council for 20 council-years, the 
latter representing 11.7 percent of the total.15 This percentage is 
similar to one obtained by me in a wider "jk councils sample, taken 
over a period of 12 years from 1962 when the period of no absolute 
representation was 10.3 percent. It may therefore be considered 
that the 23 council sample is representative of the population in 
England.
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Excessive interference in the plan by external agencies (resulting 
in poor local commitment to it). Ann McEwen reporting on "Bath:
A Planning and Transport Study" stated that, "We (Colin Buchanan 
and Partners) consulted the Bath Preservation Trust about the quality 
of the City's built and landscape heritage and other representative 
groups about the other aspects, but we worked right through to the 
end of an 18-month exercise without involving either the public or 
the City Council members in the evaluation or weighing up of 
transport alternatives.16 At the end of the day a carefully 
argued report recommending a contentious and now famous tunnel was 
put to the Council vote. Those for and those against were equal, 
neatly balanced along party lines, an ex-Mayor produced an 
alternative plan without a tunnel, and the then Ministries of 
Transport and Housing and Local Government took the EXCEPTIONAL 
step of carrying out a special examination of the two proposals, ours 
and the ex-Mayor's themselves, in an effort to help the City Council
reach a decision .....  Learning from our Bath experience, we felt to
work through to a recommendation, WITHOUT taking of any soundings of 
local and council opinion on the way, would NOT provide a basis for 
an agreement on an answer." (my capitals)
Transport planning which substantially ignores local political 
considerations, as illustrated above is prevalent in most of the 
"historic cities". This may well be the major factor that led to 
the very low implementation of long term plans in "historic cities".
A short history of road planning in Oxford is given in the rest of 
thib sub-section, as a second example to illustrate the continuing 
interference in local transport planning, by the Central Government.*7 
It is worth noting, that in both Oxford and Bath, through traffic 
movement, which is considered to be the proper concern of the 
Ministries, is not a major problem.
DATE OF PUBLICATION 1953 : City Council development plan calls for a
shopping centre at Cowley to releive 
traffic pressures on City Centre.
1955 * Minister of Housing and Local Government 
rejects Council's view and calls for 
inner relief roads. Council submits a 
City centre relief road plan through 
Eastwyke Farm.
1956 :
1957 : 
1957 : 
1964 :
1966 :
1966 s
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1968 s
1969 :
1972 :
Minister rejects the Council's plan 
and calls for a road through Christ 
Church Meadow.
House of Lords unanimously condemns the 
Minister's call for a road through 
Christ Church Meadow.
Council rejects Minister's plan.
Hoad Research Laboratory commissioned to 
conduct traffic surveys.
New Oxford Development Plan continuing 
a road through Christ Church Meadow, 
published, passed by the Council and 
sent to the Minister.
House of Lords condemns Minister's route 
and calls for the development of a 
Greater Oxford area, to relieve congestion 
at the centre.
Minister's "interim" decision on 
Development Plan includes a suspension 
of road plans through Christ Church 
Meadow. Minister instructs the City to 
appoint consultants to consider alter­
native routes.
Consultants recommend and the Council 
accepts East Wyko Farm Road, with 
connections to the North and South with 
the Outer Ring Road (Phase 3).
Minister rejects phase 3 of the plan, 
resulting in re-design and consequent 
delay to the implementation of phases 1 
and 2. The Council (Conservative ) 
introduces interim traffic management 
measures.
New Labour Council suspends the work on 
East Wyke Farm Road and extends the area 
wide traffic management schemes 
(Balanced Transport Policy).
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1976 : Oxfordshire County Council
(Conservative) includes parts of the 
East Wyke Farm Road in its First 
Structure Plan submission to the 
Secretary of State.
1979 5 Secretary of State (Labour) deletes 
the East Wyke Farm Rood proposals.
In the case of Oxford and Bath, the two "historic cities" in the 
sample, "POLI'i'C" was assigned a value of 0.01, suggesting that 
local politics is dominated by national considerations.
11.2.2 Statistical tests on the significance of political continuity
A scatter graph (see Fig. 11 -Ol ) of FMR Vs POLITC for the
23 towns in the sample suggest a degree of positive correlation 
(coefficient of correlation = 0.64) between the two variables. 
However a logarithmic function was expected to provide a bettor 
description of the relationship between the two variables, because 
of the decay in the rate of implementation that results due to 
loss of enthusiasm and changes in value over time in the part of 
the councils.
The results-of regression analysis will be unrealistic if logarithmic 
transformation is applied to extremely small numbers. For instance 
the natural logarithm of 0 is - 00 (infinity). In order to 
overcome this problem, I have included the values relating to Bath 
and Oxford from the sample when applying this transformation.
Under the circumstances, an equation of the form,
FMRLGN = 0.801 POLNTC - 0.738
proved to be the best description of the relationship between the 
two variables. 49 percent of the variation in FMRLGN can be 
explained by its association with POLNTC (i.e. coefficient of 
correlation = 0.70). This level of correlation, with 21 degrees 
of freedom is significant at less than 0.05 percent level (i.e. 
more than 99.95 percent level of confidence).
Therefore, the variable "POLNTC" will be carried forward for 
further statistical analysis in Chapter 14.
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11.3 EFFECT OF CHANCES IN POLITICAL VA1.UES OVEH TIME : HYPOTI'ESIS IX
In the last section, continuity was expressed in terms of the original 
party's years in office as a fraction of all years. An 
alternative measure would be years to first political change as 
a fraction of all years. The purpose of this section is to 
examine which of these is more likely to affect transport plan 
implementation. '
For national rather than local reasons, many local authorities 
changed party more than once during the period under study.
In the mid-sixties, when urban land use-transportation plans were 
being introduced, 63% of county borough councils in England and 
Wales wore controlled by Labour. All the councils during this 
period were supporters of largo urban road construction. Within 
4 years, when moat of the plans produced by the local authorities 
were ready to be implemented, a nationwide swing brought 78 
percent of these councils under Conservative control. The effect 
of this swing on the implementation of transport plans was 
examined in the last section. A swing back in 1972, returned the 
control in 69 percent of the county borough councils to the Labour 
Party. The result of this latter swing was to hring in a large 
number of new labour councillors, who were uncommitted to the 
earlier labour plans. For instance in Nottingham, 27 out of the 
45 labour members in the 1972/73 City Council were newly elected. 
Introduction of uncommitted members, in Nottingham and elsewhere 
in the early seventies is sometimes held as a significant reason
for the rejection of mid-sixties urban road plans in favour of
o nlarge-scale traffic management measures.
Goffey and Dickens traced this swing of opinion by Labour councillors
2iagainst road construction to the opening of Westway in 1970.
They stated that;
"Tiie publicity campaign that started on the day tiio motorway opened
shook planners and traffic engineers to the core ....  The shock
wave did not die, but gathered way, aided and abetted by the 
considerable degree of political connivance and support."
\
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On tho same note, Buchanan commented that;
"The loss of houses threatened by the rest of the roads 
programme in the Grenter London Development Plan was ruthlessly 
and successfully used for political campaigning and upon a 
change in local government in London (when Labour were elected 
in 1973) the programme was dropped with little in its place 
beyond vague assurances regarding improvement in public 
transport. "^2
However, it should also be noted that,
(i) capita] expenditure on principal road construction and major 
improvements by county borough councils during the financial year 
1973/7** was 8 percent higher in real terms than the equivalent 
expenditure during 19 7 1/72.
(ii) councils that adopted wide area traffic management and 
restraint schemes to the exclusion of all large scale road 
construction did not in fact inherit an approved "traditional 
plan", containing a number of committed schemes. For instance, 
in Nottingham, the first two of the schemes that were planned for 
implementation by tho early 70's - Sheriffs Way and the Eastern 
By-pass - were rejected after the planning inquiry in 1970. The 
Conservative Council of that time, instituted a wide area traffic 
management scheme, "People and Traffic - Now" in late 1971 and 
the incoming Labour Party inherited these proposals by May 1972 
and extended their application.^^
All the above leads to the hypothesis that,
HYPOTHESIS II : The large scale local election swing in favour of 
the Labour Party in the early seventies did not 
result in abnormal frustration to the implementation 
of approved transportation plans.
The statistical evidence for this hypothesis is based on comparing 
the cumulative rate measure of implementation (F*!R) for the years 
up to 1972 with that up to 197**« for towns which changed their 
political allegiance from Conservative to Labour, during the 3 
years 1970 to 1972. In a sample of 23 towns, the Labour Party 
newly aquired the control of l*t towns during that period and 
retained that control until the Local Govern"ent Re-Organisation 
in April 197**. In addition, they had continuous control since the
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publication of the respective 'transport plans, in Gateshead,
St. Helens and Birkenhead. Thus by 1972, Labour control was 
established in 17 out of the 23 towns (7^ percent). This 
percentage rate compares with 6(5 percent Labour control for all 
the county borough councils in England and Wales by 1972/73«
The statistical comparison (see Fig 1102 (Table )) i3 carried out 
using Students' t-test for the paired differences of means of
small samples.
P.T.O
11.12
F I G U R E  l l . o n ( T a b l e )
COMPARISON OK DIFFERENCE OF MEANS OF CUMULATIVE FMR UP TO 1972 WITH 
CUMULATIVE FMR UP TO 1974 FOR TOWNS THAT CHANGED FROM CONSERVATIVE 
CONTROL TO LABOUR CONTROL DURING THE PERIOD 1970-72
TOWS THAT CHANGED TO 
LABOUR DURING THE PERIOD 
1970-72
COL 1.
FMR 
UP TO 
1974 
COL. 2
FMH 
UP TO
1972
COL. 3
d=
C02-C0L 
COL. 4
d2
COL. 5
1. BURY 0.38 0.46 -O.O8 0.0064
2. BOLTON 0.69 0.91 -0.22 0.0484
3. BOOTLE O.3O 0.20 +0.10 0.0100
4. OLDHAM 0.48 O .56 -O.O8 0.0064
5. SUNDERLAND O .19 0.22 -O.O3 0.0009
6. SALFORD 0.22 0.24 -0.02 0.0004
7. TEESIDE 0.22 0.11 +0.11 0.0121
8. COVENTRY O .32 0.29 +O.O3 0.0009
9. LEICESTER O.O8 0.10 -0.02 0.0004
10. LIVERPOOL 0.69 0.77 -O.O8 0.0064
11. MANCHESTER O.3O 0.45 -O.I5 0.0225
12. NOTTINGHAM O.O5 0.06 -0.01 0.0001
13. ROCHDALE O.5I 0.46 +O.O5 0.0025
14. OXFORD 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.0000
T d  = -0.40 ~Z< l2 = 0 .1174
d = 0.40 standard deviation
_ k . = [ 0.1174 - 0.02862)'2=-0.0286 | d f— ^ —  /
= O.OO70
It can be shown that for the above example, the statistic
- kt = d - "d where
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d and a, are the mean and standard deviation of the n (= 1 k  in this d
sample) difference obtained from the n pairs, has Student's t-distribution
The difference of means is not significant at the 5 percent level, 
suggesting that one can accept the "null hypothesis" with 95 percent 
confidence and claim that there is no reason to believe that the rejection 
of urban highway schemes by the Labour party in the early seventies 
significantly affected the overall implementation ratios. Therefore 
one ha3 no basis to make adjustments to the proof of hypothesis I, to 
allow for the "change in values" over time for the local labour parties 
of the early seventies compared with the local labour parties of the mid­
sixties.
However, it is of interest to note that the calculated value of "t" is 
negative and not too small. This value of t compares with a value of 
t = 2.17 for the remaining 9 towns in the 23 town sample (in this case 
tQ = 2.365)» providing further evidence to hypothesis X.
with \>= n-1 degrees of freedom. We wish to test, at a level of 
significance ( )  of 0.05, the hypothesis that,
two-tailed test
I* = population difference of means. Now assuming that = 0,
t = -0.0237 1.18
. A
EFFECT OF POLITICAL PRESSURES ON CHIEF ENGINEER CONTINUITY
Evidence was given in section 11.2 to show that changes in political 
control of the council, resulted in changes to the recommended 
plan. Chief Officers who are committed to the original trans­
portation plan would resist attempts to bring changes to the 
plan. The incoming controlling party, wishing to introduce 
large scale changes to the existing plan may find it expedient 
to pressurise the chief engineer to depart from his position in 
order to appoint a now incumbent who would co-operate. In this 
section, we search for evidence of any pressure that was applied 
on the chief engineer, to vacate his post in this manner.
Grant referring to Nottingham’s "Primary Highway Plan" suggested 
that "the combined effect of the retirement of the City Engineer, 
the result of the Inquiry and the arrival of the uncommitted 
Director of Technical Services meant that the Officers did little 
to protect the transport plan of 1966. ^*l The new Director of 
Technical Services co-operated closely with the 197i-72 
Conservative and the 1972-7** Labour majorities. In the other two 
cities, however, the officers encouraged the members to retain 
the existing road schemes and transport policies."
However, Newton reporting on decision-making in Birmingham noted
25the following words of a Labour Alderman. J "There's always a 
little skirmish of some kind going on, but a clever officer will 
bend in the wind. They're clever diplomats and outright conflict 
on anything the committee decides is important, is extra­
ordinarily rare."
This leads us to the hypothesis that;
HYPOTHESIS III : Changes in the political control of Councils do 
not normally result in departure of chief 
engineers.
The statistical examination ( see Plff 11•03—Table)Of thiC 1 b 
based on a y j " (chi-square) test. The sample contains 72 towns, 
representing 87 percent of all the pre-197** county boroughs.in 
England and Wales. The %  -tost is used on this sample, to show 
that there is no signficant association between the number of times 
the political control of a council changed hands and the number of 
changes to the chief engineer appointments. All the 72 councils in 
the sample had an overall majority during the whole of the period - 
196V65 to 1973/7*1, of this study.
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FiaURE 1 1 . 0 3  ( T a b l e )
x 2  - TEST TO EXAMINE THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CHANGES IN CHIEF ENGINEER 
APPOINTMENTS AN!) CHANGES IN PARTY POLITICAL CONTROL OF COUNTY BOROUGH COUNCILS
H : Changes to chief engineer is not significantly associated with changes o ---
in party political control
H^: chief engineer is significantly associated with changes in party
political control
Level of significance (*C) for testing = 0.05
Degrees of freedom 
Decision criterion^ 20.05
= 2 
- 5.99
"0" PARTY 1 PARTY 2 OR MORE
CHANGE CHANGE PARTY CHANGE
0 : C.E. CHANGE 10 9 34 53
*COCO (11.0) (33.2)
1 OR MORE C.E CHANGE 2 6 11 19
(3.2) (4) (11.8)
12 15 45 72
♦The values in 
brackets are 
the expected 
frequency.
For example;
12 x 53
-------  = 8^8
72 ---
(10 - 8 .8)‘
8.8
(9 - H.0)‘
11.0
(34 - 33.2)'
33.2
( 2 - 3.2 ) 2 +
3.2
+ ( 11 -  11. 8) 2
11.8
* 2.04
X 2 (2 d.f) = 5.99 at %  level, suggesting that there is no significant 0*05
association between changes in chief engineer and changes in party political 
control of county borough councils.
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11.5 CONCLUSION
The success of implementation of long term transportation plans 
is very much dependent on the continued control of the county 
borough council, by the local political party under whose 
authority the plan was prepared. Political continuity in this 
respect (Hypothesis I) was measured as a ratio of the number of 
years the party which published the plan was in power jto the 
total plan period.
I then proceeded to show (Hypothesis II) that no adjustments 
were necessary to the first tost in order to allow for the 
large scale local election swing in favour of the labour party 
that happened in the early 70s. I also showed (Hypothesis III) 
that changes in the political control of councils do not normally 
result in departure of chief officers.
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"At the height of his powers and the summit of his profession ho served 
with great energy and vision as Chief Engineer and Surveyor to the 
West Riding County Council. Those of us who negotiate the Doncaster 
By-pass, spin up and down the Ml south of Leeds, or traverse the
recently opened stretches of the Trans-Pennine motorway .....  are all
making use of transport facilities provided under his direction."
The above words, spoken of Colonel S. Maynard Lovell, C.B.E. by the 
Public Orator when the former received an honorary degree of Doctor of 
Technology from the University of Bradford, are given here to illustrate 
that the successful completion of large scale infrastructure works is 
often regarded by public and professionals alike as the achievement of 
the Chief Engineer to the public authority.
In this chapter we examine the importance of continuity in participation 
of key individuals, in the local authorities' professional group, as a 
determinant of the (level of) implementation of urban transport plans.
12.1 IDENTIFICATION OP KEY INDIVIDUALS
The recommendations contained in transport plans changed 
significantly over the post-war period, for instance, as to the 
need for largo scale road construction as opposed to the need of 
more buses. Depending on the expertise necessary, several renior 
officers from the local authorities' professional group would play 
important roles, at various stages from plan inception to plan 
implementation. In this section, I show that irrespective of the 
period of study, major civil engineering conctruction, particularly 
the provision of highways, accounted for a large part of the 
recommended expenditure. Therefore, the Chief Engineer (and his 
deputy) were well placed to be the key professionals to provide 
the expertise necessary and to ensure the "successful" 
implementation of transport plans.
For the purpose of this chapter, transport plans prepared since 
the war are considered in four distinct phases - Immediate 
post-war period, Pre-Buchanan period, Buchanan period and 
period post-1968.
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12.1.1 Immediate post-war period
In the immediate post-war period road space was provided on the 
general assumption that traffic volumes in the longer term would
Obe about double those which obtained before the war.
Road schemes of short, medium and long term (l-5i 5-20 and 
over 20 years) to meet these limited objectives were planned 
and executed by the Chief e n g in e e r s .  ^ Land-use planning was in 
its infancy and was normally carried out within the engineers'
Ldepartments.
It was recognised that public service vehicles were important 
because most people were completely dependant on them and because 
buses occupied less road space per passenger than did cars. 
However they were run largely as profit-making concerns separate 
from other local authority services. Because, of this and 
because of the limited scale of long-term road plans, integrated 
transport planning was non-existent.
12.1.2 Pre-Buchanan Period
In the post-war period, the growth of vehicle traffic was faster 
than anticipated, with double the pre-war flows being obtained 
by the mid-fifties.^ This unprecedented growth in traffic led 
to the formation of Con urbation Highways Committees in 1958 to 
frame co-ordinated highway plans for South-East Lancashire 
North East Cheshire ('SELNEC'), Merseyside, Tyneside and the 
West Midlands.^ Being Committees dealing with highway pro­
visions, the local authorities were represented by their 
respective chief engineers. The Minis’try of Transport was 
represented by the Divisional Road Engineer. The working parties 
consisted of the more senior staff from these engineers' 
departments.?
The Reports of the Conurbation Committees were published in the 
early sixties, a large proportion of the schemes were entered in 
the Ministry's Preparation List and the construction of large 
scale urban motorways began in earnest by the mid-jixties.8
In the representative sample of 23 studies given in Table
of this thesis, the SELNEC Highway Plan represents this group of
studies.
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12.1.3 Buchanan period
The studies published during this period were based on the 
advice given in Traffic in Towns (Buchanan R e p o rt).9
The Buchanan report, published in 1963, redefined the concept of 
the environmental area and that of the hierarchy of distributor 
highways - the primary distributor, the district distributor and 
the local distributor.10
Circular No. 1/64, issued jointly by the Ministry of Transport 
and the Ministry of Local Government, recommended the Buchanan 
Report to the local autho r i t i e s . I t recommended an integrated 
approach to land-use and transport planning. Land use/ 
transportation studies for London, the conurbations and the 
larger free-standing towns were approved by the Government on a 
cost-sharing basis with the local authorities. The following 
extract from the Circular is of relevance.
"Urban land-use and urban transport requirements must be con­
sidered as a single subject. The integration of policies 
covering land-use, housing, highways, traffic and transport is
therefore of fundamental importance ........ Traffic on the
scale now forseen can only be handled safely and efficiently if 
the longer (term) traffic flows are canalised on to a system of 
roads - the primary road network - where traffic needs take
precedence ...... In the longer term, authorities should aim to
develop plans for a complete primary road network, using the
technique of the land-use/transport survey ......  A properly
thought-out primary road network will form the essential basis 
of an urban development plan."
Studies prepared'during this period form the bulk of the sample 
(see Figure 5.06 ) used for analysis, in this thesis.
Merseyside Area Land-Use Transportation Study (MALTS) is the one 
in this sample which considered land-use factors in greater 
detail than did the other studies. Therefore MALTS is used below 
as an example when considering the relative levels of partici­
pation of the land-use planners and the engineers in the study 
process and in the subsequent implementation of the transport 
plans prepared during the Buchanan period.
12.04
The role of tho planner; The opportunity for planners to 
influence the recommendations contained in a land use - 
transportation study will be greatest, when there is substantial 
land-use change, for instance due to abnormal population growth, 
within the study area.
In Merseyside, they anticipated the 1966 population of 1.4 
million within the study area to grow by a further 400,000 by 
1 9 9 1 . A  pilot land use-transport study was undertaken to choose 
from 6 alternatives, a land-use plan for the main study. From 
then on, the main study continued essentially as a traditional 
transportation study, suggesting that the rest of the land-use 
input needed was only of a general nature. In the early stages 
of the study, there is insufficient opportunity for the planners 
to influence the final recommendations.
Referring to the various land-use inputs, the MALTS team stated that 
"more than four-fifths of the road construction and improvements 
would ’ >3 required b y  all plans. This reflects the fact that,
though substantial, the transportation problems created by the 
additional 400,000 people would be relatively small compared with 
those of the other 1.4 million."
It is also worth noting that the professional study personnel 
in the MALTS team consisted of l4 engineers, 5 planners, 2 public 
transport specialists and 8 others and that the Chairman of tho 
technical committee was the Liverpool City Engineer.15
The role of the engineer: The provision of highways, accounts for 
most of the recommendations contained in land-use/transportation 
studies. For instance MALTS recommends a capital expenditure of 
£287 million on highway construction, £21 million for parking 
and traffic management, £8 million for the provision of buses and 
£12.5 million for the improvement of urban railway network.
The greatest influence on what alternative highway networks are 
considered feasible and should be tested and finally what goes 
into the plan will be that of the Engineer.
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The publication of the land^use/transportation plan is the 
initial step of a network of activities involving a further 5 to 
8 years or more of preparatory work necessary before the 
execution of schemes recommended by the plan can begin.1? In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that of the 23 transportation 
studies sponsored by the various county boroughs and contained 
in my sample, those relating to Bath, Oxford and 
Leicester had the least preparatory work completed before most 
of the recommendations contained in these plans were abandoned.
The plans for Oxford and Bath were prepared by consultants with
1ftminimum participation by the respective city engineers. °
None of the schemes recommended in these two plans reached the 
Ministry's preparation list.
In Leicester, the design works for the Central Ring Road, the only 
scheme to reach the preparation list was completed by the 
Engineer, before the commencement of the study for Leicester 
Traffic Plan 1965. This latter study was prepared by the City 
Planning Officer, with minimum participation by the Engineer.
None of the other schemes recommended in the Leicester Traffic 
Plan reached the stage in their scheme preparation, required for 
inclusion in the list.
I do not wish to imply by giving these examples that the engineers 
resisted the implementation of those plans in which they did not 
play a key role. Indeed, the plans for Bath and Leicester were 
two of the most expensive recommendations made for cities of 
their respective sizes and therefore promised a prominent role 
for the Engineers' Department.
12.1.4 Post-1988 period
The Transport Act 1968, the Town and County Planning Acts 1968 
and 197i, the Local Government Act 1972 and the Department of
the Environment Memorandum 73/104 are the main pieces of
• • 20legislation affecting transport planning during this period.
The Transport Act introduced three important measures relating to 
urban transport planning. Firstly, it created the Passenger 
Transport Authorities (PTA) in an attempt to co-ordinate road 
and public transport operations in the conurbations. Secondly, 
it eliminated the financial bias against public transport capital
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expenditure by treating it on a par with highway expenditures for 
Exchequer grants. Thirdly, it increased the planning powers given 
to local authorities to use traffic management measures as part 
of a comprehensive local transport policy.^ 1 The first two 
measures would have had the effect of increasing the influence 
of the public transport planner in the preparation of urban 
transport plans. This effect will be examined in the next section. 
The third measure could hove affected the final recommendations 
of urban transport plans and their implementation, for instance 
by delaying the construction of a major highway in preference 
to implementing an area traffic control scheme. The effect of 
this measure was shown (see Chapter 9) to be insignificant.
The Town and Country Planning Act 1968 provided that in the longer 
term, comprehensive transport plans should dovetail into structure 
plans. In this respect one needs to examine the effect of any 
increased part played by the land use planners, in determining 
the form and content of transport plans produced after 1968.
The Local Government Act 1972 gave effect to the Local Government 
Re-Organisation in 1974 and the consequent transfer of the bulk 
of the transport planning powers from the former county borough 
authorities to the new county councils. Together with this, the 
Department of the Environment Circular 104/731 introduced the 
Transport Policies and Programmes (TPP) system. We need to 
consider, the effects of-these post-1974 legislative changes, 
only insofar as they affect the applicability of the results of 
this research. This study of applicability will be considered 
in Chapter 15. In the rest of the sub-section, I will examine 
the role played by public transport planners and land use 
planners only during the period 1968 to 1974.
The role of the public transport planner: The important studies 
in this respect are those relating to the conurbations which were 
published after the enactment of Transport Act 1968. In our 
sample given in Figure ?'06(these studies are represented by the 
Merseyside Area Land Use Transportation Study and the Tyne Wear 
Plan.
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Figure 12.01 (Tab) is a summary of financial considerations for 
alternative transport concepts used in MALTS.22
FIG 12.01 (TAFJLE)
FINANCIAL DETAILS OF ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORT CONCEPTS USED IN HALTS
LEVEL OF CAR USAGE LOW INTER HIGH RECOMhENUED
TRANSPORTATION CAPITAL 
COSTS: £ MILLION
(i) Highway capital 162.5 237.5 377.5 291.9
(ii) Car parking 
facilities 9.8 16.0 33.4 16.2
(iii) Public transport 
capital costs - 
buses 8.6 5*5 1.3' 8.0
(iv) Public transport 
capital costs - 
railways 18.4
,27.0
11.9 2 A j
>3.7
12.5
TOTAL 199-3 270.9 414.6 328.6
The public transport capital cost varies between £3.7 million, when the 
level of car usage to be provided for is high and £27.0 million, when the 
level of car usage is low. These variations in public transport costs are 
substantial in real terms. However, the effect of these variations on 
highway capital finance availability is relatively small. For instance, 
the above variations in public transport expenditure represent between 1.1 
percent and 8.9 percent of the recommended total expenditure, the balance 
representing that to provide highways. Also it is worth noting that the 
highway expenditure in the plan was determined independent of public transport 
provisions the former being largely based .on capital finance availability as 
indicated by the Ministry of Transport, the unfulfilled transport needs 
being provided for by public transport.
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Two transport alternatives were tested in the case of Tyne 
p3Wear Plan. Alternative I allowed for 23 percent of a total 
transport capital expenditure of nearly £210 million to be spent 
on public transport infrastructure and the balance on highway 
provisions. Alternative II allowed for 11 percent to be spent on 
public transport works. In effect, the level of public transport 
infrastructure provision could have made a difference of only 
16 percent in the highway expenditure. However, it should be 
noted, that additional funds were promised by the Ministry of 
Transport in the case of this study to provide for a higher level 
of public transport.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the enactment of 
Transport Act 1968 did not substantially alter the role played by 
the Engineer in determining the contents of land use-transport 
studies.
The role of the land use-planner: The introduction of the new 
development plan system (Structure and Local Plans) has not 
substantially affected the dominant role of the Engineer in deter­
mining the provision of transport facilities. It is noteworthy 
that neither the Department of the Environment's approval of the 
Structure Plan nor the subsequent preparation of a Local Plan on 
the basis of the approved Structure Plan convey approval of any 
transport plans contained therein. In particular, they do not 
commit the Department of the Environment or any other Government 
department to the payment of grant on any particular project or 
to the amount or timing of any capital expenditure programme.
In practice transport, especially the provision of major highways, 
is largely determined outside the Structure Plan process. For 
instance, in 1972, the Town and Country Planning Association, in 
its evidence to the DOE/Home Office Expenditure Committee (sub­
committee on Urban Transportation Planning) stated that:
"For too long Britain has allowed transportation to dominate 
urban planning discussions."25
1 2 .0 9
The Surveyor elaborating on this Report, stated:
"Put baldly the operation (land use/transport planning in 
Britain) might bo expressed os measurement of present road and 
rail traffic; assumption of a relatively unchanging pattern of 
life; projection of traffic and population growths to some 
orbitYa*y date; design of transport facilities to carry the 
estimated loads (and the) creation of further key developments 
on land which lies around major interchanges. In short, town 
planning is based on transportation, itself based on the belief
that city life will not change its pattern.....  Well, it
certainly will not, if the existing shape of developments is 
held in place by major construction like London's or Glasgow's 
urban motorways - some built, some proposed ......"
The role of the other professionals: The Clerk and the Treasurer 
are the important professionals in this respect. It would 
suffice to say that the Liverpool City Treasurer and the Clerk 
were admitted as observers in the MALTS technical committee while 
minimum professional assistance was requested from their depart­
ments.*^
12.2 CONTINUITY OF ENGINEER PARTICIPATION AS A DETERMINANT OF 
IMPLEMENTATION
It was said earlier in this chapter that the publication 
of the landuse-transportation study is the initial 
step, for the construction of a network of transport capital 
schemes. Each of these schemes has to complete a network of 
preconstruction activities involving some 5 to 8 years of pre­
paratory work. The bulk of this work demands continued professional 
involvement of the engineer and of his staff. In this section we 
examine the significance of continuous participation of the chief 
engineer and of his staff to the "successful" implementation of a 
transport plan.
12.2.1 Technical staff continuity : Hypothesis I
The detailed design and the preparation of contract documents for 
the recommended schemes involve the interpretation of a large 
amount of data which would be partly new and would partly have been 
collected and processed for the transportation study. The later 
data, would invariably need updating.
12.10
An efficient use of personnel to process and interpret, the above 
information would be the continued employment of the staff who 
completed the study. In this respect Solesbury and Townsend 
noted that:
"In most studies, there has been a common continuity problem with 
staff. In Teeside as in several other areas the consultants 
retain a continuing brief for detailed work but there has been 
little transfer of staff from the consultants to the new County 
Borough."27 However, with respect to MALTS, the consultants 
recommended that,
"Consideration be given to the establishment of a service centre 
which could provide conurbation-wide information to the respective 
authorities ........ In staffing MALTS, considerable importance
was placed on the need to provide a continuity of experience and 
knowledge through seconded staff. This staff could now provide
nOthe nucleus for the "service centre".“10
The following hypothesis in relation to the need for staff 
continuity to "successfully implement" plans prepared by consultants 
will be tested in the rest of this sub-section.
HYPOTHESIS I: Continuity of employment of technical staff when 
plans were prepared by consultants did not 
significantly affect the implementation of 
transport plans.
The testing (See Figure 12.04) of this hypothesis is based on a 
sample of 23 towns. This sample is divided into two groups, one 
representing 11 towns whose studies were prepared by consultants 
(having therefore no staff continuity) and the other repre- . 
senting 12 towns with in-house studies. A statistical t-test 
to compare the difference of means of small samples is used to 
show that at a 5 percent level of significance, there is no 
difference in the mean values of the rate measure of implementation 
(FMR) for the two groups of towns.
12.11 FIGURE 12.02 (Table)
SIGNIFICANCE TEST ON CONTINUITY OF EMPLOYMENT OK STAFF AND DATA
TOWNS WITH STUDIES 
CONSULTANTS
BY FMR] UP 
TO 1974
TOWNS WITH "IN HOUSE" 
STUDIES
FMR2 UP 
TO 1974
HALTS SELNEC HIGHWAY PLAN
1. Liverpool O .69 1. Oldham 0.48
2. Bootle 0.30 2. Manchester 0.30
3. Birkenhead 0.66 3. Bolton O .69
4. Wallasey 0 .5 1 4. Salford 0.22
5. TYNE WEAR PLAN 5. Rochdale 0.51
5. Tynemouth 0.37 6. Bury 0.38
6. Sunderland 0.19 FREE STANDING TOW STUDIES
7. Gateshead 0.24 7. St Helens 0.42
8. Newcastle 0.22 8. Southampton 0.35
FREE STANDING TOWN STUDIES 9. Leicester 0.08
9. Bath 0.01 10. Coventry 0.32
10. Oxford 0.01 11. Portsmouth O .50
11. Middlesborough 0.22 12. Nottingham 0.05
Comparison of Means of Small Samples by t-tcst 
(i) Comparison of Variances:
To compare the means of small samples using the t-test, one must first 
show that the two populations from which the samples ore drawn have the 
same (unknown) standard deviation. So one first estimates population 
variances from the respective sample variances and compares them using 
the F-test as shown below.
Level of significance (^) for testing = 0.05
Hc * ¿i* = >
. ^  ■>- , ^  ) two-tailed testHi • O, jz j
. Where <5^ *" = population variance of FMK^
= population variance of FMR2 
From the above values of FMR,
Consultants' 
Studies:1
"In-House" 
Studies:2
X Sample mean of FMR 0.331 0.358
n Number of towns in sample 11 12
Estimate of population variance 0.053 0.034
>> Number of degrees of freedom 10 11
Sample Variance 0.048 ' 0.031
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Figure 12.02 (continued)
Fisher's F =
A 0.053
0.03 4
1.56
F (10,11) = 3.53 (at 5 percent level of significance)
0.975
Hence F is not significant at the 5 percent level.
We accept H and can proceed to use the t-test for the difference
° x-2 .of means. The best estimate of 0 is
1.
$
(O.O40 x 11) + (0.031 x 12)
21
= 0.043
(ii) Comparison of means: 
We can now test
H
where
Take
1*1 ' K
Hi * (• 1 <it*a
population mean 
0.05
two-tailed test
f -
5  0 .3 111 i _______ 0.358 = - 0.5'*
z  / _!— 1— i- 10.043 + 0.
n, "x ----- _
V 11 1
*0.975 With 21 d*f
043 
2 
2.O8O
Hence the difference in means is not significant at the 0.05 
level meaning that towns with studies by consultants did not 
have a significantly lower rate measure of implementation 
(FMR) than those with in-house studies.
C h ie f  e n g in e e r  c o n t i n u i t y  : H y p o th e s is  I I
Success in expensive and complicated negotiations(with several 
parties persuing conflicting interest^ over the construction of 
engineering schemes having long gestations, normally demand the 
personal attention of the chief engineer or his deputy.
These negotiations continue in stretches, over the whole of the 
gestation period and afterwards. The important parties in this 
respect are the local authority politicians, especially the 
chairman of the highways committee, the Divisional Road Engineer 
of the Department of Transport - the local link for Exchequer 
grant assistance and the chief engineers of other public bodies.^9
The MALTS team, referring to the organisation necessary for the 
successful implementation of their study noted that
"In terms of line management, it would be appropriate for the 
service unit to be responsible to the Chairman of the Technical 
Committee (Liverpool City Engineer), the continuation of which is 
imperative if the policy pl-n is to be implemented effectively."30
Grant, in his case study of Transportation Policy Formulation in 
Three U.K. County Boroughs stated that,
"keyindividuals in technical groups will play a significant 
role in the policy process. Changes in key individuals may result 
in policy changes."-*1
The principal evidence given by Grant in respect of "changes to 
key individuals resulting in policy changes" is limited to only 2 
examples, one in Southampton and the other in Nottingham. In 
Southampton, the 1964 plan was abandoned soon after the City 
Engineer died. In Nottingham, the 1966 plan was rejected after 
the retirement of the City Engineer in 1970. However, it should 
also be noted, that elsewhere in his works, Grant suggests that the 
plans were rejected because the cities were unable to justify them 
to the Central Government.32 with respect to the Southampton 
Plan, he states that
"the scheme was estimated to cost £60 million at 1965 prices 
and the Ministry of Transport considered th'>t. such a sum was 
unlikely to be made available to the City".
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With respect to Nottingham, "the Deputy (City Engineer) and the 
City Planning Officer wore unable to justify the City' 3 case 
against the combined efforts of the Civic Society, the Chamber 
of Commerce, St. Anns Tenants and Hate payers Association and 
A.E. Telling ...... They (the Deputy City Engineer and the
City Planning Officer) were unable to convince the Inspector of 
their case and the application was rejected."33
It should also be noted that my analysis of the careers
of 72 county borough engineers and their deputies
over a decade beginning in 1964, show that 53 (74 percent) of
these posts were continuously occupied by one man or his deputy
replacing him in succession.34 Despite this high degree of
continuity of chief officers, the rate measure of implementation
of plans has boon low. This leads us to tost
HYPOTHESIS II ; The chief engineers departure from his post,
premature to the implementation of transportation 
plans is a significant reason for the lower 
implementation of plans
The test (see Fig 1303,T) of this hypothesis is based on a 
sample of 20 towns, (3 towns - Oxford, Bath and Leicester, were 
rejected~due to the questionable level of engineer participation 
in the study process).
Of these 20 towns, 6 had changes in chief engineer, the replace­
ment being brought from outside, 5 towns did not have a change in 
chief engineer after the commencement of the study and 10 county 
boroughs promoted the deputy on the departure of their chief 
engineer. There was no evidence to suggest, that in any of the 
last ten towns, the deputy attempted to make large scale changes 
to a published plan following his promotion. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this analysis, we are justified in assuming that the 
promotion of the deputy on the departure of the chief engineer 
did not affect the "chief engineer continuity" (CECON) necessary 
for the "satisfactory" implementation of the plan.
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CECON for the analysis is defined as,
CECON = OF, 4 DCE where 
PLANYUS
CE = NUMBER OF YEARS THE CHIEF ENGINEER CONTINUED TO STAY
AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF TRANSPORT PLAN UP TO APRIL 197'*
DCF. = NUMBER OF YEARS THE DEPUTY CHIEF ENGINEER AT THE TIME
OF PLAN PUBLICATION, AFTER PROMOTION TO REPLACE HIS CHIEF, 
CONTINUED TO STAY AS CHIEF ENGINEER, AGAIN COUNTING UP TO 
APRIL 197'*
PLANYRS = NUMBER OF YEARS SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF THE PLAN TO
APRIL 1974
l
In Figure 12.03 the 20 towns are divided into 2 samples, one 
set of 14 towns with CECON = 1 and a second set of 6 towns with 
CECON 1. A statistical t-test to compare the difference of 
means of small samples is used for significance testing.
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F I G U R E  1 2 . 0 3 ( T a b l e )
SIGNIFICANCE TEST ON CHIEF ENGINEER CONTINUITY
TOWNS WITH CONTINUOUS 
ENGINEER PARTICIPATION
FMR1
UP TO 1974
TOWNS WHERE THE ENGINEER 
WHO PUBLISHED THE STUDY 
DEPARTED BEFORE 1973/74
f m r2
UP TO 1974
1. Liverpool 0.69 1. Bootle O.3O
2. Birkenhead 0.66 2. Gateshead 0.24
3. Wallasey O .5 1 3. Newcastle 0.22
4. Tynemouth 0.37 4. Middlesbrough 0.22
5. Sunderland O .19 5. Bury O .38
6. Portsmouth 0.50 6. Nottingham O .05
7. Oldham 0.48
8. Manchester 0.30
9. Bolton 0.69
10. Salford 0.22
11. Rochdale O .5 1
12. St. Helens 0.42
13. Southampton 0.35
14. Coventry 0.32
*
Comparison of means of small samples by t-test 
(i) Comparison of Variances:
To compare the means of small samples using the t-test, one must first 
show that the two populations from which the samples are drawn have the 
same (unknown) standard deviation. So one first estimates population 
variances from the respective sample variances and compares them using the 
F-.test as shown below
Level of significance ( ) for testing = 0.05
H o  :  ~ <j *i . )
H, ) two-tailed test
)
Where < 4 x’I = population variance of FMR with continous engineer participation
Population variance of FMR for studies with premature 
departure of engineer
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F I G U R E  1 2 . 0 3  ( T a b l e ) : C T D
continuous
participation
1
premature
departure
2
•x. sample mean of FMR 0.441 0.235
n no. of towns in sample 14 6
0.012c r estimate of population variance 0.027
number of degrees of freedom 13 5
z
< f sample variance O .025 0.010
*2.
Fisher's F = = 0.027 = 2.25g 0.012
F0.975(13’5) = 6.49
Hence F is not significant at 5 percent level, the variances are acceptably
similar. We accept H 0 and can proceed to use the t-test for the
2 ,difference of means. The best estimate o f i s ,
2
/ C  = (0.025 X 14) + (0.010 X 6)—
= 0.023
(ii) Comparison of means 
We can now test_ 
Main hypothesis
Null hypothesis 8 h t -* y
2
2
)
| Two tailed test 
)
Where p = population mean
For our sample • - X  0.441 - 0.235 “■ < 1 2
\ - ________  - _ _ _ _ _  ; ■£.•76
r r  ~  /0.023 + Q.Q23
o  ^ n~2 n22 y 14 5
At 5% level of significance tQ ^ with 18 d.f = 2.101
The difference of means is significant at the 5 percent level suggesting
that one can reject, with 95 percent confidence, the "null hypothesis"
11 and claim that there is a significant relationship between the pre- o —
mature departure of the engineer and the under-implementation of
transportation plans. However this result is not conclusive for two
reasons. Firstly, the same claim cannot be supported with 99 percent
level of confidence, when t- with 18 d.f = 2.878. Secondly, if0.995
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Oxford, Bath and Leicester studies with questionable engineer 
participation were also included in the last sample for comparing 
the means, then t = 1.73. This value of t compares with a value of 
t with 21 d.f = 2.08 (95 percent level of confidence) throwing
0.975
some doubt on a significant relationship between chief engineer 
continuity and "successful" plan implementation.
PTO
CONCLUSION
The chief engineer to the authority is the key professional 
in relation to the successful implementation of transportation 
plans, prepared either "in-house" or by consultants. The 
implementation of plans is not significantly lower when carried 
out by consultants than "in-house".
The chief engineers occupied their posts over long periods and 
in the event of their departure, the deputy chief engineers 
vfere normally promoted to fill the vacancies.
The premature departure of the chief engineers, followed by a 
replacement from outside, in about 30 percent of the towns 
proved to be of some importance in explaining the low 
implementation of transportation plan. Although the evidence 
did not provide conclusive results, the statistical test values 
justify the inclusion of the variable, CECON, in the multiple 
regression analysis to be carried out in Chapter 14.
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"Two parks at either end of the East Wyke Farm relief road - Hinkscy 
Park and South Park - set two of the major problems in planning the 
(Oxford Southern Kelief) route. Another is, that it would cross the 
University Rugby ground.
At the Western end, the Consultants (to the Oxford Central Area Study s 
1968) considered three lines - through Hinksey Park or through the 
housing to its north or south.
To take it through would mean destroying the park as a social amenity.
The line through Grandpont, they say, seems reasonable, the housing 
affected being undistinguished and is likely to be redeveloped on a 
large scale."
1
- OXFORD ROADS 1968: SUPPLEMENT TO TIE OXFORD MAIL, 4TU DECEMBER 1968
"It is stated (by the Consultants) that the exact location (of the Oxford 
Southern Relief Road) depends on the relative weights to be placed upon 
the amenities of the (Minksey) park against loss of housing.
The Association ask what is this relative weight? The consultants have made 
no assessment of the weighting to be given to housing or amenities in South 
Oxford and the Association do not want this community and the houses 
destroyed by either the construction of the road or the noise and fumes
of the motorway ....  The area shown in the (Oxford Central Area) Study
which is believed to be that with a maximum need for quiet is mainly the 
University area, whereas those considered to have the minimum need for 
quiet are the predominantly residential areas. This shows an apparent 
lack of sensitivity for people's needs and it is questioned whether the 
consultants conducted social surveys in South Oxford to find out people's 
attitude to noise and the proposal of having a motorway in their midst.
It is believed they used a computer .....  the Association submits that
insufficient attention has been paid to the impact of the 2 ground level 
spur roads on the physical characteristics of the area. It seems 
that the area of South Oxford will be split into 3 pieces by the spurs 
and it is thought that this will have a detrimental effect on the 
community, because of the physical barriers raised to human contacts." 2
- SOUTH OXFORD COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION (OBJECTOR) AT THE PUBLIC ENQUIRY 
INTO OXFORD CENTRAL AREA ROAD PLANS : NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1970
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"Thin objection does not seek to demonstrate that there is no need for 
these two spur roads, although it would appear that by implication, the
need is challenged .......  It is agreed that the construction of the spur
roads would have a serious effect on traffic in the area and-in the safety
of people living in the area, particularly the children .....  It is not
suggested by the Objector that the line of the proposed East Wyke Farm
Hoad should be amended at this point .....  The conclusion on this
objection is that it has not demonstrated that these spur roads are
unnecessary to solve the Oxford traffic problem .....  I recommend that
no modification (to the Oxford Central Area Road Plan) be made to meet 
this objection."
- INSPECTOR'S RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE3:
PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO OXFORD CENTRAL AREA ROAD PLANS: NOV/DEC 1970
The three statements above are given here to highlight respectively the 
views of the professionals concerned with the planning of motorways in 
urban areas, the response of the affected community and the equity 
available to the affected community in the public inquiry procedures.
In this chapter, I describe the means by which local pressure groups 
safeguarded their interests, when threatened by road proposals and the 
extent to which their opposition to the proposals led to the under­
implementation of-the plans. In discussing, I will concentrate on the 
significance of local group activities that took place after the 
publication of the plans. This is because pressure group activities do 
not begin in earnest until after this event.^’5
In the next section, I will continue to analyse the pressure group 
activities that emerged from the Oxford Development Plan Review (1971)« 
in order to illustrate the operation of such acitivities in practice.
The Oxford Development Plan Review is one of the very few which was 
contested by a wide range of community groups,6 which attracted 
international attention? and on which the final decision was taken at 
Cabinet level.
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Oxford is not typical of cities in England. It is an internationally 
famous university city, one of the centres of British motor industry, 
a county town and a regional centre. Plowden has stated that,
"Of all the British town planning disputes, that of Oxford is the 
most famous, protracted and emotionally charged."8
Therefore the pressure-group activities that ensued these proposals can 
be looked upon as providing a magnified view of similar activities in 
other towns. The following points are worth noting from this case- 
study.
Firstly, that for an objection to be successful one must argue against 
the viability of the proposal rather than on illustrating the losses 
suffered by the affected party. Cause-groups and self-interest groups 
belonging to higher socio-economic category (who employed professional 
assistance) adopted this approach successfully. Secondly, that the 
more influential groups can bring pressure to bear on the Minister and 
ultimately on the Cabinet who in that order has the power to over-rule the 
inspectors. Thirdly, that even fairly moderate changes resulting from 
objections can result in serious delays and even to subsequent rejection 
of a major plan.
1 3 .1  CITY OF OXFORD DEVELOPl'ENT PLAN ; PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT 1970
The public inquiries into the proposals for the construction of 
urban motorways in Oxford central area lasted for a period of 36
Q
working days, during the latter half of 1970* Fifty one 
objections to the scheme were heard during this period, of which 
39 represented individuals or public bodies directly 
affected - ("self-interest groups"). "Cause groups" repre­
sented at the Inquiry were the Oxford Civic Society, the 
* Oxford Preservation Trust, the Victorian Society, the Oxford
Consumer Group, Oxford City Labour Party, Oxford City Liberal 
Association and the Oxford Architectural and Historical Society.
The contention of the cause groups, who generally objected to the 
scheme as a whole, was that the scale of the proposal was too 
large; that the roads and the car parking structures would 
adversely affect the appearance of the City and that a better 
and less expensive road solution incorporating more public 
transport was possible. ...
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Major modifications were won from the Inspector, by Dr. Thomas .Sharp,
(a former consultant to the City Council and a proponent of the road 
through the Christ Church Meadow), partly acting on his private capacity 
and partly representing the Ifflcy Hoad Traders' and Residents 
Association. He argued amongst other things that,
(i) the proposed relief road did not provide a total solution to the 
problem, that the implementation of park and ride should be carefully 
investigated and that the greatest effort must be made to secure that 
public transport plays a greater role in Oxford.
(ii) no advantage was gained by the proposed large scale scheme, 
whereas by omitting the extensions to the outer by-passes and introducing 
restraint, thereby reducing the need for such large scale car parking 
provision, there would be a saving of some £10 million out of the 
proposed £31 million. At the same time the impact of the proposed spine 
road and car parking complexes could be reduced.
(iii) Christ Church Meadow cannot be regarded as having outstanding 
landscape value. Its special quality lies in the peace and quietness of 
the Broadwalk which could be safeguarded by planting on the northern side 
of the proposed road.
However, the then Secretary of State, Mr. Walker, over-ruled his 
inspector's accommodation for a Meadow Road. Though he accepted the other 
recommendations in the Inspector's Report, Mr. Walker stated that he did 
not attach the same value or weighting as the Inspector had, to the various 
factors involved, and accordingly confirmed the Council's original proposal 
for the East Wyke Farm Route to the South of the Meadow.
The rejection of his inspector's recommendation for the Meadow 
Road by Mr. Walker, was widely believed in the City to be due to the 
lobbying of the Central Government by the University.10
The other modifications to the plan by the Secretary of State, 
although they were accepted by the Council, resulted in design changes and 
consequent delays to its implementation. The delays subsequently lead to 
the rejection of the plan by the City Council, when the latter changed hands 
to the Labour Party.
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Other objectors who received major concessions at the inquiry, 
included the University, its colleges and other educational 
institutions, an architect acting on his private capacity and 
the residents of North Oxford. The latter group, comprised of a 
powerful body of professional and managerial workers. They were 
able to argue against the extension of the Spine Hoad to the 
Northern boundary of the City.
Most of the damaging features of the plan were however 
contained within the Southern half of the City. The households 
affected in this area largely belonged to industrial workers of 
the lower socio-economic groups. They were unable to present 
alternative solutions to the proposals and were therefore 
markedly unsuccessful in convincing the Inspector of their case.
In the next section, the above case study will be used for an 
initial selection of indicators for the effectiveness of pressure 
group activities.
13.2 INDICATORS FOR TUB EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESSURE GROUP ACTIVITIES
We ore interested in measuring the effectiveness of local pressure 
groups in determining the implementation of urban transportation 
plans. The existing literature does not contain any satisfactory 
direct measures for this puipose.11 The Oxford study given above 
suggested three surrogate variables - spatial intensity of 
listed buildings, distribution of socio-economic groups and the 
scale of the proposed transport network. These variables will 
now be examined in turn regarding their applicability to other 
studies and further developed, where applicable, as quantitative 
surrogate measures for the effectiveness of local pressure groups.
13.2.1 Measure of spatial intensity of listed buildings
I estimate, based on information updated to 1978 that there are 
1000 buildings in Oxford, 612 in Bath and 258 in Southampton which 
are listed by the Department of the Environment as buildings of 
historic or architectural importance.12 a measure of the 
intensity of listed building per unit area could give an 
indication of the probability of road proposals disturbing 
historic buildings and the willingness of local amenity societies 
to contest such proposals. However a closer examination of route- 
location techniques used for a number of road proposals showed 
that a seiving process was normally used to prevent road proposals
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disturbing the "historic core" of the city and other "hard 
areas".1-* Therefore this measure appeared unsatisfactory for 
further development.
13.2.2 Socio-economic distribution measure : Hypothesis I
The socio-economic group tables in the Ward Library of the 
1966 Ten Percent Sample Census of England and Vales were 
used to obtain the socio-economic group (SEG) data for this 
analysis.l/> The seventeen socio-economic groups recognised 
in this Census were amalgamated into seven groups for the 
purposes of the standard tabulation in the Ward Library and 
arc reproduced below.
TABLE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS: 1966 CENSUS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
1966 CENSUS 
SEG
WARD
LIBRARY SEG OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD
3, 4 I PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
2, 13 II EMPLOYERS AND MANAGERS IN CENTRAL 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, 
COMMERCE, ETC. INCLUDING FARMERS
8,
14
9, 12, III FOREMAN AND SUPERVISORS (MANUAL), 
SKILLED MANUAL WORKERS, OWN ACCOUNT 
WORKERS (OTHER THAN PROFESSIONAL) - 
THIS INCLUDES OWN ACCOUNT FARMERS 
WITH NO EMPLOYEES
5, 6 IV INTERMEDIATE NON-MANUAL WORKERS AND 
JUNIOR NON-MANUAL WORKERS
7,
15
10, V PERSONAL SERVICE WORKERS, SEMI­
SKILLED WORKERS AND AGRICULTURAL 
WORKERS
11 VI UNSKILLED MANUAL WORKERS
16, *7 VII MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND 
PERSONS WHOSE OCCUPATIONS WAS 
INADEQUATELY DESCRIBED
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In this table the professional and managerial workers who suffered-least 
from road proposals and gained most concessions through pressure group 
activities, belong to SEG 1 and SEG II. Those who suffered the most 
from the location of new roads belonged to SEG V and SEG VI.
Dwellings belonging to these latter groups were an easy prey to road 
construction proposals, as explained below.
The urban roads are generally planned to be located in areas that are 
ripe for re-development or along the lines of crocks in existing 
communities. The Minister of Transport, referring to areas ripe for 
re-development, recommended in the sixties that,
"An important function of the new type of urban plan .....  would be the
identification of action areas; that is to say, of those areas where 
large scale activity would be concentrated in the next ten years and 
which would therefore need to be planned comprehensively and in detail.15 
This process would help in establishing the relationship between the re­
development and the need for highway works and would offer a useful 
tool in brining about a closer relationship between the programming of 
urban road schemes and the phasing of urban re-development. In the meantime, 
the Ministry is taking increasing account of re-development factors in 
determining the road schemes in the road programme."
The Urban Motorways Project Team confirmed that the location of urban 
roads in re-development areas was a widespread practice in the early 
seventies. Householders in these areas belong mainly to the lower 
socio-economic groups. It is shown in Fij I301 (Title), that the fraction of 
unskilled manual workers and semi-skilled workers, living within the 
locality of planned urban roads, in a sample of 13 towns is significantly 
higher than the average fraction of this class of workers within those 
towns.
Furthermore, the lower socio-economic groups were least able to 
safeguard their interests, in the public inquiry procedures.
FIGURE 13.01 (Table)
COMPARISON OF THE FRACTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BELONGING TO SEG (V AND VI) (UNSKILLED 
MANUAL WORKERS AND SEMI-SKILLED WORKERS) IN WARDS CONTAINING PROPOSED MAJOR 
ROAD CONSTRUCTION VS THE FRACTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BELONGING TO SEG(V AND VI) FOR 
THE WHOLE TOWN
This analysis is based on comparino the paired differences of "PLANSEGFRAC 
(V + VI)" and "TOWNSEGFRAC (V + VI)" for the sample towns
"PLAN SEGFRAC (V +VI)" for a town is defined by, PLANSEGFRAC (V + VI)
All Wards
£ ( SEGFRAC(WARD)x COST OF RECOMMENDED SCHEME UP TO 1973/7'* IN WARD)
All Wards
£ ( COST OF RECOMMENDED SCHEME FROM FIRST YEAR OF PLAN TO 1973/7'*IN WARD)
Where,
SEGFRAC, , = NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS IN WARD BELONGING TO SEG (V + VI)(W ARD) ________ ___  -   -   - . . . .----- -
NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS IN WARD BELONGING TO SEG (I TO VI)
" TOWN SEGFRAC (V + VI)" FOR A TOWN IS DEFINED BY 
TOWNSEGFRAC (V + VI) = NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS IN TOWN BELONGING TO SEG (V + VI)
NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS IN TOWN BELONGING TO SEG (I TO VI)
THE respective values of "PLANSEGFRAC (V + VI)",
"TOWNSEGFRAC (V + VI)" and the paired difference
d = ( PLANSEGFRAC (V + VI) - TOWNSEGFRAC (V + VI) )
are given below. We wish to test the hypothesis
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case) differences, AGAINST the Students "t" value with V = n-1 degrees
of freedom, at the chosen level of significance. H is assumed to be* d
zero i.e.; assume "null hypothesis" to be true.
W hore d an d  s ,  o r e  th e  mean and s ta n d a r d  d e v ia t i o n  o f  th e  n (=  13 i n  t h i sa
TOWN PLANSEGFRAC TOWNSEGFRAC d d2
LIVERPOOL 0.537 0.357 0.180 0.0324
BOOTLE 0.496 0.422 0.074 0.0055
BIRKENHEAD 0.332 0.326 0.006 0.0000
WALLASEY 0.188 0.258 -0.070 0.0049
BOLTON 0.345 0.307 0.038 0.0014
SALFORD 0.398 0.336 0.062 0.0038
BURY 0.221 0.254 -O.033 0.0011
OLDHAM 0.378 0.335 0.043 0.0018
ROCHDALE 0.302 0.317 -0.015 0.0002
MANCHESTER 0.372 0.296 0.076 0.0058
SOUTHAMPTON 0.283 0.277 0.006 0.0000
OXFORD 0.363 0.303 0.060 0.0036
NOTTINGHAM 0.462 0.326 0.136 0.0185
t = 0.0433 ~= 2.315 with 12 d.f.
0.0648/ J"l2
Since tQ 95 (12) = I.782,
Ihe fesult ¡S significant at the 
0.05 level and we sta'te with 95 percent 
confidence that there was a significant 
preference|of locating roads through 
lower SEG wards.
Id = O.5C3 
—  = 0.0433
£d2 = 0.0790
Id2 = 0.0061 
n
less
d2 0.0019
0.0042
d =(£d2 -  d 2  ) 
n
0.06^ 18
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In the sixties, opportunities were afforded to the public to object to 
the road plans normally in two s t a g e s . T h e  initial stage was a public 
inquiry held by the Minister to hear objections to amending the local 
Development Plan, so as to incorporate the recommendations of a 
landuse-transportation study. A second inquiry was held to hear any 
objections to compulsory purchase orders and side road orders, 
necessitated by the individual road schemes.
Householders in the lower socio-economic groups were generally least able 
to organise themselves into successful pressure groups with sufficient 
time, money and expertise to represent themselves in public inquiries.
The comprehensive redevelopment areas in the inner cities contain a 
large proportion of tenants (belonging to lower socio-economic groups) 
living in houses owned by the Council which proposed the highway
1 Rconstruction, or by private or other public authority landlords.
The negotiations, whether inter-departmentally or with the other owners, 
to purchase these properties ore taken to a fairly advanced stage before 
the tenants are informed of the purchase. Even at present, tenants who pay 
their rent on a monthly or more frequent interval cannot be statutory 
objectors in a public inquiry.19
Examples to illustrate the theme that the householders in the lower socio­
economic group were comparatively easy prey to urban road proposals will 
now be given.
The Western Approach Road in Southampton was built through an area of bod 
housing, occupied largely by socio-economic groups V and VI - manual and 
semi-skilled workers from the City's docks. The scheme did not meet with 
any objections from organised pressure groups. Similarly in Liverpool, 
urban schemes that were successfully completed are concentrated in the 
Central Ward of the City. This electoral ward, had in 1966, over 60 
percent of households belonging to socio-economic groups V and VI (SEG V 
and VI) and less than 5 percent belonging to SEG I and II. This compares 
with a City average of 36 percent for SEG V and VI and 10 percent for 
SEG I and II. The Merseyside Area Land Use Transportation Study also 
recommended that the construction of the Liverpool Inner Ring Road should 
begin by 1970/71. 20 This scheme was also partly contained in the Central 
Ward. However the Inner Ring Road proposals affected nearby properties 
beloning to a powerful group of companies operating os retailers within the 
City. Their objection resulted in delays to the Inner Ring Road for a 
period of 9 years and the work on a reduced scale of the original plan only 
began in 1979/80.
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All the above, lead to the hypothesis that;
HYPOTHESIS I: There is a significant correlation between a pressure
group's ability to resist the implementation of transportation 
plans and the socio-economic distribution of the households 
in the area affected by the proposed plans.
The statistical examination of this hypothesis will be given in section 
13.3. In the next sub-section, I will proceed with the development of the 
third and final surrogate variable - the scale of the proposed transport 
network.
13.2.3 A measure based on the scale of proposed transport network: 
Hypothesis II
The effectiveness of pressure groups depends on the quality of 
the membership and on the quantity of support attracted to resist 
the urban transport, mainly road, proposals.
The Report of the Urban Motorways Project Team suggests that at 
ground level, a 3 lane dual-carriageway urban motorway in an 
inner city area would displace some 300 to 450 dwellings per 
kilometre length.21 My examination of several schemes suggests 
that a single 2 lane road at ground level would affect less than 
20 percent of the above number households. This latter road 
would cost not more than 10 percent of the motorway. Thus 
larger and therefore costlier schemes affect a larger number of 
properties per kilometre length. Costlier schemes should 
therefore lead to bigger self-interest pressure groups. Expensive 
urban motorway schemes also alienated the 'cause' groups. In the 
period of interest, they accepted the construction of only modest 
• road network complemented by traffic restraint and improved
public transport facilities.22
| Even Stephen Plowden, the ardent proponent of area-wide traffic
management and restraint agreed that,
"there will certainly be a need for some new roads, since otherwise 
it is doubtful whether the various (traffic management) measures 
described .... could he implemented. In particular, to create 
attractive local centres which are convenient for pedestrians may 
not be possible without considerably re-bu'lding them and their 
road systems"23
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John Grnnt, dealing with transportation planning in three U.K. 
boroughs noted that larger schemes did generate greater
p / ,  #opposition. *■' All the above lead to the hypothesis that;
HYPOTHESIS II: There is a significant correlation between the
level of destruction inflicted by road proposals 
on a town (in comparison with the size of the town) 
and the level of implementation of the plan.
13.3 INFLUENCE OF SEG DISTRIBUTION ON IMPLEMENTATION: STATISTICAL 
EXAMINATION OF HYPOTHESIS I
The 1966 Census data provides SEG distribution at three levels of 
aggregation - enumeration districts (E.D.), local government 
electoral wards and county boroughs. I first completed a pilot 
study to determine the appropriate fineness at which the 
examination of SEG data should be undertaken for the main study. 
The following reasons were revealed by the pilot study to 
justify the examination of SEG values at the county borough level. 
Reasons to reject the examination at ward or enumeration district 
levels are first given below. This is followed by the 
justification for examining SEG values at county borough level.
13.3.1 Reasons for rejecting the examination of SEG distribution at E.D. 
or ward levels
(i) Comprehensive development areas, which contain most of 
the urban motorway proposals, are usually located within the inner 
city, adjacent to the central business districts.Therefore the 
proposals will invariably have some impact on business premises. 
Owners of affected business premises, even in small numbers are 
well placed to resist or delay the implementation of road schemes. 
Moreover, the census data for the inner city, is particularly 
unsatisfactory in reflecting the ownership interests of the 
premises located therein. However, it is the owners who negotiate 
the compensation and have the major statutory rights at public 
inquiries.
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(ii) It is sometimes possible to locate urban road projects 
closely following a railway line or other natural crock existing 
in a community. Under these circumstances a community, 
irrespective of its socio-economic distribution, may not he 
willing or able to fight such a project, indeed they may welcome 
the project for its convenience. It is unrealistic to compare such 
projects with those having a direct impact on residents, 
suggesting that at best, SEG analysis can only be a crude indicator 
of the social resistance likely to develop.
(iii) Except in a few well publicised cases, such as Oxford and 
Nottingham, successes of local pressure groups were fairly limited, 
particularly until the mid-seventies. Christopher Mall and Dilys 
Hill are amongst several authors to subscribe to this point of 
view.2?’2® Even in the case of Oxford Development Plan Inquiry, 
of the 51 objections only 5 resulted in recommendations by the 
Inspector to make amendments to the plan.2*)
For these reasons, I concluded that an extensive research involving 
the analysis of SEG distributions, at enumeration district or ward 
level was not justified.
13*3.2 Reasons for accepting the examination of SEG distribution at county 
borough level
(i) Public Inquiries, particularly into an amendment to a 
development plan, normally relate to a group of proposals, as 
submitted by a Council.
The proposals can either be approved .by the Minister or can be 
referred back to the Council with recommendations for amendments 
and a subsequent public inquiry into the amended proposals.
Normally, the Minister has no power to amend a plan without an 
inquiry.
Under the circumstances, the referral of the submitted proposals, 
because an objection to one part of a road proposal by a higher- 
socio-economic group was sustained would bring indirect benefits to 
all the affected parties. For example, at the public inquiry into 
the Amendment to the Development Plan for Nottingham (1970), the 
proposals for Sheriffs Way was successfully resisted by the city 
centre shop owners. The residents of St. Ahn's Ward in Nottingham, 
whose dwellings were to be demolished for the Inner Ring Road- also 
benefited from their success, because the amendment proposals were 
remitted as a whole to the City Counci 1 . 3 0
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Thus in towns with a large proportion of higher socio­
economic groups and a low proportion of socio-economic groups V 
and VI, there is a better chance of whole proposals being 
referred back after a public inquiry and subsequently delayed.
(ii) Local amenity societies are concerned with the amenity of 
their town as a whole and operate on this basis. Particularly, 
before the mid-seventies, they accepted a reasonable amount of 
road building as necessary. They rather concentrated their 
efforts on resisting large-scale road construction and in safe­
guarding buildings of historic and architectural importance.
These buildings are normally owned by the higher socio-economic 
groups. Also the membership of the societies is predominantly 
made up of socio-economic groups I and II (SEG I and II).
In the sixties, the Civic Society, for instance supported the 
principle of an Inner Ring Road for the City of York to reduce 
traffic in the conservation areas. It was not until the mid­
seventies, that most of the amenity societies changed their views 
to favour extensive traffic restraint and public transport based 
policies in urban areas.
I have therefore decided that the analysis of SEG distribution 
at county borough level would be useful in studying the influence 
of pressure groups on the implementation of urban transportation 
plans.
12.3.3 Examination of SEG distribution at county borough level
Christopher Hall writing on "How to run a pressure group" stated 
that,
"The spectacular success of a few groups misleads people into 
supposing that the position of the ad hoc pressure group is now 
secure.31 The most notable of such success was the Victory of 
the Wing Airport Resistance Association. But W.A.R.A. represented 
an affluent middle-class constituency (though at times it did its 
best to disguise itself as a bunch of tractor-driving yokels). It 
was never short of money or unpaid professional advice ..... It 
fought a selfish campaign. It did not merely soy "No Wings over 
Wing" (the campaign slogan); it pressed for the airport to bo sited 
on Foulness where the few hundred inhabitants were mostly old age 
pensioners and powerless to mount an effective reply."
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This example is also found to be valid in the case of urban 
motorway route location. An efficient vay of winning a public 
inquiry is for the objectors to show the existence of a cheaper 
but equally satisfactory alternative to the proposed road. The 
opportunity to present such alternatives ore greatest when there 
are large areas inhabited by lower SEG groups.
Therefore it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
quality of social resistance (SR) at the county borough level can 
be measured as the inverse of the difference in proportion of the 
lowest and the highest socio-economic groups. Thus,
SR = (SEGFRAC(V + VI) - SEGFRAC (I + II)) where
SEGFRAC (V + VI) = FRACTION OF POPULATION IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC
GROUPS (V + VI) TO SEG (I TO VI) IN A TOWN
SEGFRAC (I + II) = FRACTION IN POPULATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
GROUPS (I + II) TO SEG (I TO VI) IN A TOWN
13.3• Statistical proof of Hypothesis Is
Hypothesis I will now be restated with a minor modification as that 
"there is a significant correlation between the ability of pressure 
groups to resist the implementation of transportation plans and the 
socio-economic distribution of households within the town 
affected by the proposed plans."
The evidence for this hypothesis is based on showing the 
existence of a significant co-relation between the independent 
variable SR and the dependent variable FMR. The variable SR is 
defined above and the variable FMR is defined ns before.
A scatter graph of FMR VS. SR for the 23 towns in the sample is 
given in Fig 13.2 (Grph) The statistical analysis produced a fairly 
low degree of correlation (coefficient of correlation
= -0.41). The reasons for this low degree of correlation was 
discussed earlier. Essentially there are (a) the limited 
influence of local pressure groups in the implementation of 
transportation studies, (b) that even the higher socio-economic 
groups do welcome proposals within their midst, under certain 
circumstances (see Sections 12.2.1 (ii and iii), (c) socio­
economic distribution can only partially explain the influence 
of pressure groups on the implementation of plans. The rest of 
the explanation would rest on the scale of the proposals 
(sec section 11.2.3)» This will now be examined.
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1 3 . 4  INFLUENCE OF T I E  SCALP. OF PROPOSALS ON TUB IMPLEMENTATION; 
STATISTICAL EXAMINATION' OF HYPOTHESIS TI
This hypothesis stated that "there is a significant correlation 
of negative sign between the level of destruction inflicted by road 
proposals on a town (in comparison with the size of the town) and 
the level of implementation of the plan.
The proof of this hypothesis needs as the independent variable 
a measure for the level of destruction inflicted on a town 
compared with the size of the town. The measure of destruction 
is taken to be the estimated cost of the road network to be 
implemented from the first year of the plan to 1973/74. The 
suitability of using the cost of proposals for this measure was 
discussed in section 12.1.3.
Two variables were examined to represent the size of a town - 
its administrative area and its population. The population was 
chosen because it appeared to directly represent the potential for 
forming pressure groups. In some cases, such as locating a road 
through a "green field site" in a sparsely populated part of a 
county borough (Eg. Rochdale) or a tunnel under an estuary 
(Eg. Liverpool), an area measure would have been useful.
Thus a variable to represent the social resistance to the 
destruction inflicted on a town is defined by a "cost resistance 
measure" - CR
(ANNUAL AVERAGE COST OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN ¿MILLIONS
RECOMMENDED BY THE STUDY UP TO 1973/74)
CR = ----------------------------1— --------------------
(POPULATION OF THE TOWN IN MILLIONS)
It is worth noting that CR varies over a range of 1 to '** despite 
the constant per head of capital expenditure/head of population/ 
year intended by the Ministry. The dependent variable is FMR.
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A scatter graph of FMR VS. CR for the 23 towns in the sample 
is given in figure 13.03 (graph) which show a degree of negative 
correlations ( = -0.48) as expected.
This level of correlation with 23 degrees of freedom is significant 
at 6 per cent.level in a t-test for small samples.
The variable CR will now be combined with the variable SR, to 
produce a single variable "SOCIAL COST RESISTANCE" (SCR) to 
explain the total influence of pressure groups in the implementation 
of transport plans.
13.5 COMBINATION OF VARIABLES SR AND CR
The cost resistance variable CR can be largely looked upon as a 
quantity measure of public resistance. It should therefore be 
possible to introduce a measure of quality to CR by multiplying 
this variable by SR. Thus,
SOCIAL COST RESISTANCE SCR = COST RESISTANCE (CR) x
SOCIAL RESISTANCE (SR)
The scatter graph of SCR VS. FMR for the 23 towns in the sample 
is given-in 13.04 (graph) which shows a marked degree of negative 
correlation. The linear equation,
FMR = -0.00259 SCR + 0.458
was fitted to this scatter graph. 35 percent of the variation in 
FMR (coefficient of correlation = -0.59) can be explained by 
its association with SCR. This level of correlation with 23 
degrees of freedome is significant at less than 5 per cent level 
for a two tailed t-test for small examples.
An interesting aspect of this scatter graph is that the points on 
its outer boundary (shown dotted in fig. 12.03) suggest the 
natural existence of 2 discrete curves. The dotted curve 
represents a set of seven studies which had a relatively lower 
impact on the community compared with similar cost schemes 
produced by the second set of 16 towns. Much of the expenditure 
on the first set was associated with tunnels or bridges in 
Merseyside and Tyneside,for reclaimed land in the cose of 
Portsmouth and in providing the highways after the heavy war 
damage in Coventry. Had the cost of major tunnels and bridges
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been excluded from the definition of SCR and KM!?, in the cases 
of Liverpool, Wallasey, Gateshead, Newcastle and Bath then a 
better fit for the 23 points can be obtained. The fraction of 
the variation in FMR that is explained by the variation in SCR 
rises from 35 percent to 46 percent in this case.
13.6 CONCLUSION
Socio-economic-group distribution of households at county borough 
level can be used in the form of SOCIAL RESISTANCE (SR) to 
measure the quality of pressure group activities that will be 
developed in a town. Its explanatory power cannot be increased 
by using socio-economic group distribution at ward or enumeration 
district levels.
The scale of destruction of a proposed road network, measured in 
terms of the annual average cost of proposals up to 1973/74, per 
head of population (COST RESISTANCE, CR) proved to be a second 
useful measure for the scale of pressure group activities against 
implementing transport plans.
SOCIAL COST RESISTANCE (SCR), the product of the cost resistance 
variable (CR) and the social resistance variable (SR) proved to be 
a single satisfactory variable, in explaining the impact of 
pressure group activities on implementation.
The variable SCR will be carried forward for multiple regression 
analysis, to be completed in chapter 14.
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* *  *
In the last three chapters, local political continuity, chief-engineer 
continuity and pressure group effectiveness were identified as the primary 
factors influencing the implementation of urban transportation studies.
In this chapter, I examine the cumulative influence of these three 
variables by using multiple regression techniques and proceed further to 
identify and comment on the effects of other secondary factors.
The combination of the variables in this manner is useful for several 
purposes. Firstly, it allows us to use all three independent variables, 
acting jointly, to explain the variation of the dependent variable - the 
rote measure of implementation. Secondly, we can determine the level of 
impact of the individual variables on the implementation of plans.
Finally, this analysis helps to isolate those studies in the sample, 
whose rate measure of implementation cannot be significantly explained in 
terms of the three independent variables. These latter .studies will be 
individually examined in order to identify the special circumstances that 
led to significantly unexplained variations.
14.1 COMBINATION OF VARIABLES: HYPOTHESIS I
Case studies have been commonly used in the past, to examine the 
nature of decision making in local government. A few of these case 
studies have identified one or more of the three factors, 
local political continuity, chief-engineer continuity and pressure- 
group activities as important in local government decision-making.
Grant reporting on the "Politics of Urban Transport Planning"
concluded that,
"there is generally a close relationship-between the factors (political 
technical and community actors) ... to influence the transportation 
planning and policy making process and the transport policies which 
developed in each city."^
However, as with other case studies on such subjects, he was unable 
to analyse the cumulative impact of the factors, nor more 
importantly to allow for "double counting" of the individual 
effects.
In order to examine the cumulative influence of the factors, we 
state the hypothesis that,
HYPOTHESIS I: There is a casual relationship between the variation of 
urban transportation plan implementation and the three 
measures of local influence - political continuity, 
chief-engineer continuity and the propensity to form 
pressure groups - taken together.
14.02
In this analysis, difficulties arise with a plan containing a 
recommendation for large scale expenditure on public transport 
infrastructure and also where there is a non-linear relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables. Procedures for 
handling these situations are described below.
14.2 TREATMENT OK PUBLIC TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTU.iE
Recommendations for the provision of substantial public transport 
infrastructure were made in 4 of the towns - Liverpool, Birkenhead, 
Newcastle and Gateshead, contained in the 23 town sample. In the 
case of Liverpool and Birkenhead the rate measures of implementation 
(FMR) of public transport recommendations were not very different 
from the FMR for highway infrastructure recommendations. However, 
inclusion of public transport recommendations would increase the 
FMR up to 1974, for Newcastle and Gateshead from 22 3<iJ 24 percent 
to 5S and 30 percent respectively. Public transport recommendations 
are excluded from the multiple regression analysis for the following 
reasons.
(i) During the period under consideration, provision of large- 
scale public-transport infrastructure was supported by the Central 
Government as an innovation in a few towns. Capital sums over and 
above the cash limits for road construction were allocated so that
pthe road-construction capital provisions were largely unnffected.^ 
Also particularly in Tyneside, most of the highway schemes planned 
for construction up to 1974 were committed, by the time the public 
transport plan was conceived.3»^
(ii) Significant public-transport recommendations were not 
contained in any of the early studies nor in any "non-metropolitan" 
town studies.
(iii) The amenity societies, who normally co-ordinate pressure 
group activities against road construction, supported public 
transport measures.5
(iv) A large proportion of the public transport infrastructure 
that was recommended, comprised tunnels and bridges or improvements 
to existing railways. Because of this and the last reason, we ore 
justified in disregarding public transport costs in considering the 
variable "SOCIAL COST RESISTANCE (SCR)".
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(v) In all the four towns where public transport works were 
recommended, the City Engineer was not responsible for the schemes. 
They were the responsibility of the Director of Public Transport, 
v/ho reported to the respective public transport executive and the 
public transport authority.6 Therefore it is unrealistic to include 
public transport costs in the dependent variable FMR, when the 
variable "CHIEF ENGINEER CONTINUITY (CECON)" is included in the set 
of independent variables.
(vi) There is some justification for including public transport 
in FMR when correlating with the variable "POLITICAL CONTINUITY 
(POLTIC)".
However, in a multiple regression exercise, it is not possible to 
include public transport costs in FMR when considering one 
independent variable (POLTIC) while excluding them, when considering 
the other two (CECON and SCR).
14.3 NON-LINEAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
A logarithmic transformation of all the variables was undertaken for 
this multiple regression analysis. The reasons for preferring this 
transformation over a linear relationship are:
(i) A logarithmic regression was first introduced in this 
thesis, in chapter 11, to explain the relationship between "POLTIC" 
and "FMR". There it was justified on the basis that such an 
expression allowed for an element of "loss in enthusiasm over time 
in implementing the plans" to be brought into the expression. This 
loss in enthusiasm can occur for instance, when councillors who are 
committed to the original plan are replaced on their retirement by 
new councillors within the same ruling party. It was found 
desirable to keep this type of function for the multiple regression 
analysis.
(ii) The relationship between "SCR" and "FMR" is also slightly 
improved by transforming both variables to be logarithmic functions. 
This improvement can also be expected intutively for when "SCR" 
increases to socially unacceptable levels, "FMR" will tend to zero.
A linear relationship would produce negative values of FMR for high 
values of "SCR".
L
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(iii) It is cumbersome in a multiple regression analysis to. 
combine some linear variables (together with their "additive 
constants") with other logarithmic functions. In any case it 
will be very difficult to intuitively appreciate the results 
produced.
(iv) Most importantly, the case studies referred to earlier and 
my experience suggest that the independent variables act jointly to 
influence the decision-making process and do not each separately 
add their contribution to the implementation of plans.7 Tlie 
former type of joint interaction can be best represented by a 
"multiplicative" function produced by a logarithmic transformation 
rather than by an additive function.
14.4 EXAMINATION OF HYPOTHESIS I
The SPSS MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: SUBPROGRAM REGRESSION was 
used for this analysis.9 Copies of the data input to the program 
and the output are given in figures 14.01 and 14.02 respectively.
14.4.1: The regression programme and its input
The SPSS programme suite allows regression to be performed in a 
variety of ways. The way used here was stepwise-regression, in 
which the independent variables a^e introduced sequentially starting 
with that having the strongest correlation with the dependent 
variable. Two of the independent variables are continuous and for 
the reasons already given were entered in logarithmic form. The 
remaining variable CEPAR is a binary one (1 denotes continuity of 
chief-officer, 0 denotes discontinuity. For CEPAR therefore taking 
logarithims is meaningless and it was simply entered as a dummy
• (i.e. two valued) variable.
The programme calculates the regression coefficients that define a 
best-fit curvej
log FMR = A*  log (POLTIC) + B* log (SCR) + C* (CEPAR) + D
As with other regression programmes the fraction of the dependent 
variables variance explained by the regression equation is given - 
(R SQUARE in Fig. 14.02), This normally rises as the
independent variables are introduced in turn. The standard deviation 
of the predictions (BETA in) are also indicated.
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1*1.4.2 Discussion of output
The repression output is divided into two parts: step by step 
results printed out when a variable is introduced to the 
regression equation (page 1 of figure 14.02) and the 
summary tabic (page 2 of fig 1 *1.02 )• Using the regression 
coefficients output in the summary table, the multiple 
regression is given by, •
LOG (FMR) = 0.641 LOG (POLTIC) + 0.622(CEPAR) - 0.235 LOG (SCR)-0.46( e e e
WHERE CEPAR = 0 or 1 EQN 1 i
(see
in FMRLGN
is explained by the regression equation. A second measure of the 
dependency of a variable on an independent variable is the slope 
of the equation describing this relationship, a horizontal line 
(slope = 0) meaning that the two variables are not related while 
a negative slope meaning that an increase of one variable, will 
result in a decrease of the second variable. The slope of a 
multiple regression equation is measured in terms of the 
normalised regression coefficient DETA. In ou•• case, the 
i variable POLNTC has the highest BETA value (BETA ^  = ®*^99) 
followed by CEPAR (BETA„„,_ = 0.262) and finallyl/brAK
SCRLGN (BETA = -0.168) all of which suggest satisfactorySCHLAjN
relationships with the dependent variable. However, 1 will 
statistically examine to see if it is wort'.while retaining the 
third variable SCRLGN (the least significant) in the regression 
equation. The terms F and TOLERANCE printed in the step-by-step 
output would be used for this purpose.
which can alternatively be stated as; 
,0.64lFMR = (POLTIC)
(SCR)0.235
x (0.63 + 0.5*t CEPAR) EON 2
WHERE CEPAR = 0 OR 1
As an illustration, in the case of Manchester, the data 
figure 14.01 ) given is ■
SEC, 56 = 0.296, SEG 12 = 0.105, FMR = 0.30, CR = 6.43 
POLTIC = 0.50 and CECON = 1 
Therefore Using EQN 1;
L0G„ FMR = 0.641 L0Ge (0.50) + 0.622(1) - 0.235 L0Ge
; ---- -------* - 0.468 = -1 . 1 16( O.296-O.IO5 ) ______
Therefore, FMR = O .238 —  ~
which compares with a measured value of FMR = 0.30
Nearly 91 percent (R-SQUARE = 0.90993) of the variation
1 4 .0 6
Firstly, the value of F for SCRLGN is 3*74 (see Fig 14.02(D)
The F-statistic is another measure of the normalised regression 
coefficient BETA. This value of F with 1 and 19 degrees of 
freedom is significant at less than 8 percent i.e. one can be 92 
percent confident about the result. (For the same degrees of 
freedom, to be significant at 5 percent the value of F should be 
4.38 and to be significant at 1 percent F should be 8.18).
Secondly, the variable has a tolerance of 0.6315 (see
Fig 14.02) If a tolerance is small then the variable is nearly
a linear combination of variables already in the equation.
Tolerance has a range of 0 to 1. The output value suggests that 
SCRLGN contributes a new dimension in explaining the variation in 
FMRLGN.
Thirdly, it is intutively attractive to retain this variable 
because pressure group activities are being recognised as having 
a growing influence in transportation policy making (See 
Chapters 8 and 15).
The 3-variable equation given above has a standard-error of 
0.38333^(see Fig. 14.02(D).
This is the standard-deviation of the residual and can be
looked upon as the typical error in prediction. Thus on the
average, the predicted FMRLGN will deviate from the measured
FMRLGN by 0.3834 units of the latter. A scatter graph of
PRED. FMR Vs MEASURED FMR (see Fig. 14.03 graph) and a tnbl
(see Fig. 14.04 ) comparing FMR with -(PRED, FMR + 1.0 STANDARD ERROR)
are given to illustrate these deviations-
14.4.3 Comments on the residual (or "unexplained") variation in FMR
Comparison of the calculated FMR against the predicted values of 
FMR (see Figs. 14.03 & l4/i’4)showed that in 6 towns - Liverpool, 
Bolton, Middlesborough, Salford, Southampton and Nottingham, the 
measured values of FMR were outside the range of (PREDICTED FMR 1 
1 STANDARD ERROR). Four special reasons are applicable for theseI
unexplained variations.
r... .... ! thniiil:. p i p
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I'OGe (FMR) = 0.641 LOGe (POETIC) + 0.622 (CKCON) - 0.235 1-00« (SCR) - 0./i68
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COMPARISON OP MEASURES "FMR" VS "PREDICTED FMH
STANDARD ERROR (SE) FOR T!!E REGRESSION EQUATION = O .383 (See TABLE 14.02 
PAGE 2, STEP 3)
THEREFORE, THE RANGE WITH 1 STANDARD ERROR OF PREDICTION 
= (PRED. FMRLGN) ± O .383
E.G. FOR MANCHESTER, THE RANGE OF FMRLGN WITH 1 STANDARD ERROR = -1.116 ± O .383 
THEREFORE, THE RANGE OF PRED FMR WITH 1 STANDARD ERROR = ANTILOGg (-1 . 1 16  t  O.383) 
= 0.22 to 0.48
TOWN PREDICTED FMR PRED FMR + 1SE PRED FMR -1SE MEASURED FMR
1. OLDHAM 0.45 0.67 0 .3 1 0.48
2. MANCHESTER 0.33 0.48 0.22 0.30
3. BOLTON 0.34 0.50 0.23 O .69
4. SALFORD 0.39 0.57 0.26 0.22
5. ROCHDALE 0.36 0.52 0.24 0.51
6. BURY 0.28 o.4l 0.19 0.38
7. LIVERPOOL 0.43 0.63 0.29 0.69
8. BOOTLE 0.26 0.39 0 .18 0.30
9. BIRKENHEAD 0.72 1.00* 0.49 0.66
10. WALLASEY 0.47 0.69 0.32 0.51
11. ST HELENS 0.76 1.00* 0.52 0.63
12. SOUTHAMPTON 0.53 O .78 0.36 0.35
13. BATH 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
14. LEICESTER -O.O8 0.12 0.05 0.08
15. COVENTRY 0.39 O .58 0.27 0.32
16. PORTSMOUTH 0.48 0.70 0.33 0.50
17. OXFORD 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
•COH TYNEMOUTH 0.46 0.68 0.32 0.37
19. SUNDERLAND 0.18 0.26 0.12 0.19
20. GATESHEAD 0.24 0.35 0.16 0.24
21. NEWCASTLE 0.22 0.32 0.15 0.22
22. NOTTINGHAM 0.13 0 .18 0.09 0.05
23. MIDDLESBOROUGH 0.13 0 .19 0.09 0.22
* FOR BIRKENHEAD AND ST HELENS, THE CALCULATED UPPER LIMITS ARE 1.06 AND
1.11 RESPECTIVELY
i'i.07
Firstly in Liverpool, Bolton and Middlesborough the MEASURED FMR 
is larger than the PREDICTED FMR. (Even in these cases the 
MEASURED FMR is within PREDICTED FMR + 2 STANDARD ERRORS).
The result is portly anticipated. In chapter 12, we noted that 
towns that produced road schemes which had relatively low impact 
on the community considerably improved their chances to implement 
the schemes. In Liverpool, lower community impact was 
experienced in the provision of the 2nd Mersey T u n n e l . I n  
Bolton and Middlesborough, much of the expenditure was associated 
with the provision of link roads from the rural M63 and A19 
respectively.11 Being roads linking a town to the rural trunk 
road network, there was greater opportunity to locate these roods 
partly along lines of existing cracks and partly on "green field" 
sites. For instance, A 666, the Bolton Link Rood is built along 
a "natural" crack created by the River Croal and the Manchester 
Bolton Railway line.
Secondly in Salford, the "MEASURED FMR" was lower than the 
'PREDICTED FMR". Further investigation showed that nearly half the 
recommended capital expenditure for Salford was directed in solving 
essentially Manchester's traffic problems, for instance the 
provision of Manchester Inner Ring Road which was not built.
This proposed ring road was located such that almost one-third 
of it lay just within Salford's boundary. (See Fig. 5.O7 )
Thirdly, the MEASURED FMR for Southampton is 0.35 while the 
PREDICTED FMR is 0.49. It appears that this difference was 
associated with the "peaks and troughs" in output which will 
be prominent over a period if an expensive scheme has to be 
implemented in one phase. In this particular case the "trough" 
in construction activity was related to the pre-construction 
activities needed to provide the new Itchen Road Bridge. The 
construction of this £6 million (1970/71 prices) toll bridge 
began in 1974/75 end lasted for a period of 4 years. This 
bridge although mentioned in the "Southampton Outline Trans­
portation Plan" was essentially conceived as a. separate project 
and was designed during 1971/74 by a team drawn from Southampton 
City Council staff and Messrs. R. Travers Morgan and Partners.
The chairman of the Working Party was the Southampton City Engineer 
Itchen Rond Bridge proposals were not included by me in calculating
FMR
CONCLUSIONS
Local political continuity, chief engineer continuity and the 
propensity to form pressure groups, taken together are highly signilleant 
in explaining the variation of urban transportation plan implementation. 
Political continuity is the most significant single variable in this 
respect followed by chief engineer continuity. If necessary, the 
predictive accuracy of the equation Could be further enhanced by 
improving the variable SCR - propensity to form pressure groups.
Grant, J (1977) THE POLITICS OP URBAN TRANSPORT PLANNING 
London Wl, Earth Resources Research Ltd., 40 James Street; 
p. 135
Williams, R.G. (August 1980) GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT EXPENDITURE 
CONTROLS AND LOCAL G0VERNJ1ENT AUTONOMY
Unpubl. dissertation submitted to the University of Oxford. 
Department of External Studies, p. 23
The Tyneside Rapid Transit Bill was enacted in Parliament only
by 1972
Surveyor
New Civil Engineer (7 August 1980) TYNESIDE METRO FINALLY COMICS 
TO SURFACE
London, Institution of Civil Engineers, Great George Street; 
pp. 14-17
For instance Transport 2000 i3 a widely recognised public 
transport pressure group. Its members include the Civic Trust, 
Conservation Society and Friends of the Earth
Public passenger transport in Liverpool and Birkenhead is provided 
by the Merseyside Area Passenger Transport Authority and that 
in Newcastle and Gateshead is provided by the Tyne and Wear 
Passenger Transport Authority. Before the local government 
re-organisation in 1974, these authorities were independent of 
the local councils.
Grant, J; °P* P» 135 ,
Walker, G & Savage, C.J. (1958) as quoted in Foster, C.U. (19&3) 
THE TRANSPORT PROBLEM
London, Wl, Blakie & Son Ltd., 5 Fitzhardinge Street, p.l 
Nie, N, Bent, D.H. & Hull C.H. ( )
STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (SPSS)
New York, Me Graw-Hill Book Company; pp.
I was an employee of Liverpool Corporation and was closely 
associated with the construction of the second Mersey Tunnel.
I completed case-studies on these six towns. These included site 
visits, searches in the local libraries and information supplied 
by Council staff.
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15.6 NOTES
"LIVERPOOL RING ROAD DIES AS LABOUR MARCHES IN:
There is absolutely no justification for the road - 
says the new Council"
1
announced the New Civil Engineer (NCE, l(ith May 1981 )
The NCE report continued that,
"Within days of seizing control of Merseyside County 
Council, in a swing away from the Tory party, Labour's 
new ruling leadership has confirmed plans to scrap 
Liverpool's £50 M ring road. Council leader Jim Stewart- 
Cole ... (said) that he was determined to prevent the 
controversial scheme's northern leg from being built - 
even though a £5 M initial contract started there just 
two weeks ago."
Stewart-Cole said that the only thing to prevent his 
Council - which has an overall majority - from halting 
the northern leg would be if this was contravening the law 
and thus made Council Members financially liable for such 
action.
But you can be assured that the massive eastern leg link 
between the northern and southern legs of the ring road 
will not be built he said ... Stewart-Cole claimed, the 
Tories during their last weeks in power had rushed through 
the £5 M northern leg contract by 'suspending standing 
Orders and pushing out invitations to tender. .... They 
are legally within their rights, but morally wrong to do 
this because they knew they would be defeated in the 
elections.'
The above decision is typical of the reversals in transport planning 
policies that nowadays occur regularly because of the increasing 
polarisation of local politics since local government reorganisation.
In the previous chapters, 1 identified political continuity, chief 
officer continuity and the pressure group activities as the important 
influences that determined success in implementing long term plans 
prior to 197^« In this chapter, the strength of these three social 
factors in local government decision making in the post­
reorganisation period will be examined. In addition, the effect of
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other minor factors, that were previously identified (for instance 
national economy) that might have increased their influence on the 
urban transport planning process, during the past decade will also 
be examined.
15.1 CHANGES IN LOCAL POLITICAL CONTINUITY
In Chapters 11 and 14 it was shown that the continued control of the 
county borough council, by the local political party under whose 
authority a plan was prepared, is the most important criterion for 
its successful implementation. Local Government Reorganisation 
significantly affected the ability of transport planning authorities 
to maintain political continuity. The following changes stemming 
from the Local Government Act of 1972 are relevant in this respect.
Firstly, the post of alderman has been abolished thus making the 
position of authorities with marginal council majorities less 
tenable. 2 The abolition of aldermen would also help to reduce the 
number of members committed to the successful implementation of long 
term plans.
Secondly, councillors are now paid an attendance allowance. This 
measure has increased the number of contestants for a seat, thus 
disrupting the continuity in Council by only those who can serve 
without financial recompense.-*
Thirdly, the transportation planning process, particularly in the 
former county boroughs is now complicated by the power-sharing that 
has resulted from the reorganisation. For instance most of the 
‘ district councils in urban areas were former county borough
authorities who lost their substantial transport planning powers.
They are normally the local agents on transportation matters within 
their administrative areas, for the counties. Also, the district 
enjoy certain residual powers for transport planning, such as the 
provision of car-parking, now recognised to be the most important 
tool to influence urban private vehicle useage. Such power-sharing 
would result in less permanency than in the pre-reorganisation period, 
to implement transportation policies, as the balance of political 
control among the central government, the county councils and district 
councils changes. Roy Rhodes commented on the inter-authority 
conflict between the county and the districts as follows:^
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"The two-tier structure especially in metropolitan 
areas has been a flash-point. The metropolitan 
counties have sought to define a clear role for 
themselves and in doing so have met resistance, if 
not downright antagonism from their districts."
Fourthly, formal arrangements have been made to extend organised 
politics within the local government machinery. In most counties 
the party leadership has been incorporated in the committee structure 
of local government in policy and resource committees.^
Finally, and most importantly, the practice of rural weighting in 
drawing up electoral boundaries has been discontinued and 
boundaries have been re-drawn to amalgamate the urban areas, thus 
bringing the latter to influence the government of the counties.
The most obvious result of the merger of urban and rural arens is the 
spread of party politics. Before reorganisation, party politics was 
prédominent in the urban areas. In the counties, before reorganisation 
party politics existed in a minority, albeit a substantial one. Soon 
after reorganisation, only Cornwall and Isle of Wight of the English 
counties, remained controlled by independents. Also before 
reorganisation, only Durham of the English counties was controlled 
by the labour party. Immediately after reorganisation, this number 
has grown to seven and since then, this balance of power has increased 
in favour of the Labour Party.*’
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that local government 
reorganisation has introduced a system of control in which party 
politics has not only become more dominant but its impact on the 
management of the local authority has been intensified. Moreover, 
the power-sharing between the three elected bodies instead of the 
county boroughs and the central government in the pre-reorganisation 
period, has made the transport planning decision making process, 
less conducive to long-term planning.
15.2 CHANGES IN CHIEF OFFICER PARTICIPATION
In the 60s, the chief engineer had the greatest influence amongst 
the chief officers on deciding the contents of transport plans.
Since then three significant changes have occurred.
(i) the introduction of a new grant system to provide
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comprehensive local transport and the attempts to 
co-ordinate land use transport strategy under the 
new style development plans system;
(ii) the introduction of "corporate approach" to the manage­
ment of local government;
(iii) the growing influence of politics in decision making.
The effect of these changes on the influence of the chief engineer 
will now be discussed.
13.2.1 The Introduction of the New Grant System
In Chapter 10, the effects of the Transport Act I96B and the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1968, on the influence of the chief 
engineer were analysed. There, it was concluded that the enactment 
of these two Acts did not substantially alter his role.
Since reorganisation, the new County Councils are made responsible 
for public transport, highways and strategic planning - the three key 
elements of landuse - transport policy. This co-ordination is 
reinforced by changes in the system of grant allocations. Under the 
new system, a single annual grant is allocated to cover all forms of 
transport expenditure. The grant is partly distributed via the Rate 
Support Grant (RSG) and partly as the new Transport Supplementary 
Grant. To justify their transport expenditures, the County Councils 
have to submit annually, a Transport Policy and Programme (TPP) to 
the Department of the Environment.
Circular 27/7^ indicates how TPPs should relate to the structure and 
local plans.? The new development plans are supposed to provide 
• the framework for TPPs, because the former are more comprehensive 
subject to public participation and have to go through a cycle of 
statutory processes. In reality, this desired end has not been 
achieved because of the following reasons:
Firstly, the time scales of the TPPs are vastly different from that 
of the development plans. The first round of Structure Plans has 
only recently been approved by the Secretary of State and a large 
number of local plans still await publication. However, eight rounds 
of TPPs are already completed, largely without the assistance of 
development plans. (The present intentions of the Government is to 
reduce the role of the TPP and the TSG system and eventually to
15.5
distribute a single, comprehensive grant.
It is now recognised that even when the first round of development 
plans are complete, because of their long turning cycle, it is 
unlikely that rapidly changing issues and policies in transport 
could be incorporated in the development plan system before being 
applied in the TPP. Hather, the TPPs provide the opportunity for an 
annual stock taking and expression of changing transport policies, 
which might be eventually incorporated into the structure plans if the 
policies stand the test of time. David Dayliss reporting on this 
relationship stated that,
"by singling out local transport for separate treatment, 
the tail has come to wag the dog and the proper relation­
ship between landuse and transport has been usurped."9 
Secondly, the exclusion of trunk roads from local control is not 
conducive to co-ordinated landuse-transport strategy. This is 
particularly important after the reorganisation, because the 
termination of trunk roads at county borough boundaries has since 
been scrapped.^ This situation has brought the control of some 
major through fares in urban areas under the direct control of the 
Department of Transport with, in practice, the County Surveyor acting 
as the Department's main agent.
Thirdly, the TPPs are fairly tightly controlled, as to the detailed 
allocation of funds, between the various programmes by the central 
government. Williams reporting on TSG allocations in Oxfordshire 
reported that,
"... not only has the Government attempted to control the 
expenditure but progressively it has'tried to influence the 
way in which resources are to be al located. This has been 
achieved by direct intervention, for instance the national 
moratorium on starts^ on new capital projects between July 
1976 and May 19771 by exhortation in the annual TSG Circular 
and the TSG decision letters to each authority ... Bus 
revenue support has received particular attention from the 
Government. In 1975i along with other Shire counties, 
Oxfordshire was encouraged to revise the bid upwards, as 
part of the attempt to encourage counties to provide a higher 
level of support for buses ... As part of the same process, 
a special revenue support threshold was introduced for shire 
counties in 1977» which was intended to "ensure that all 
counties will receive at least enough Transport Supplementary
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Grant" to cover 70% of their forecast expenditure on 
revenue support."
Central control in this manner, docs not encourage the 
philosophy of producing TPl’s as working documents, derived from 
policies contained in the development plans. The control leads to a 
position where TPPs are produced ns a physically bound volume of 
separate working documents for highway construction, maintenance, 
traffic management and parking and public transport, each largely under 
the control of the local authorities spending section, much as it was 
in the pre-reorganisation period.
Comments by the Greater Manchester Transport Action Group on the 
Structure Plan generally support the last three points. The Group 
stated, in 1980, that:
"The major highways schemes are in effect the residue from 
the SELNEC Highway Plan of I96212 .... As things stand, the 
GMC (Geater Manchester Council) Major Highways Programme, 
the Government's Trunk Road Programme and the Medium Term 
Railway Strategy have been advancing on their separate fronts 
with limited consideration of their interaction or of their 
effects on planning objectives.
..... Unlike the highway programme there is no firm programme 
for bus transport."
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the integrated approach 
to landuse-transport planning has not significantly altered chief 
engineers' influence over highway-policy.
15.2.2 The Introduction of "Corporate Approach"
The Report entitled, "The New Local Authorities Management and 
Structure" (Bains Report) was published in 1972 and implemented with 
the Local Government Reorganisation on 1st April 197,*>^^ The Bains 
Report recommended the appointment of a chief executive, who would 
be the head of the councils' paid officials. The chief executive 
will be responsible for securing overall co-ordination and control 
of all services provided by the council. If successful, such an 
approach could have reduced the parochial influence of the 
departmental heads in allocating landuse-transport resources.
However, for essentially the same reasons as those given for the
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"integrated approach", the "corporate approach" also failed to 
undermine the traditional role of the chief officer in deciding 
the input to transport plans.
For instance, Greenwell, Northamptonshire's Chief Executive noted 
that,
"the local authorities have adopted these (corporate management) 
structures and then been disappointed to find that the new 
organisation tends to work very much as the former authorities.^ 1
Departmental loyalties remain strong, committee chairmen and 
"their" chief officers form strong alliances to "protect" 
their services, chief officers' meetings are used to air 
the grievances of individual chief officers, very rarely are 
collective decisions reached in the interests of the authority 
as a whole; committee chairmen show no signs of wishing to 
act corporately. Such complaints are commonplace .... "
This view is further supported by Greenwood et al who sought to 
explore the process of organisation-functioning in British local 
government.'^ Thus corporate management has not altered chief 
engineers’ powers over highway policy.
15.2.3 The Growing Influence of Politics in Undermining Chief Engineer 
Participation:
Soon after the local government reorganisation the County Councils 
completed a review of inherited road proposals. Their reviews w~re 
substantially based on political consideration, with a low level of 
technical support provided, largely using the pre-reorganisation 
transport surveys. For instance, Nickson and Batcy described how the 
surveys and analysis from the SELNEC model, with minor modifications, 
were used to provide technical support for highway schemes in Greater 
Manchester, from the irheritcd roads list.*^ Furthermore, 'my' 
anaylsis of TPP from 8 other counties, supported by confirmation 
from the respective transport planners, showed that the reviews of 
their inherited road schemes were substantially completed by early 
1976, a period of only 2 years since the reorganisation. These 
reviews also largely employed existing traffic data to support high­
way schemes which had the backing of local politicians.
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Statements made by politicians also support the view that the 
influence of chief officers has been undermined by party political 
considerations. For instance, John Grugeon, leader of the Kent 
County Council observed in 1976 that,
"It is important to remember the relative positions of the 
chief officers and chairmen(of committees) against this 
background.Unless a chairman has his political colleagues' 
views in mind, he will sooner or later be replaced by some­
one, who more nearly expresses the common view of the majority 
party. Failure to understand this point is often at the root 
of impatience and difference between chief officers and 
committee chairmen."
The importance given to public transport revenue support measures 
(see section 15.4) as opposed to capital spending, in the post­
reorganisation period, has also helped to replace bureaucratic 
decision making by party political considerations. This is because 
highway capital justification employ much sophisticated modelling 
procedures while equivalent measures are not commonly available to 
deal with revenue-support problems.
The Market Analysis Project (MAP) is the most sophisticated 
mathematical tool that was created in the post-reorganisation period
l Oto model bus scheduling and operations. 1 Its success could have 
assured the future of bureaucratic decision making in the bus industry. 
However, the MAP proved to be deficient in similar respects as its 
counter port of the 60s, the landuse-transport model.
The Association of Transport Co-Ordinating Officers commented as 
follows on the future of the Market Analysis Project.
"MAP has not in itself necessarily resulted in the achievement 
or control of financial targets ... even if a scheme is right 
unless its design is settled, it may not be when it is 
subsequently introduced and within months of implementation, 
a very different picture can emerge from that forecast..... 
Changes in policy can now be expected which would materially 
affect the future application of MAP. The implementation of 
the Transport Act 1980 and the current Government policy of 
encouraging competition, releasing fares control and reducing 
cross-subsidisation must influence the type of network that 
should be evolved. The cut-back in revenue support in many 
counties, the abolition of bus grant and the tighter controls
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on cash limits and borrowing on top of a deteriorating 
trading position all place pressure for rapid short term 
changes."
Based on all the evidence given in Section 15.2, I arrive at the 
following two conclusions:
(i) the relative influence of the chief officers within their 
group has not markedly changed since the reorganisation;
(ii) political decision making has (somewhat) undermined the 
influence of chief officers, in the post-reorganisation 
period.
15.3 CHANGES IN THE INFLUENCE OF PRESSURE GROUPS
The effectiveness of pressure groups in challenging transport proposals 
have substantially increased in the post reorganisation period. This 
increase can be attributed partly to the influence of national 
environmental lobbies in being able to martial the objections at local 
level and partly to legislative changes.
15.3.1 Improvements in Pressure Groups' Organisation
A large number of national environmental lobbies have built network 
of branches to promote their objectives at local level since 197^» An 
information note released by British Road Federation in 1980 stated 
that,
"With objections to road proposals becoming more vocal and 
with objectors taking advantage of every opportunity to prolong 
and in some cases disrupt proceedings, the time taken for 
inquiries has tended to rise.^0 ... Some of the causes of 
stretching of inquiries can be ascribed to the various local 
amenity and less obviously interested groups making their 
views known, and' in son« cases putting forward alternate 
routes. As well as adding to the duration of the inquiry 
itself, the inquiry consultation period has got longer. For 
example, the first motorway scheme, the M6 Preston bypass 
took five and a half years to plan and build, the Ml80 
Scunthorpe bypass touk eight and a half years from 1971 to 
completion and the A12-A13 sections of the M25 will take 13 
years from inception in 1969 before it opens in 1982 ... It 
is the actions of some of the national (pressure) groups that 
cause unwarranted delay."
t
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Tho nbove note identified Transport 2000, Conservation Society 
and Friends of tho Karth as the important national antiroad 
lobbies, with rigorous local networks. For instance, Transport 2000 
founded in 1973* has a network of 2 dozen branches, concentrating 
on resisting highway construction from the development planning 
stage to the scheme inquiries. However, it must also be noted, 
that in the post-reorganisation period, British Road Federation 
itself has sot up a number of branches in opposition to the 
environmental lobbies; for example the Northern Road Users Group 
covering the Tyne Wear and Teesside regions.
Mayer Hillman commented on the overall effectiveness of these 
opposing groups as follows:
"The extent to which any or all of these groups and 
organisations have influenced either policy making in general or 
specific policies in particular is difficult to assess.
It is obvious, however, that none of them has fully achieved 
their objectives and it may be that their influences have 
balanced each other. "21
An indirect advantage to the anti road lobby in extending the 
preparation period, irrespective of the result is, that, eventually 
political changes at local and national level could altogether 
delete the resisted scheme from the programme. For instance, it is 
widely claimed that the environmental movement gained its impetus 
from the resistance to the first stage of the West Cross Route in 
London. The resistance extended to the implementation of the rest 
of this scheme estimated to cost £180 million resulting in the scheme 
being delayed through the Conservative control of the Greater London 
Council (GLC) and finally deleted from the Highway Programme in 
1981, when the Labour Party regained control of GLC.
On this basis, it is reasonable to conclude that in the post­
reorganisation period, anti road lobbies have successfully increased 
their influence to resist the implementation of highway schemes.
Several legislative changes in the post-reorganisation period have 
helped the anti road lobbies, in their cause-
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15.3*2 Pressure Groups and New Legislation
Legislative and administrative changes that affected the influence 
of local pressure groups in the two yeurs following reorganisation 
are as follows:
(i) the TPP/TSG system and the new Development Plans;
(ii) Land Compensation Act 1973;
(iii) "Participation in Road Planning" published by the 
Department of the Environment (DoE) in 1973»
(iv) "The Highways (Inquiries Procedures) Rules 1976
Details of the TRANSPORT ACT 1968, the TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACTS 
1968 AND 1971 and the introduction of the TPP/TSG SYSTEM are given 
elsewhere in this thesis (particularly see Chapters 2, 10 and 17). 
Opportunity for public participation in the TPP/TSG system was 
introduced by relating it to the new development plans. I provided 
three pieces of evidence in section 15 .2 .1 to show that the intended 
co-ordination however was not achieved. This was because firstly 
that the time scales for the TPPs were not co-ordinated with those of 
the development plans, secondly that the trunk roads are planned by 
the central government and the public consultations for these roads 
are progressed independent of the development plan system and thirdly 
the TPPs are fairly tightly controlled by the central government as to 
the detailed allocations of funds. In addition the following further 
point which would hinder proper public consultation of transport plans 
through the development planning system is worth noting.
The Structure Plans are strategic documents and are not expected to 
contain details of revenue support measures. For instance, the 
* Secretary of State for Environment commenting on the Structure Plan for 
Oxfordshire, in relation to Oxford transport stated that,
"Measures for the management of traffic and for the 
development of public transport seem a more appropriate 
solution to the problem with such minor improvement as might 
be necessary to the road network. The most appropriate context 
for this to be dealt with is the Local Plan for Oxford. " 2 1^
The above discussion suggests that the opportunity for public 
discussion of material contained in the TPP are rtrovided in the local 
plan preparation stage. However, the arrangements for consulting the 
public on transport matters as part of the local planning consultation 
process are unsatisfactory for three reasons:
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Firstly, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, a large number of 
local plans are not yet prepared but eight rounds of TPPs are 
completed. Secondly, the local plans are prepared by the district 
authorities. Therefore in practice, there is lack of co-ordination 
in presenting to the public, transport measures proposed by the 
counties as part of districts' local plan consultation. Thirdly, 
local plans cover only a part of a county, in some cases these plans 
are prepared to cover a small town. Plans dealing with small areas 
are not a satisfactory media to form an overall opinion about the 
county's transport policy, particularly public transport subsidies 
which accounts for a large proportion of local transport expenditures 
in the post-reorganisation period.
Based on the above evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
TPP/TSG system and the new development plans did not significantly 
alter the influence of pressure groups on local transport policy 
making in the post-reorganisation period.
Before proceeding further with the changing significance of public 
participation, the following comment is worth noting. The rest of 
the legislation to be discussed in this section might appear to be 
related for trunk road construction. However, the Department of 
Transport expects and the local authorities follow similar provisions 
for principal and other roads. Also the public environment in 
which the road construction policies operate are fairly similar. 
Therefore it is reasonable to discuss these procedures as if there 
is no difference in promoting trunk and other road construction.
The Report of the Urban Motorways Committee to the Secretary of 
State for the Environment was published in 1973» Better "LAND 
COMPENSATION" provisions and opportunities for earlier public 
"PARTICIPATION IN ROAD PLANNING" are two of a number of improvements 
that have resulted from the Urban Motorways Committee recommendations.
THE LAND COMPENSATION ACT 1973» apart from providing improvements in 
the terms of compensation, also set out to overcome some of the 
adverse environmental effects of urban highway construction, on their 
surroundings. In particular, it was possible under the Act for the 
promoting Authority to purchase land well in advance of the need, 
to provide for loss of amenities caused by noise and dirt, to acquire 
additional land for landscaping, planting and noise insulation and to
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make "home Ions" payments and removal expenses. However, some 
researchers subscribe to the view that the promoting authorities 
misused these powers in order to set in motion a "blight" along a 
chosen route by advance purchase and subsequent neglect of the 
properties. Also, it is sometimes claimed that the additional 
powers helped to avoid the optional "side roads order inquiry" by 
the authorities buying their way out of the mandatory "compulsory 
purchase order" inquiries.23
The effect of the enhanced "PARTICIPATION" procedure, was to provide 
an additional opportunity for public to comment on a number of options 
prior to the selection of the preferred corridor for the detailed 
design of a highway scheme. However it must be noted that regardless 
of this enhanced procedure, several criticisms wore being made by 
the anti road lobbies, about the lack of opportunities for public 
to question transport policy decision making. Concern regarding the 
restrictive participation procedures was also noted by the Environment 
Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee. The Secretary of State 
recognizing public disquiet, announced a further inquiry in 1976, in 
an attempt to improve highway inquiry procedures.
HIGHWAYS (INQUIRIES PROCEDURE) RULES was enacted in June 1976. Levin 
commented on these Inquiries Procedures.2^
"The Rules introduced an entirely new concept, that of 
the statutory objectors ... and laid down that statutory 
objectors were the only ones who were "entitled to appear 
at the inquiry", any other objecting person or group could 
appear only at the discretion of the inspector ... Certainly 
it seems scarcely credible, since the Minister is obliged 
to consider the objections of "non statutory" objectors, 
that Parliament should have intended that he be free to 
exclude them from a public inquiry when one was convened ... 
Complaints ... that the rules are ultra vires Highways Acts 
have been made and the issue has yet to be tested in the 
courts."
Dissatisfaction with the inquiries procedures led the anti road 
lobbies to adopt militant tactics at local public inquiries. John 
Tyme was one of those who regularly used these tactics to gain 
publicity for his causes.2  ^ These lobbies also co-operated with local 
objectors in safeguarding the letter's interests.
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Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that in the first half of 
the post-reorganisation period, opportunities for public 
participation was not substantially greater than the pre­
reorganisation period, however the national anti road groups by 
direct representation through their branches and by indirectly 
assisting local objectors, significantly extended the scheme 
preparation period. Their actions led to delays and consequently 
to under-implementation of plans as the political control of 
promoting authorites changed hands.
It was in June 19771 a truce was called between the highway 
authorities and the anti road lobbies, with the publication of a 
White Paper entitled, "Transport Policy".2® This White Paper 
contained a number of major policy changes, including promise to 
transfer some resources from road construction to public transport 
which helped to win the approval of the anti road lobbies. Further, 
recognising that concern has been expressed about the inadequacy of 
public and parliamentary discussions on transport policy, the 
Government undertook to publish not only annual White Papers on 
roads but also White Papers on transport policy as a whole, every 
three years or so. This White Paper on transport policy would review 
the significant changes that had taken place over the period, 
propose whatever adjustments to forecasts and policies seemed 
necessary and make available the essential facts and analysis. By 
this means, the Government aimed to,
"provide a regular and better basis for reporting to 
Parliament and for debate there. They will also serve 
as an authoritative background for consideration of specific 
road schemes at public local inquiries."
The steps to improve local public participation, continued further 
with the publication of the REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
TRUNK ROAD ASSESSMENT in October 1977. This Report was a result of 
a review of the existing road appraisal and traffic forecasting 
methods. The committee while recognising the appraisal method to be, 
"generally sound as far as it goes, (believed) it to be 
unbalanced2^ •••• It is unsatisfactory that the assessment 
should be dominated by those factors which are susceptible 
to valuation in money terms ... We believe that the right 
approach is through a comprehensive framework which embraces
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all the factors and groups of people involved in scheme 
assessment. ... It is also central to the framework approach 
we have proposed that at the local level, the entire frame­
work with supporting documents should be made publicly 
available."
With regards to the traffic forecasting methods, the Committee 
recommended that,
"Uncertainties are fundamental in the forecasting process, 
arising both from the data used and from the model itself.^
It is crucial that such uncertainties are acknowledged ...
The Department should indicate the likely range of 
uncertainties involved in the forecasts and demonstrate the 
consequences of selecting different values within the likely 
range."
Nearly all the recommendations of the Committee were accepted by 
the Government. The "framework" approach is now adopted for the 
presentation of road appraisal results, a range of traffic forecasts 
with assessment of uncertainties using statistical techniques is 
introduced as standard practice and "C013A", the cost-benefit analysis 
suite of computer programs, used for economic evaluation of road 
proposals, is now made fairly flexible and able to accept local 
deviations in"traffic parameters. These changes should lead to 
further scrutiny of highway assessment and for a more informed 
basis for local public consultation. However the following two 
views to the contrary should also be noted before concluding this 
section.
Firstly, it is still possible, by negotiating satisfactorily with 
the land owners, to avoid all other forms of public consultations 
to highway proposals. Secondly, a large proportion of transport 
finance is now expended on the provision of public transport.
However, neither the 1978 Transport Act, which was based on the White 
Paper on Transport Policy (1977) nor any other enactments legally 
bind a council to consult the public on public transport expenditures.
15.3.3 Concluding Remarks on the Influence of Pressure Groupr in the post- 
1974 Period
(i) the local pressure groups are now better informed than in 
the 60s. They are further able to call upon the support of 
local branches of national pressure groups to support their 
local interests.
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(ii) The reduced highway construction combined with an
increased expenditure on public transport revenue support 
would result in a higher proportion of cause groups compared 
with self interest groups, particularly in local transport 
policy making.
(iii) Although the effectiveness of participation may have changed, 
no changes in the post-reorganisation period have occurred 
that would significantly invalidate the applicability of 
SEG distribution and cost of projects (as developed in Chapter 13 ) 
os measures to assess the success of local pressure groups in 
being able to influence local transport decision making.
15.4 CHANGES IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
It is widely claimed that the down-turn in national economy is a major 
cause for the poor implementation of plans in the post-reorganisation 
period. In this section, I will examine the validity of this claim.
In Chapter 8 I provided evidence to show that in the pre-reorganisation 
period, the central government encouraged the local authorities to 
claim their grants for the implementation of plans. An overall change 
in national policy relating to the provision of roads did not take 
place until 1975* Only in 1976, the Secretary of State advised the 
new local authorities, in relation to road building, to make the 
best use of existing road facilities, especially in the conurbations 
and large towns.- From then on, there was substantial cut-backs in 
local road construction activities.
National economic conditions are unlikely to have changed over short 
periods of time. It is only the interpretations of needs within a 
given set of economic conditions that can change. The changed needs, 
as interpreted by the then newly elected Labour Government was 
reported by the Chancellor in the 1975 Public Expenditure White 
Paper, lie stated that, "Compared with the 1972 White Paper (Cmnd 
5178) there have been reductions of nearly 40 per cent of expenditure 
on new construction and improvements of roads in England. ^  These 
reductions included switching some resources from road construction 
to roil. Expenditure is also affected by the announcement in the 
recent Report (HC 74) on the Rate Support Grant (No. 2) Order 1974, 
in which the Government publicised their decision temporarily to 
support high levels of revenue support by local authorities to 
public transport, particularly bus and underground services."
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It will be interesting to quantify the effect of the above 
statement. This I have done, using out-turn of expenditures given 
in subsequent White Papers. Relevant details of expenditure by 
the United Kingdom, for the period 1968/69 to 1977/78 are given in F'5‘ 
1501 -l5-04(TABlf)in I9G8/69, the total public expenditure in UK in the 
non-transport sector was £13,790 million (1966/67 price basis which 
will be used for the rest of this discussion) and in the transport 
sector was £736 million making a total of £14,526 million. Except 
for a small decline in 1969/70 the total public expenditure has 
steadily increased (see Pig 1501-04) until in reached a peak of £17,552 
million in the non-transport sector and £1003 million in the transport 
sector in 1975/76. In the next two years the public expenditure 
in both the transport and non-transport sectors hove slightly 
declined. For instance in 1977/78 the public expenditure in the 
non-transport sector was £16,470 million and in the transport sector 
was £8l8 million, making a total of £17,288 million.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE TOTAL TRANSPORT NON-TRANSPORT
YEAR £ million as % of 68/69 £million % of Total £million %  of Total
1968/9 14,526 100 736 5.1 13,790 94.9
1975/6 18,555 128 1003 5.4 17,552 94.6
1977/8 17,288 119 818 4.7 16,470 95.3
Comparing public expenditures both in the transport and non-transport 
sectors respectively in the late sixties, with that of the late 
seventies (see above) it can be concluded that in the late 70s, total 
public expenditure has substantially increased. Also the total 
transport expenditure has only suffered a marginal decrease in the 
late 70s, compared with the late 60s, as a percentage of the total 
expenditure. In real terms the total transport expenditure was 11 
per cent higher in 1977/78 compared with 1968/69. Therefore it is 
reasonable to conclude that cut-back in expenditure is not a prime 
reason for non-implementation of transport plans in the post­
reorganisation period.
15.5 A NOTE ON CONCLUSION
In order to reduce the length of this thesis and because conclusion 
for the whole thesis will be presented in the next chapter, a 
conclusion will not be presented for this chapter.
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A number of writers have claimed that the rejection of urban transport 
plans began in the 70s» Their reasons for the rejection were based 
on well publicised events such as the disruption of the road 
inquiries and cut backs in national expenditures.
In this research, I have developed measures of implementation in 
order to assess the influences of various factors that led to the 
rejection of plans. A measure of implementation could record how 
closely the plan recommendations were followed or they were followed 
at a specified rate or whether in the specified order. I disregarded 
the last of these because it was often not easy to record and it was 
always hard to interpret. I developed separate measures for the 
first two criteria. They arc called the quantitative and rate 
measures respectively. Based on these measures, I have showed that 
even before the well-publicised events of the 70s, urban transport 
plans were poorly implemented and that they were not effectively 
superseded.
The bulk of this research, was concerned with searching for factors 
that led to the rejection of urban transport plans. I formed the 
hypothesis using subjective evidence and then tested the level of 
significance of statistical relationships between the effect of 
influencing factors and the associated measures of implementation 
of plans.
Several factors were identified and their significance as caused for 
rejection tested. Most natural factors which have been popular as 
reasons for rejection were found to be insignificant in their effect. 
Predominantly, local factors appear to have determined the level of 
implementation of urban transport plans. In the rest of this chapter 
I will present my conclusions, treating one factor in each section.
I will first present, the primary conclusion which relates to the 
significance of a factor as a reason for rejection. I will follow 
this with any secondary conclusion, which are spin-offs that 
resulted from the study of that factor.
The influence of the following national factors are presented: 
institutional changes and party political control of central 
government, public expenditure cut backs and national pressure groups.
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These are followed by the effects of changes in predominantly local 
factors: predictive accuracy of studies, local government expenditure 
party political control of local councils, officer participation and 
pressure group effectiveness (as measured by socio economic 
distribution of population and cost of plans),
16.1 SIGNIFICANCE OK INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND PARTY POLITICAL CONTROL OF 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
There lias been a succession of legislative changes in relation to 
local government in general and transport planning in particular.
The important changes in this area, during the past two decades were:
London Government Act 1963 
Town and Country Planning Act I960 
Transport Act 1968 
Local Government Finance Act 1972 
Local Government Act 197^ 
Transport Act 1978
Procedural Changes leading from the Leitcli Report
For various reasons, I have excluded London - a special case in many 
respects and can disregard the 1963 Act.
The two Acts of 1968 and the Finance Act of 1972 had only minor 
impacts on the transport planning process. There is no evidence that 
they delayed the implementation of urban road plans.
A major discontinuity in the local government system was brought 
.about by the Local Government Act 197^, I have allowed for this, 
by initially considering the implementation of plans up to Local 
Government Reorganisation. Subsequently I have analysed the 
relative changes in influence^of these factors, in the post- 
reorganisation period.
Until about the reorganisation both the major political parties, 
during their terms in Government, encouraged road construction. 
Only in the po3t-reorga;iisation period, the Labour Party promoted 
public transport useage. These are generally reflected in the 
institutional and economic policy changes.
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16.2 SIGNIFICANCE; OF NATIONAL PUBEIC EXPENDITURE CUT-HACKS
I provided several pieces of evidence to show that national 
expenditure cut backs was not a significant reason for the non 
implementation of plans until the inid 70s. Even after this period, 
the cut backs in total transport expenditures was roughly in 
proportion to the total cut backs. However, there has been an 
internal re-distribution of transport expenditure in favour of 
British Kail and urban public transport revenue support.
16.2.1 Secondary Conclusion
In the seventies, grants for the provision of urban roads, not 
taken up by local authorities was spent on the provision of inter 
urban ronds.
16.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF NATIONAL PRESSURE GROUP EFFECTIVENESS
Until the early 70s, national pressure groups, either actively or 
tacitly supported road building.
British Koad Federation influenced the production of Traffic in Towns 
and helped to maintain local and central government support for road 
construction.
The Civic Trust supported the provision of roads to remove through 
traffic from urban areas.
In the early days of the changing environment, the Trades Union 
Congress initiated the enactment of Transport Act 1968. Subsequently 
it also influenced other legislation by the Lavour Government tc support 
public transport.
Policy changes won by national pressure groups were effectively used 
locally to support public transport, essentially in the post­
reorganisation period as an alternative to road building. All 
pressure groups, including the more recent ones, e.g. Transport 2000 
now pursue these local activities.
16.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF STUDIES *i)
Assumptions about the following inputs^determine the amount ofj 
transport infrastructure provisions recommended in plans,
i) available budget
ii) cost per unit of construction
iii) unit capacities recommended in technical standards
iv) traffic management effectiveness
v) unconstrained future demand
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I have shown tlva^ t there were predictive inaccuracies in some of these 
inputs. However they did not significantly affect the implementation of 
plans.
16.5 SIGNIFICANCE OK LOCAL GOVEKNMKNT EXPENDITUI1K CUT HACKS
If local authorities are satisfied about the need for specific 
provisions, they are normally willing to find the financial 
resources to ensure their supply.
Secondly, the authorities financed their capital expenditures by 
borrowing. I have shown that had the authorities wanted^they had 
sufficient revenue income to borrow further capital for highway 
construction.
Thirdly, the highways budget was the only one, amongst all the services 
provided by the county borough councils to have suffered a steady 
reduction as a proportion to total expenditure, throughout the period 
under consideration.
Fourthly, no major local government cut back was announced during the 
period up to 197^•
Therefore, I conclude, that considering cumulative expenditures by 
county borough councils, there was no evidence to suggest that 
expenditure cut backs was a significant reason for the low 
implementation of plans.
This conclusion was further supported by analysis of implementation 
measures, where I showed that it was the rich county boroughs who 
mostly rejected their-transport plans.
16.6 SIGNIKICANCE OF CHANGES IN PAHTY POLITICAL CONTROL OF LOCAL COUNCILS 
Party political considerations dominated the affairs of the county 
borough councils. The success of implementation of a long term 
transport plan is therefore dependent on the continued control of 
the county borough council, by the local political party, under 
whose authority the plan was prepared. This was shown to be the 
most important of the three significant factors that determined the 
success of a plan.
Since the reorganisation, the importance of party politics in local
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authority decision making has increased further.
16.6.1 Secondary Conclusions:
(i) the large scale local elections swing ^ in favour of the
Labour Party in the early seventies did not result in an 
abrupt frustration to the implementation of approved 
transportation plans.
(ii) changes in the political control of councils did not 
normally result in pressure on the chief engineers to 
purge them out of the office.
16.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF OFFICER PARTICIPATION AS A DETERMINANT OP PLAN 
IMPLEMENTATION
The continuity of employment of the chief engineer proved to be a 
significant factor that determined the success of implementation 
of transport plans.
Even in the post-reorganisation period, the relative influence 
of the chief officers, within their group, in determining transport 
priorities lias not changed. However, political decision-making 
has somewhat undermined the influence of chief officer groups.
16.7.1 Secondary Conclusion:
Need for the continuity in employment of technical staff and in 
supply of data, when plans were prepared hy consultants did not 
significantly affect the implementation of transport plans.
16.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF LOCAL PRESSURE CROP P EFFECTIVENESS AS A DETERMINANT 
OF PLAN IMPLEMENTATION
Socio economic group (SEG) distribution of households at county 
borough level can be used, to construct a social resistance scale 
SR, to measure the quality of pressure group activities that will 
be developed in a town. Its explanatory power cannot be increased 
by using SEG distribution at ward or enumeration district levels.
The scale of destruction of a proposed road network, measured in 
terms of the annual average cost of proposals, per head of 
population (COST RESISTANCE, CR) proved to be a second useful 
measure for the scale of pressure group activities against 
implementing transport plans.
SOCIAL COST RESISTANCE (SCR) the product of CR and SR proved 
to be satisfactory os a single variable and significant in 
explaining the impact of pressure group activities on implement­
ation.
The influence of pressure groups in the provision of urban transport 
has increased in the post-reorganisation period.
CUMULATIVE INFLUENCE OK SIGNIFICANT FACTORS
91 per cent of the varifition *in cumulative implementation of plans 
(FMR) in the pre-reorganisation period can be explained by the 
variation in the three independent variables, political continuity 
explaining 56 per cent, chief engineer continuity 21 per cent and 
social cost resistance explaining 14 per cent of the variation.
Since the local government reorganisation political considerations 
have grown to be more significant, essentially undermining the 
influence of the chief officer groups. However, the opportunity 
for local parties to plan for the long term is undermined further, 
at present, because of reasons given earlier (see Chapter 15)«
In the final Chapter, I will recommend measures to improve plan 
making, so that the plans could ba satisfactorily implemented.
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17.01(a)
"At present, towns are developing in a way which no one has chosen or 
seems to like, largely because the control over the transport system 
has been lost. It must be regained if our towns are to become fit and 
delightful places for human beings to live in."
Stephen Plowden: 1980
In this research project, local political discontinuity was identified 
to be the primary cause for the poor implementation of urban transport 
plans. Pressure group resistance and chief officer discontinuity were 
also found to be significant causes.
In the post-reorganisation period, political influence has increased 
further to the detriment of officer participation - an essential 
element in plan preparation. Pressure groups have also increased their 
influence. In the next three chapters, I will develop a modified basis 
for planning that recognises this changed environment.
The following assumption is made with respect to the development of 
this basis. None of the factors that influenced implementation are 
solely applicable to urban transport plans. These factors effectively 
influence any plans, particularly those that ore long term. The 
following implication of this assumption is worth noting.
The bulk of my research, presented in the previous chapters was 
restricted to transport planning in county borough councils in the 
pre-1974 period. In this port of the thesis, I wished to apply my 
findings based on that fairly restricted sample to prescribe remedies 
to a wider range of local authorities. Therefore any recommendations 
made can only be of a fairly general nature and would necessarily 
be speculative. However, such shortcomings are common to most
t
prescriptions based on extrapolation of historirei data.
17.01(b)
In the post-197^ period, my interest is essentially related to new 
style structure and local plans (SP-EP system) and the transport 
policies and programmes (TPP) as against the Buchanan style landuse- 
transport plans. Before the development of the recommendations, some 
features of the existing planning system are critically reviewed. A 
summary of the criticism is provided in Fig. 19.03 (Table), preceding 
page 19.02. It may be helpful if this is read prior to the detailed 
analysis which begins in para 17.2 .1 (page 17. )^ and continues in 
the next chapter.
17.1 THE PRESENT I,A NOUSE-TRANSPORT PLANNING SYSTEM IN BRITAIN
The County Councils ore the strategic planning authorities under 
the Town and County Planning Act 1971; their role encompasses both 
landuse and transport policy.2 They are entrusted with preparing 
comprehensive statements of strategic planning policy, termed 
"structure plans", which should be approved by the Secretary of 
State for the-Environment. These documents cover a period of 
fifteen years, to be revised every five years or so.
The detailed applications of the structure plans are covered in local 
plans, which are generally the responsibility of the district councils, 
with some involvement of county councils, where strategic issues are 
concerned. These plans cover a period of 10 to 15 years, subject to 
periodic review.
In addition the county councils are required to annually submit to the 
Secretary of State for Transport their Transport Policies and Programmes 
(TPP) in order to bid for Transport Supplementary Grants (TSG) and 
capital expenditure allocations.
The TPP is intended to cover the authority's transport objectives over 
a period of 10 to 15 years and provide a 3 year (formerly 5 years) 
detailed expenditure programme to be rolled forward annually.
I will comment on these three phases of landuse-transport planning, 
namely;
(• ) Prpparation and implementation of structure plans 
(Section 17.2)
(ii) Preparation and implementation of local plans 
(Section 17*3)
(iii) 0 peration of the T.P.P. system (Chapter 18.0)
17.2 COMMENTS ON THE PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF STRUCTURE PLANS
Detailed advice on the preparation of structure and local plans (new 
style development plans) was initially given in the Development Plans
Manual issued by the then Ministry of Housing and Local Government in 
31970. Since then, a number of revisions have been issued, essentially 
in order to reduce the time taken to produce these plans. Important 
revisions in this respect are contained in;
(i) Public Participation - DC® Circular 52/72
(ii) Structure Plans - DOE Circular 98/7^
(iii) Memorandum on Structure and Local Plans - DOE Circular V79
(iv) Local Government, Planning and Lane (No. 2) Act 1900
John Raine is one of a number of authors who have commented on the 
above revisions to the Manual. He observed in 1980, that
"It is the issue of speeding up the planning process which underlies 
almost all the changes proposed in planning procedures, and which seems 
to be regarded as so important in the government's perception of the 
way the planning system needs to be modified.
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If the process can be speeded up, without any loss in effectiveness 
then of course the changes are not only justified but should be 
welcomed. However, many reservations have been expressed and 
it is considered that possibly too much emphasis has been attached
to the question of delay. The fear is therefore that .......  the
changes represent a serious challenge to the principles and practice 
of good planning."
The modifications applied over the past decade hove undermined the 
consistency of the 1970 planning process as detailed in the Manual. 
Presently planning is in a state of confusion. For instance 
Circular 9 8 / 7 1* identifies one of the main functions of a structure 
plan as,
5"to provide a framework and statutory basis for local plans."
However, the Local Government Planning and Land Act 19^0 redefines 
what constitutes a count matter, from the Local Government Act 1972, 
so that it NO longer includes operations or uses which conflict with, 
or are consistent with the counties' plans and p o l i c i e s . A l s o  
the 1980 Act abolished the power of a county planning authority to 
give directions to the district planning authority as to how it should 
determine an application for planning permission which would 
substantially and adversely affect its interests as a county planning
Q
authority. A county planning authority therefore no longer has the 
power to prevent a district planning authority granting planning 
permission for development that is not in accordance with the county 
structure plan.
Therefore for my comments in this chapter, I will go back to the 
1970 version and identify its strength and weaknesses with a view 
to proposing modifications to it. In this respect, the following
advice given in 1979 by the Department of the Environment is worth
9noting.
"A technical description and explanation of the form and content of 
structure and local plans are contained in "Development Plans: 
a manual on form and content'. In general the manual remains a 
useful guide."
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The manual identifies seven functions that need to bo performed 
by a structure plan. In this sub-section, 1 will comment on the 
effectiveness of performing six of these functions under the present 
day, structure planning system. The seventh function is that of 
providing a framework for local plans, on which comments will be 
made in the next section.
17*2 .1 Interpreting national and regional policies:
The national and regional context for structure planning is essentially 
drawn from the regional strategic plans, produced by joint central 
and local government agencies. 10 I will make the following comments 
on the suitability of these plans as a starting point for structure 
planning.
FIRSTLY,'the regional plans are neither statutory documents nor arc 
they subject to public consultation or challenge.
SECONDLY, they are only reviewed every 8 to 10 years at best.
Further, the dates do not normally coincide with changes in party
political control of central and county governments. Therefore,
regional plans do not reflect government policies for extensive
periods of their currency. For instance, the Strategic Plan for the
South East recommends a number of satellite towns to accept the
overspill "population of London.^ Soon, this policy was reversed.
In 1980, the Secretary of State for the Environment issued a two-
page comment on the review to the plan, which amongst other things,
12brought an end to most of the new and expanding town schemes.
THIRDLY, the regional plans are based on traditional prediction
methods (e.g. extrapolation of existing, conditions) and are too
restrictive in their recommendations. For instance the Plan for the
South East recommends that for structure planning purposes, Luton
should accommodate about 4000 extra persons per year up to 1981,
with a slightly lower rate in the following decade and a rate of
1 33000 per year in the last years of the century. Such details 
should be a matter for the structure plan.
17.2.2 Establishing aims, policies and general proposals:
The structure plan is expected to contain statements on the planning 
authority's aims for the area and the strategy, policies and general 
proposals which are designed to achieve these aims.
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In preparing their first set of structure plans most counties
14undertook long and complicated surveys and analysis. This 
information was then used to seek positive answers to a number of 
problems covered by the plan. This approach has two shortcomings.
FIRSTLY, the extensive work involved in preparing the plans makes
it impractical to revise them every five years. The plans are
further delayed because some county areas are not well-fitted as
15natural units for landuse planning purposes. Kg. Reading is a 
town in Berkshire with its northern suburbs in Oxfordshire. This 
increases the need to co-ordinate the work of several authorities, 
each progressing their plans to different timetables. Kven some 
structure plans, published in the early 70s are not yet revised.
Eg. Hampshire Structure Plan.
County Council elections take place every four years. Structure plans
which are not revised to be in line with the incoming county council's
policies or those which are not reviewed because of other changes in
circumstances are normally disregarded when control changes hands.
Eg. The Labour Party, on recently gaining control of the Greater
London Council have imposed a general embargo on office development
l6in large parts of London. This policy disregards the approved 
Greater London Development Plan.
SECONDLY, preparation of structure plans by trend prediction, offers 
little scope for the positive guidance of development.
Based on an analysis of 40 structure plans, Graham May and Howard 
Green came to the conclusion that,
"Very little consideration appeared to have been given in the plans
to the various selected features of employment change ..... The
assumptions in the employment forecasts were found to be either
closely tied to recent experience ........  or highly optimistic
17about a return to high rates of economic growth."
This practice sets unrealistic targets for local plans. Also, the 
long cycle of plan-making prevents useful feedback of information 
about unfulfilled past expectations.
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17.2.3 Indicating action areas:
The Town and County Planning Act I960 specifics that structure 
plans indicate action areas where major change by development, 
redevelopment or improvement may be expected.
The intention in the late 60s was that landuse plans should indicate 
fairly comprehensively and at an early stage, possible action areas 
so that it will assist in the route location of urban motorways. 
However, at present, the treatment of "action areas" in this manner 
is recognised as a politically sensitive issue which is particularly 
unsuitable for inclusion in a structure plan. This requirement is 
now relaxed and has virtually been unused.
17.2.4 Providing guidance outside local plan areas:
The 1968 Act requires that the structure plan provides a basis for 
development control in those parts not covered by a local plan. These 
areas are essentially of a rural character which is not the central 
theme of this research.
17.2.5 Providing basis for co-ordinating decisions:
Prior to being abandoned in Circular 90/74, the intention was that 
the preparatory stages of a structure plan should provide a forum 
for discussion between the various committees of the county and 
district councils and other public bodies such as statutory under­
takers in order to encourage corporate planning. Internally social 
services, housing and education are the important local authority 
services in this respect. Authorities attempt to optimize the 
overall benefits to the community by using corporate planning 
techniques.
In practice little official guidance is given about the role of
spatial planning in reflecting the social and economic policies of
the local authorities. Moreover, the traditional rivalries between
departments further restrict the effectiveness of the structure plan
19as a co-ordinating medium. Structure plans arc a particularly 
unsatisfactory mechanism for co-ordinating spatial with social and 
educational policies in metropolitan areas since the latter services 
are provided by the district councils whilst structure plans are 
prepared by the county councils.
Co-ordination of structure plan policies with the strategic plans of 
other public authorities is also made difficult because these other 
authorities have no statutory requirements to publish long term plans.
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17*2.6 Bringing main planning issues before Minister and public:
The restrictive nature of MINISTERIAL CONTROL during the plan 
preparations stage was discussed in section 17.2.1. The Town and 
County Planning Act 1971 requires that the draft Structure Plan 
be submitted to the Minister for further approval.
Recently it has been noted, that the Government has taken keen interest
even in directing apparently local matters. This has resulted in
extensive modifications to a number of "submitted structure plans"
particularly if the County Council is controlled by a different
21political party to that of the Government. It is likely that such 
interference will continue in future, resulting in disturbance to 
"submitted structure plans" whenever the control of the Central 
Government changes between the political parties. However
"the approval of a Structure Plan does not convey approval for other
27statutory purposes. In particular, it does not commit the Department
of the Environment or any other Government department to the payment of
grant on any particular project or to the amount or timing of any
n
capital expenditure programme.
1 would argue that the ministerial control described alone makes the 
Structure Plan/local plan system e sufficient vehicle for the control 
of some local government expenditure by the central government. The 
annual submission of TPP could therefore be dispensed with. I will 
develop this theme later in chapter nineteen.
Since 1972, the opportunity available for PUBLIC PARTICIPATION in 
structure plan inquiries (Enquiry In Public - EIP) has been substantially 
reduced. Since then the Secretary of State for the Environment, in 
" considering a "submitted structure plan" HAY hold an Examination in
Public. Even then the EIP is only intended to bring the public opinion 
on the broad policy issues contained in the "submitted structure plan" 
to the attention of the Secretary of State and not to give the inquiry 
the status of a formal hearing. The Secretary of State need not take 
public representations into consideration in approving a structure plan. 
The intention is that public consultation should take place essentially 
at the plan preparation stage.
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"Public participation as part of this process is constrained by the
, 23time-schedule of plan-production ....... In our case studies, the
result of public participation exercises have, in most cases lagged 
behind the planning process, so that by the time they are received, 
the planners may have moved on to the next stage in planning and the 
public input cannot be fully integrated at the relevant stage."
Public acceptance of plans as manifest in local pressure group 
activities were identified in this thesis as an important influence 
on the success of implementation. Therefore recommendations 
contained in chapter 19 provide improved opportunities for public 
participation.
17.3 COMMENTS ON THE PHKPAHATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF LOCAL PLANS
Just as the structure plans are prepared within the context of 
national and regional policies, it was intended in the Manual, that 
the structure plan should set the content within which local plans are 
prepared. Thus the broad policies and proposals in the structure 
plan form a framework for the more detailed policies and proposals 
in local plans.
There are three types of local plan: action area plans, subject plans
and district plans. I have already explained the nature of action area
plans. A subject plan deals with specific aspects of planning such
as "mineral working". They are called by the name of the "subject"
to which they relate and is normally prepared by the county council.
The district plan is concerned with the detailed planning of an area
of substantial size "where the factors in local planning need to be
24studied and set out in a comprehensive way." They typically
relate to the whole of a small town or a major sector of a larger one 
and are normally prepared by the district councils. In the content 
of this chapter, an examination of "local planning and implementation" 
as applied to district plans is sufficient to appreciate the various 
issues.
I  c o n te n d  t h a t  th e  p r o p o s a ls  a t  t h i s  s ta g e  a re  to o  vag ue  f o r
i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  comment u s e f u l l y .  A ls o  D ra k e  and  T h o rn le y  n o te d
t h a t ,
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The Development Plans Manual identifies four functions that need
25to be performed by a district plan:
(i) applying the strategy of the structure plan
(ii) providing a detailed basis for development control
(iii) providing the basis for co-ordinating development
(iv) bringing before the public local and detailed planning issues
I will now comment on the effectiveness of performing these functions 
as intended in the Manual. 26
17.3*1 Applying the strategy of the structure plan:
FIRSTLY, 1 will comment on the problems that arise from the influence 
of party politics in local government. In chapter 15, I explained 
the difficulties involved in the two tier control of some local 
government functions.
For a number of reasons to be explained later in this section 
( $ 17.3) it has proved to be difficult to review structure and 
local plans every 5 years or so and still maintain all the require­
ments as originally specified in the Development Plans Manual. On 
the other hand the county council elections take place every four 
years and the district council elections every four years or annually, 
in which case one-third of the councillors retire before each election
The frequent changes in political control of county and district 
councils during the currency of a set of structure and local plans 
lead to inflamation of the difficulties in two-tier control. Better 
co-ordination of plan reviews with local elections would help 
successful implementation.
SECONDLY, lack of co-operation, even between county and district 
councils controlled by the same political party is common place.
Buxton commenting on mutual co-operation noted that,
"The Government's intention is to see the county and districts
2 7operating as free agents. Excepting in those situations in which 
the legislation specifically provides the County Council an upper • 
hand, any influence that County Council, in persuit of their 
statutory responsibilities for establishing and maintaining the 
general strategic policies within their areas wish to exert over 
the activities of the district council,will depend on the letters 
consent."
T
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liven the legal redress available to the counties against a district 
acting "ultra vires" was questionned by BuKton. He showed that the 
combination of provisions in the 1972, Local Government Act produced 
oddly inconsistent results when applied to resolve disputes between 
counties and districts.
THIRDLY, there are difficulties encountered in the two tier system 
of local government, even where mutual co-operation exists. When 
the new style development plans were introduced in 1968, the intention 
was that the whole planning process would be administered by one 
authority, the pre-197^ county councils. This assumption necessarily 
affected the content of the rules made for the development plan 
procedure but the rules were hardly revised to assist the two-tier 
planning processes.
Under the old regime, the relationship between the structure and local 
plans was left comparatively obscure, the local plan being merely 
required to confirm generally to the structure plan. Nothing in the 
structure plan was intended (because before 197^ nothing was 
necessary) to serve the rather different purpose of exercising any form 
of detailed control over the makers of the local plan.
This assumption is invalid in the post-reorganisation period, when 
the two plans are made by different teams, working for different 
authorities, the series of local plans being published a number of 
years after the structure plan. Bunton commented on this type of 
arrangement
"It has been suggested that a local plan may be regarded as a 
statement of further and better particulars, demonstrating a more 
detailed aspect of town planning which in the structure plan is 
merely sketched as a matter of policy and not worked out in any detail.' 
Further and bettor particulars are, however, most normally and most 
usefully given by those who drew up the statement that is to be 
particularised. Confusion, rather than illumination is more likely to 
follow when one authority attempts to amplify and particularise 
anothers plan."
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FOUKTMLY, there are the practical difficulties in plan implementation.
A number of practical difficulties in implementing the structure plan 
policies came to light only when detailed studies are carried out in 
local plan stage or even afterwards. Eg: geological problems needing 
expensive foundations to develop a site.
Normally, sufficient land is allocated in the development plans to 
provide for a period of 10 to 15 years. Chief Officers having spent 
a number of years preparing the plans become committed to their 
implementation. Therefore, even if a plan proves to be impractical, 
they may prefer to have another attempt to solve the problem rather 
than accept rejection of their plans.
Delays identified above, even if they paralyse action for a few years, 
would significantly affect implementation, if political control of council 
changes hands. Delays in implementation would also provide an 
opportunity for resistance groups to gain momentum and add their 
weight to rejecting the plans.
17.3.2 Providing detailed basis for development control:
A local plan must provide information to developers by allocating sites 
for particular purposes, by defining the areas to which particular 
development control policies will apply and by expanding these policies 
in terms of standards and other criteria.
Professor Peter Mall identified inflexibility as the major problem in
29allocating sites in the above manner. Me stated that,
"Some authorities zone land for residential development, whether or 
not the land is suitable for development or whether or not the owner 
wants to develop it. This is one good reason for the paradox in many 
areas, that developers complain while the planning officers insist that 
there is 5 to 10 years supply."
17.3.3 Providing a basis for co-ordinating development:
The Development Plans Manual states that,
"The planning policies and proposals in local plans will be used as a 
basis for co-ordinating public and private development and expenditure 
over the areas covered by them."
\ \
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Problems in co-ordination arise due to the limited nature of 
powers available to the local authorities to positively encourage 
private development. For instance, the grant of a planning 
permission increases the value of a piece of land, in many cases to
several times the existing value and the owner of the land gains 
30substantially. Also it is difficult and expensive for the 
authority to revoke the permission, even if•the development is not 
completed for a number of years. However the owners is under no 
obligation and the local authority has only limited powers to force 
development of the land.
17.3.^ Bringing local and detailed planning issues before public:
The structure plan is a broadly based document whose implications for 
the individual are difficult to identify. The local plan proposals 
provide the first opportunity to assess the losses to individuals; 
yet it is normally the case that objections to a local plan are 
determined by the proposing district council itself. This procedure 
indeed reduces the rights of the individuals even when compared with 
the old style development planning procedures where an aggrieved 
citizen had a right to a public inquiry, with the outcome 
determined by the Secretary of State.
In the recommendations in chapter 19, I have increased the 
opportunities for public participation in local plan preparation 
compared with that provided by the Manual.
17.4 CONCLUSION
The basis of present day structure and local planning system is 
explained in the Development Plans Manual. Subsequent revisions to 
the system were mainly intended to expedite plan preparation rather 
than to improve it. Therefore improvements to structure and local 
planning methods should be related to the functions of the plans as 
identified in the Manual.
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The important functions of a structure plan are:
(i) Interpreting national and regional policies
(ii) Establishing aims, policies and general proposals
(iii) Providing basis for co-ordinating decisions
(iv) Cringing main planning issues before Minister and public
(v) Providing a statutory basis for local plans
The important functions of a local plan are:
(i) Applying the strategy of the structure plan
(ii) Providing a detailed basis for development control
(iii) Providing the basis for co-ordinating development
(iv) Dringing before the public local and detailed planning
It is concluded that most of the published structure and local plans 
did not fulfill their intended functions because of a number of 
difficulties, including constraints in resources and in adapting 
planning procedures designed for unitary authorities for operation 
by a two tier local government system.
• * *
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" ... there should bo a single process which expresses itself 
on the one hand in TPPs, for the purpose of grant and resource 
decisions and on the other in structure and local plans .... 
(which) would form a framework for TPPs."
DEPARTMENT OK THE ENVIRONMENT: 1973
Unlike structure and local plans, the Transport Policies and 
Programmes (TPP) is not a statutory document. The intention is that 
TPPs should stem from the structure plans in order that the SP-LP and 
the TPP will together promote co-ordinated planning.
In this respect, I will comment on the difficulties involved in:
(i) deriving TPP from the structure plan policies;
(ii) promoting on internally co-ordinated TPP.
The TPP and the Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG) system are devised
2to fulfill these further functions. These are namely to:
(iii) eliminate bias towards capital or current expenditures or 
towards particular forms of expenditure;
(iv) reduce the degree of supervision of Government over individual 
schemes;
(v) distribute central government grant in a way that, reflects ns 
far ns possible the needs of individual areas.
With respect to the last function, the Government has never explained 
the basis for the estimation of needs, neither is there any evidence 
to believe that the Government considers need as a significant factor 
in determining TSG.-* Therefore, I will not comment further on the 
success of meeting this objective.
1 fi. 1 THE TP1 > AND THE STRUCTURE AND LOCAL Pl-ANS
Five problems in translating structure plan policies into TPPs 
were discussed in Chapter 16. They are;
FIRSTLY, the long cycle of the land-use plans compared with 
the TPPs, which are revised annually. This results in TPPs 
reflecting the changed transport policies which might eventually 
he incorporated in the structure plan. For instance, the 
Councils which hove changed hands to Labour control at the 
recent elections, would reflect their policy to favour bus 
revenue support, initially in their TPPs, with apparent disregard 
to the structure plans.
SECONDLY, the exclusion of trunk roads from local control which 
is not. conducive to co-ordinated land use-transport strategy.
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THIRDLY, excessive Government controls on the detailed 
allocation of TPP fends which stifles local choice of 
transport programmes.
FOURTHLY, departmental loyalties of the committee chairmen 
and their chief officers which seek to undermine the corporate 
approach to the provision of services.
FIFTHLY, the powers available to the district councils to 
undermine the authority of county council to determine 
transpoi't policies. For example, the County Council is the 
highway authority but district councils have power to provide 
off-street parking.
In addition, two further difficulties arise:
SIXTHLY, the county council can back-track on infrastructure 
provisions, outlined in the development plans and even in the 
TPP. Such back-tracking has become fairly frequent, normally 
resulting soon after changes in political control of local 
councils. Il An example of such an instance, in the case of 
Liverpool Inner Ring Road was given in Chapter 16. Back­
tracking may result in hardship to the public because of the 
following reasons.
Householders along the abandoned route would have unnecessarily 
suffered from blight for a long time.5 Even if the blight is 
lifted, it is unlikely that conditions would significantly 
improve, partly because of the lasting worry by the residents 
that the Council can change its mind, when the political control 
changes hands and partly because a number of buildings along the 
route would have been purchased by the Council and poorly 
maintained awaiting their demolition for the new route.
Moreover, large-scale developments need a few years lead time 
before construction can begin. If councils back-track within • 
the lost few years, from providing the infrastructure as detailed 
in their plans, this results in significant losses to the 
private developer. However, the councils cannot bo held liable 
for refusing to proceed according to the plans.
d
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LASTLY, the implementation of programmes contained in the 
TPP and the land-use plans are co-ordinated only through time. 
Projects only linked through time can loose synchronisation 
if their implementation depends upon different departments. 
For example, delay in construction of an estate often results 
in the unnecessary provision of relief roads.
18.2 PROMOTING INTERNALLY CO-ORDINAThI) TRANSPORT POLICIES AND *(i)
PROGRAMMES
The TPP provide details of five inter-related transport 
expenditure streams, namely;^
(i) highway maintenance
(ii) highway investment
(iii) rood safety, traffic management, car parking and
related expenditures
(iv) public transport revenue support
(v) public transport investment
Major public transport investments were in vogue during the 
early 7°s, however at present they are out of fashion.? The 
larger public transport schemes were the subject of special 
studies, unrelated to the TPP, e.g. Tyneside Metro. 1 will not 
comment on public transport investment appraisal procedures any 
further.
18.2.1 Appraisal of Highway Maintenance Schemes
Highway maintenance accounts for a large fraction of TSG 
eligible expendutures. In the UK, it accounted for 39 per cent 
of all expenditures eligible for TSG during 1978/79.
There is no mechanism to co-ordinate the highway maintenance 
budget with the rest of the TPP expenditure. However, internal 
consistency within the MAINTENANCE programme is achieved, based 
on techniques derived from those initially described in the 
Marshall Report.^
The technique involves assessment of the condition of roads in 
terms of surface qualities (e.g. surface deformation) and on the 
volume and character of traffic using the road. Rased on 
information collected for all the lengths x road forming the 
highway authority's network, competing maintenance schemes 
are given "priority-ratings"The process involves many
subjective judgom nts, for instance, in comparing the need to 
repair a footway with that for reconstructing a road. However, 
the process is unsuitable for co-ordinating maintenance expenditure 
with the rest of the transport programme nor indeed for this type 
of judgement to be discussed by politicians or public. In this 
respect, it has been said by Bridle that, "Marshall sought a 
uniform system (of highway maintenance standards) that can be 
adopted throughout the County so that areas of greatest 
maintenance needs can be identified, uninfluenced by geographical 
or POLITICAL considerations."10
18.2.2 Appraisal of highway Investment Proposals and Highway Design
Highway investment proposals require extensive justification on 
admission to the detailed programme within the TPP. The 
Department of Transport (l) Tp) requires amongst other things, 
information on "Estimated benefits - e.g. COBA if applicable, 
impact on the environment and accident statistics" to be supplied 
as the programme progresses through the annual TPP cycles.'1 
In particular, major highway schemes including most urban schemes 
should be justified in economic terms using the COBA 9 computer 
program. Further the standards for the provision of new roads 
are determined outside the TPP process, essentially based on 
"National Traffic Forecasts" and national design standards.12
CODA (Cost Benefit Analysis) is a procedure for comparing the 
costs of road schemes with the cumulative long-term economic
benefits derived by the road users, the result being expressed 
13as "Net Present Value". The two flow charts, based on those 
provided in the COBA 9 manual, set out the procedures in outline 
(see Fig. 18.01) and in detail (see Fig. 1802).1,1 It is the 
estimation of user benefits that present most of the difficulties 
involved in applying COBA to urban areas.
Firstly, there aie the errors associated with the estimation of 
traffic flows (see Box 1 in Figure 1802). Traffic can be 
classified as that which operates within an urban area (internal 
traffic), those vehicles that visit on urban area from outside 
or vice versa (terminal traffic jor internal-external traffic) 
and those vehicles that ore "passing through" (through traffic 
or external traffic).
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The COHA programme needs ns input data, the volume and speed 
of traffic that uses each existing and proposed link within an 
area of influence which extends well beyond the town.*5 All 
this information needs to be classified by vehicle type and 
should normally be provided over a period of 30 years. The 
quantity of traffic and its speed are the two important variables 
which determine "user costs" and therefore the accuracy in 
estimating these two variables is extcmely important for COBA.
However, a number of expensive surveys are needed to build a
mathematical model of existing traffic, particularly internal 
traffic, and then even assigned flows in urban areas have proved 
to be significantly inaccurate compared with ground counts.16 
Even where an acceptable model of the existing traffic is 
formulated, prediction of future traffic has proved to be 
notoriously inaccurate even over a period of a few years. The 
reasons for these difficulties were explained in Chapter 9«
Secondly, there are errors in estimating the travel time 
associated with varying levels of flow. User costs in C03A are 
based amongst other things, on the sum of individual costs incurred 
in travelling on each link and through each junction described in
the network (see Box 2 in Tig. 18.02). The COBA manual states
that, ~
"The surveys (Urban Congestion Surveys 1963 to 1971 from 
which urban road speed-flow relationships are derived for 
COBA) ore not intended to provide relationships to 
estimate speeds on individual links in urban area; in 
practice urban speeds depend more on junction geometry 
and turning movements than on link characteristics! and 
complex relationships would be required to provide 
reasonable estimates of speeds on each link. However, 
the surveys do provide sufficient information to 
estimate AVEHAGE speeds in towns."1?
In this respect, it is also worth noting, that the COBA manual 
normally prohibits the modelling of urban junctions, all urban 
spoed-flow characteristics having been averaged over the network 
by a pair of linear functions.
The treatment described above may be acceptable when applied ns 
part of an evaluation package for inter-urban roads, ns suggested 
by the Leitch Committee.16 This is because the external and
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internal and internal-external movements contribute substantially 
to the benefits associated with such roads. These two types 
of movements can be modelled within acceptable albeit crude ranges. 
However, in urban areas, because a greater proportion of the 
benefits are based on internal flows the calculations are crude 
in the extreme.
Thirdly, in urban areas, a major proportion of benefits is 
achieved by reduction in accidents. In CODA, for any link or 
junction, Occidents are assumed to vary with respect to a single 
variable, the total vehicle flow. The limited number of 
research work published, express doubts on the validity of this 
assumption, particularly when the flow is high and speeds are 
less than 40 kph, as is normally the cose in urban areas.
Moreover, the monetary values associated with accident losses are 
highly subjective.
Fourthly, traffic category proportions (o.g. proportion of heavy 
vehicles) ore an important factor that determine the trnvel costs 
associated with a road network. For instance, it is several
times more expensive if delays are incurred by a heavy goods 
vehicle than by a car on a leisure trip. However, the programme 
assumes-a single traffic category proportion as over all options to 
be evaluated. This in clearly inadmissible in urban areas where 
the number of specially restricted roads (such as bus-lanes and 
lorry routes) varies from option to option.
Fifthly, the CORA programme assumes that the traffic flows 
incorporated in the do-minimum and the do-something options for a 
given year ore all derived from the same "origin-destination" 
table - fixed trip matrix assumption.22 This assumption is 
particularly crude for application in urban areas. For instance, 
there can be significant variations to the trip-matrix due to 
traffic redistribution associated with the amount of additional 
road space and parking facilities. Adjustments to accommodate 
variable matrices rapidly lend to complications and reduced 
usefulness of the output.
In this discussion, I have only outlined the major errors 
associated with the evaluation of urban road schemes using COMA. 
Pro-ponents of COHA would claim that irrespective of those
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inaccuracies, the procedure enables schemes to bo compared in 
terms of value for money nationally, locally and between 
several options. However, this is also the basis for the 
major objection of using C0I3A, because it is probably true that 
approval from the Department of Transport is fairly automatic 
provided that a proposed scheme is shown to have acceptable 
"economic net benefits" irrespective of other environmental and
, o/tsocial disbenefits.
HIGHWAY DESIGN standards and the methods of forecasting traffic 
flows arc essentially covered respectively in the following 
Department of Transport publications.
(i) Department of Transport (I90l) DEPARTMENTAL STANDARD 
TD9/81, ROAD LAYOUT AND GEOMETRY
(ii) Department of Transport (1981) TRAFFIC APPRAISAL MANUAL 
These publications extend and provide further information 
on using CODA method to highway design.25i However, in reply
to criticisms on the reliability of CODA and the traffic forecast 
the Department of Transport has recently developed a more 
elaborate C013A procedure which employs inter alia a range of 
traffic forecasts.^ The intention is that generally the design 
with the best net present value using COBA should bo accepted.
The approach is intended, for the design of both urban and rural 
roads.
For the above reasons, I question the validity of using COBA 
programme for urban scheme justification and the role of 
DETAILED traffic predictions for determining the standard of 
provision of urban road3. Also the vast amount of independent 
assessments undertaken for road schemes distract attention from 
arriving at internally co-ordinated urban transport policies.
18.2.3 Appraisal of Road Safety, Traffic Management, Car Parking and 
Related Expenditures
Injury accidents are reliably monitored throughout the County and
29remedial measures are often undertaken in a systematic manner. 
Remedies include traffic management, local improvements and road- 
user education. Some of these measures are undertaken for other 
purposes such as increasing the road network capacity.3° Fairly 
extensive area-wide traffic control tneasures arc also undertaken 
under this head.
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Justification for expenditures under this head normally 
concentrates on before and after effects rather than on 
relative value for money in a co-ordinated transport strategy. 
Some research has been undertaken to assess costs and benefits 
associated with this type of expenditure so that it can be 
compared with alternative highway investment. ^  There are two 
major difficulties associated with such exercises. Firstly, 
changes associated with an improvement are normally widespread 
and not easily measured. For instance, the pedostrionisation 
of a chopping street increases traffic flows in the surrounding 
network. Also the effect of the scheme on accidents cannot 
be easily assessed. This is because measurements have to be 
undertaken for a long period of time over an unchanged network 
to arrive at statistically significant conclusions. Secondly, 
there are the uncertainties in the values of time and life 
already referred to.
Therefore the expenditure on these ssasures are not co-ordinated 
with any of the other TPP expenditure streams. However, the 
emotive nature of accidents and the immediate changes associated 
with traffic management measures attract disproportionate 
political and pressure group attention compared with other 
costlier measures.
18.2.4 Appraisal Methods for Public Transport Revenue Support
A number of formulae are used by local councils to subsidise 
competing public transport services. However some of these 
methods are extended to provide a corordinatcd transport 
strategy.
Cole described the approach used in Cheshire to select services 
for s u b s i d y . The method is operated as follows. Firstly, a 
three-year revenue deficit forecast and consequent local 
authority support necessary for bus-operations to remain at the 
existing level is made. Secondly, various assumptions are made 
to allow for the Central Government grant likely to be 
available to support public transport. The balance needs to be 
supported from local funds. If the pre-determined revenue 
support dons not cover the balance, then a cost-benefit approach 
is used to select that network of operations which will produce
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the highest cost-benefit ration. Clearly this method is not 
co-ordinated with other transport expenditures.
The recommendations of the D Tp is to maintain existing bus 
network, subject to good house-keeping economics and service 
revisions in response to change in need.*3 However need is 
notoriously difficult to measure.3^
Slater described the "needs approach" used in Gwent County 
Council.35
In this method, services are selected for support based on a 
three-stage formulae. Stage I is described as a coarse sieve 
based on the proportions of elderly people, the proportion of 
young people and the proportion of married women living in a 
district. Districts with high proportions of these population 
are ranked high in "need" for public transport revenue support.
In Stage II of the analysis an "accessibility correction" is made 
to the Stage I "need" index. In stage III the "need" score is 
compared with a "satisfaction" score based on existing service 
level in the district under consideration, so that communities 
can be arranged in order of priority to undertake improvements 
to standards of services.
Objections to this method are that firstly the system is operated 
independent of other transport expenditure, secondly the 
Xiremature qualification of "need" prevents politfcal judgement 
to operate fully and finally that it does not take into 
consideration the adaptability of people, in making private 
arrangements to satisfy their needs.
Oxfordshire's approach to the problem is to encourage public 
transport user groups to identify local transport services that 
need subsidy.3° The user group then has to urgue its case for the 
County to retain any loss-making operations or to start afresh 
any other subsidised services. If the plea is justified the 
County examines alternative ways of meeting the need, including 
the payment of a subsidy for a public transport operator to man 
a regular service. The operator is selected by open tender. The 
demands for the subsidised services are monitored in order to 
provide data for subsequent revisions.
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In Oxfordshire, because the plea is made directly to the 
politicians, there is some flexibility in finding the total 
revenue support budget and it is also possible to take into 
consideration, the distribution of funds among all the other 
expenditure streams. However there is no evidence that even in 
Oxfordshire, transport expenditures is fully co-ordinated.
1 8 . 5  Current Attempts to Co-Ordinate TPP
In some local authorities, limited attempts have been made to 
co-ordinate the various transport expenditures. The methods 
are based on cost-benefit analysis (CBA), Goals Achievement 
Matrix or some combination of these two methods. ^  The CBA 
techniques are similar to those used in COBA. In Greater London 
Council, the CBA technique is adapted to use a points system 
instead of monetary values. In the GAM approach the objective 
is to formulate a matrix w h o r e  rows of different expenditure 
proposals are point-scored according to fulfilment of pre­
defined objectives. If a proposal wholly fulfilled an objective 
it is given a full score based on the importance of that 
objective. Partial satisfaction is scored pro rata.
Objections to the GAM and CBA methods are ns follows:
(i) Politicians are asked to choose and weight abstract 
policy objectives in GAM or value abstract benefits 
in CBA ns opposed to judging problems and solutions 
as they are presented.
(ii) It is difficult to reflect the arguments of pressure 
groups directly within the systems.
(iii) The vast amount of assessment work involved makes it 
necessary for the bulk of the work to be completed 
by fairly junior staff who will have to make several 
subjective judgements in scoring the goals (costs 
and benefits) achieved without full appreciation of 
council policies.
(iv) The cost of implementing a project is not reflected 
in the effort involved in scoring (GAM only) that 
project. Por instance, a minor traffic management 
scheme involving a few thousand pounds may need ns 
much attention ns a major highway scheme.
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(v) There is no built in mechanism, in either C1JA
or GAM that requires a co-ordinated approach to 
transport appraisal.
(vi) Finally nnd most importantly, the premature
quantification of survey data make the results of 
such exercises to be of little value for political 
decision making. Particularly if the politicians do 
not agree with the priority given to selected projects 
which they judge to bo important, they are likely to 
ignore the professional advice incorporated within the 
system.
1 fl. 3 ELIMIN’m O N  OF IlIAS TOWARDS PAPTICMI-An CATEGORIES OK EXPENDITURES 
It is sometimes claimed that there is an input bias in TPP 
towards capital, road expenditures. This is because in most 
counties the highway capita] input to the TPP is taken not from 
the structure plan but from a separate major highways capital 
expenditure plan or a transportation plan.-^ I will question 
the role of these "two documents" within the context of tho 
"structure plan-TPP local plan" system. However, the following 
advantages arc claimed by the proponents of this system. ' ' 7
Firstly, that it helps the authority to promote flexibility in 
transport planning and avoids commitments to long term, large 
scale expenditures. The flexibility arises because the two 
documents (unlike the SP and LP) ore non-stntutory. However, 
this argument is unjustified 4' o r the following reasons.
(i) The flexibility claimed is short lived because the
"two documents" are published by the local authority 
and would have been cited by the authority in "local 
searches" conducted for the purchase of property within 
the area.
(ii) It is not flexibility that is gained in this approacli 
but independence from public scrutiny and the need to 
justify tile proposals in terms of landu.se strategy.
(jii) Transport proposals that are evolved as part of a co­
ordinated landusc-transport strategy arc easy to 
explain nnd would have been discussed in principle at 
the structure planning stages nnd then in detail, at
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the local planning stages. Proposals identified 
by such process are less likely to meet with public 
resistance than schemes essentially based on technical 
analysis. I have already shown that public resistance 
is an important reason for authorities needing to 
back-track from proposed schemes.
Secondly, it is sometimes claimed by the proponents that the 
statutory processes controlling the construction of urban 
transport infrastructure are so slow that a longer lead time 
than that covered by structure and local plans is required.
The counter-arguments are as follows:
(i) It normally requires not more than a decade under the 
traditional transport planning process from the 
identification of an urban road scheme to the beginning 
of construction. This period can he significantly 
reduced by co-ordinating the proposal with landuse 
plans and by changes to the statutory procedures. A 
method of reducing the pre-construction period by at 
least five years by introducing changes to the 
statutory procedures was described by Robin Wilson.
(ii) The transport planning methodology is inefficient in
— predicting long term trends. Therefore it is better to 
select a long term strategy acceptable with a number of 
possible out-turns rather than to test a limited number 
of detailed network plans.
(iii) The bulk of the design and statutory work necessary for 
individual road schemes are carried out only about 
three years before construction. Therefore it should 
not be difficult to discuss the implications of a 
transport strategy as part of the structure plan and 
the details of the road proposals with the relevant 
local plans.
Thirdly, that detailed long term transport planning as 
exemplified by the two-documents is necessary for a number of 
reasons, the main reasons being:
(i) land can be reserved, thus reducing scheme costs;
(ii) there is a need to provide for increased future
traffic resulting from increased car ownership;
(iii) some exciting projects are so indivisible and
expensive that they can only be undertaken on a single 
long span basis, c.g. Tyneside Metro.
1 8 .1 4
My counter arguments for the above reasons are as follows:
(i) Long term plans are normally not detailed enough to 
reserve land. Long term reservations only increases 
blight since local authorities are not obliged to 
purchase land if construction is not due to start for 
ten years. Presently most county authorities, having 
rejected a number of inherited road proposals, are 
selling land they have acquired for the construction of 
urban roads planned in the 60s.
(ii) Several problems are associated with future traffic
predictions. Those have been dealt with by a number of 
authors. The exercise is further complicated when 
applied to urban areas for reasons discussed earlier in 
this chapter. In any case, the significant influence 
of political and social factors will make this approach 
invalid.
(iii) Professor Peter Hall and Stephen Plowden are amongst two 
of several authors who argue against undertalcing existing 
but expensive and indivis ible long-term projects.
The main problems with such projects are that serious 
mistakes can be made in predicting the long term costs 
and benefits, they can lock a number of future 
alternatives irreversibly, they are essentially self- 
fulfilling (for instance by generating their own demand) 
and that they are normally not justified in stages (which 
leads to a profitably initial stage of the scheme hiding 
further unjustified developments)
10.4 REDUCTION' OK SUPERVISION BY GOVERNMENT
The TPP/TSG system is intended to give local authorities greater 
freedom j.n planning local transport provisions. The requirement 
to submit TPP annually with further independent justification 
such as CODA assessments while structure and local plans are 
revised less frequently is contradictory to this intention. The 
need to review TPP frequently has two further disadvantages. It 
provides on opportunity for the engineer to ignore the structure 
plan as the specific vehicle dealing with communications and 
transport. The TPP being a document to negotiate central 
government grants and capital expenditure allocations tends to
. U sbecome the key input in the lnnduse-transport planning process.
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In the development of my rccommendntionn, X will examine 
ways to suitably mesh landuse-transport planning with grant 
negotiations.
18.5 CONCLUSION
The TPP system is intended to fulfil the twin aims of co­
ordinating policies and operating within a framework defined 
by the structure and local plans. Presently these aims are 
not fulfilled because of a number of difficulties identified 
in this Chapter.
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"On reading this paper on the problem of optional design, 
my first reflection was that if God has been exposed to 
Professor Harris's instruction, He would have postponed the 
creation indefinitely and applied to the ford Foundation 
for a research grant."
In the last two chapters, I identified and commented on the short­
comings of the SP-LP and the TPP systems. In the previous chapters, it 
was shown that to be successful, any new planning method must take 
cognizance of the three significant factors - party political control, 
pressure group resistance and chief officers' influence in that order.
The aim of this chapter is to recommend modifications to the planning 
system described in the previous two chapters. A brief outline (see 
Fig. 19.01) of a more satisfactory method of planning, essentially 
npjjlicable in county and district councils which have political stability 
for about four years, is also given. The issues considered and suggested 
remedies are discussed in the rest of this chapter and summarised in 
Fig. l'.*02 (table).
19.1 DISCUSSION' OF PRIMARY FEATURES OF THE SYSTEM
The regional plans unnecessarily restrict the scope of the structure 
plans. Also the former are not flexible enough to accommodate changes 
in Governments' policies (see para 17.2.1).
It is recommended that the Government should issue a sot of "NATIONAL 
AIMS AND POLICIES" * (see footnote) as they apply to a particular 
county as an acceptable framework for strategic planning at the county 
level.
Political control of councils changes frequently. However, political 
consideration is the most influential factor in local government 
decision making. Therefore detailed, long term planning is unrealistic 
(note: Present practice is somewhat similar to my recommendation given 
below. )
It is recommended that structure and local plans should be prepared to
* MAIN ACTIVITIES IN THE FLOW CHART (SEE FIG. 19.01) WHEN INTRODUCED IN 
THE TEXT ARE GIVEN IN UPPER-CASE LETTERS
Lowry: The Urban Transportation Planning Process^

FIGURE 19.02 (Table)
LIST OF ISSUES CONSIDERED (SEE CHAPTERS 17 AND lfl) AND REMEDIES 
RECOMMENDED IN THE PRESENT CHAPTER
SECTION REF
ISSUE where issue RECOMMENDED REMEDY
discussed
Issues Re) atinq to Structure Plans 
Interpretation of National and Regional Deli cics
1. Regional plans are not statutory 17.2.1 Replace by national aims
not scrutinized in public and and policy statement
long turning-cycles for revisions 
result in out of date reflection 
of Government policies most of 
the time. The plans are too 
restrictive.
Estab 1 ish i ng A inis, Po 1 icios and General Purposes
2. Extensive work leads to infre- 17.2.2 
quent revisions of structure
plans. SPs do not reflect council 
policy for long periods of 
currency.
3. Unrealistic long term, trend 17.2.2
predictions lead to little scope
for positive guidance.
Reduce work load by adopting 
methods recommended. In 
particular prepare a 
feasibility plan (see para 
19.1)
Detailed considerations for 
SP should be limited to 5 
years. A limited discussion 
of future for a further 10 
years (see para 19.1).
Indicatir;g Action Areas 
>k. Restrictive requirements are now 17.2.3 
relaxed.
Providing Guidance Outside Local Plan Areas 
5» Development control policies for 17.2.^ 
rural areas.
Providing Dasis for Co-Ordinating Decisions 
6. Co-ordination with other internal 17.2.5 
council functions are unsatisfactory 
because of traditional rivalries
No changes recommended.
No changes recommended.
Provide structure plans to 
be the central medium for 
a number of grant negotiations 
with Government. E.g. inc­
lude TPP as part of SP.
FIGURE 1 9 .0 2 ( 1 1 )
ISSUE SECTION REF RECOMMENDED REMEDY
Co-Ordination of SP with other 
functions of a district council 
is unsatisfactory.
17.2.3 Statements ns basis for 
feasibility plans. SP to 
be based on feasibility plans 
prepared by district councils
Co-ordination with other public 
authorities and statutory under­
takers unsatisfactory because 
structure plan policies are 
difficult to quantify.
17.2.5 Use feasibility plans in 
such negotiations prior to * 
publication of structure 
plan.
Bringing Main Planning Issues before Minister and Public
Structure plans are extensively 17.2.6
modified by Government but the
latter unwilling to financially
commit themselves to the
proposals.
10. SP consultations too vague for 17.2.6 
comments by individuals. Public 
consultation takes place too 
late for full integration at the 
relevant stage.
SP should be a main vehicle 
for grant negotiations.
This can be achieved by 
preparing policies and 
programmes reports (such as 
TPP) for all relevant services 
os part of structure planning 
every four years.
(a) Illustrate SP proposals
by outline proposals contained 
in the feasibility plans.
(b) Input from feasibility 
plan consultations available 
sufficiently early to take 
public views into consider­
ation when preparing SP.
Issues Relating to bocal Plans
Applying the .Strategy of the Structure Plan
1 1 . Excessive work involved in plan 17.3.1 
preparation leads to infrequent 
revisions. Therefore plans do not 
reflect recent council policies.
12. A number of difficulties exist 17.3.1 
in operating a two tier system
of planning.
Reduce workload by sharing 
with developers including 
council's housing 
departments.
Structure plan should be 
based os for ns possible on 
feasibility plans which 
include district policies.
FIGLI UE 1 9 .0 2 (1 1 1 )
ISSUE SECTION REF RECOMMENDED REMEDY
13. Practical difficulties on 17.3»1 Feasibility plans will
implementino the structure 
plan, e.o. geological problems 
only come to light on detailed 
studies.
reduce such problems.
Providing Detailed basis for Development Control 
Ì.U. Local plans do not sntisfact- 17»3«2 Feasibility plans to
orily consider development include input from
difficulties even when known. developers.
Providing a basis for Co-Ordinating Development 
15. Little power exists for local 17*3»3 (a) Continuous working with
authorities to co-ordinate public developers during plan
and private development and preparation will improve
expenditures. districts' ability to co-
ordinate.
(b) Commitment by councils to
provide infrastructure is
increased in the recommended
method. This will improve co-
ordination.
(c) Frequent revisions coupled
with automatic loss of out-
line permission not used at
the end of a plan period will
help in this respect.
16. Dringing Local and Detailed Issues Before Public 
Detailed issues come to light 17.3«^ (a) Illustrations using
only at local planning stage. feasibility plan proposals
However procedures to deal with enhances public understanding.
local plan objections are Such consultations begin even
unsatisfactory even when compared before structure plan
with old style development plans. preparation.
Also council staff ore too over- (b) Workload for plan
worked during plan-preparation stage 
to undertake further public
preparation is shared with 
developers' staff and is
participation work part-time. therefore reduced overall.
This will lead to council
staff having more time for
public consultation.
ISSUE SECTION BEF
FIGURE 1 9 .0 2 ( IV )
RECOMMENDED REMEDY
1 7 .
1 saucs Rel ntinn to Transport. I’oHr.ics and 
Deriving TPP From Structure Plan Po 1 ic)c 
Long turning cycle of Si’s annual 18.1 
revision of Tl’l’ causes latter to 
lend the former.
Programmes
(a) SP and TPP to bo revised 
simultaneously every four
years
(b) TPP to be nn appendix to
SP
18. Trunk roads outside local 18.1
control
19. Excessive Government control 18.1
on the detailed allocation of 
TPP funds
20. Departmental loyalties under- 18.1
mine corporate approach
21. Ability of districts to under- 18.1 
mine transport policies of
county council
22. Councils can back-track from 18.1
implementing plans without
penalty. However, blight along 
planned routes not entirely 
lifted. Moreover the practice 
causes hardship to private 
developers.
23. Land-use and transport plans 
linked through time only, lose 
synchronism when progressed by 
separate departments.
Public consultation should 
include os a last resort, 
information on all transport 
projects outside the control 
of the local councils.
Where direct Government 
intervention is warranted to 
ensure the provision of 
selected services, make these 
statutory and show them 
separately in the TPP.
Abolish practices that 
perpotutatc undesirable 
departmental practices, e.g. 
transport grants should be 
negotiated on the basis of a 
combined Sl’-TPP rather than 
an annual TPP.
Opportunities increased in 
the recommended SP-LP-TPP 
system to arrive at mutually 
agreeable policies.
(a) short term planning will 
help.
(b) Feasibility plans, co­
operation within councils 
and with the developers, 
improved public participation 
will all help in this respect.
(a) Link transport plans to 
bench mark events in 
structure and local plans.
(b) Producing SI’ and TPP 
together helps.
\
ISSUE SECTION REF
FIGURE 19.02(V)
RECOMMENDED REMEDY
Promoting Intcrnnlly Co-Ordinated Tl’P 
2 h .  Major expenditure streams such 18.2 
as highway investment within the 
Tl’R are not internally co­
ordinated.
25. Use of Marshal Maintenance 18.2.1 
Standards hinders co-ordination
of inter-related transport 
expenditures. Premature 
application of standards does 
not help political decision 
making.
26. Because highway investment 18.2.2 
proposals must comply with
special economic and environ­
mental standards, co-ordination 
of these proposals with other 
expenditure streams is under­
mined.
27. Hoad safety, traffic management 18.2.3 
and related measures do not 
employ any comprehensive approaches 
for evaluation nor for co­
ordination.
Generally, negotiations based 
on subjective assessment and 
local data should replace 
assessment based on treating 
each expenditure stream 
separately. Further research 
should be undertaken to 
devise a central framework 
for comparing the cost and 
benefits in the long and 
short term and to provide 
information for discussing 
TPP options (see Chapter 20). 
Overall maintenance needs 
should be discussed as part 
of transport provisions ior 
defined local plan areas.
(a) COBA is shown to be 
invalid for urban schemes.
Use a beitch type assessment 
ns part of the central frame­
work for justification.
(b) Highway design standards 
should be based more on 
willingness to spend capital. 
Design standards to determine 
a likely range for the level 
of service that might result 
in providing a highway scheme 
within a roughly pre­
determined budget.
The decision-making process 
should be improved by 
including all tlio information 
necessary as part of the 
framework.
FIGURE 1 9 .0 2 ( V I )
28. A needs approach or cost 
benefit approach for the 
evaluation of public transport 
revenue support measures do not 
lend to co-ordination with other 
transport measures.
ISSUE
18.2.4 Method used in Oxfordshire
County Counci 1 satisfactory 
for development and 
inclusion in a co-ordinated 
framework.
SECTION REF RECOMMENDED REMEDY
E1 imination of Bias
29. Bias in favour of capital
expenditure introduced when TPP 
receives its input from "Major 
Highways Capital Programme" or 
from recommendations contained 
in traditional transportation 
studies.
1(3.3 Abolish this practice. The
recommended SP-TPl'-l.P system 
satisfactory to identify 
investment needs and 
progress the projects.
Reduction of Supervision by Government
30. Requirement to submit TPP 18.4
annually is contrary to reduction 
of supervision. This requirement 
also encourages preparation of TPP 
as a document independent of SP.
Grants should be negotiated 
every four years on the basis 
of an SP which contains TPP 
as an appendix.
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repeat existing policies over o period of five years only. However, 
structure plans should look forward for a further period of about ten year 
This analysis of the future should indicate the likely outcomes that 
might result in implementing the short term plans and identify different 
strategics that may be adopted for the future. For example, a structure 
plan might indicate that a town should increase its housing stock by 600 
houses over the next five years. The future analysis will suggest the 
probability and estimates of long-term needs for further increases in 
housing stock in the town so that local planners can bear in mind this 
possible need when planning for the shortterm.
Extensive survey and prediction work associated with traditional planning 
makes it impracticable to undertake short-term revisions to the plans 
(See para 17.2.2).
• The workload can be reduced and shared as follows:
(i) limit detailed planning to produce only the "five year" 
plan;
(ii) combine structure and local planning work wherever possible;
(iii) share the workload with prospective developers;
(iv) restrict data and processing requirements for long term
structure planning (5th year to the 15th year period) to l:a 
consistent with the tentative nature of such predictions.
In the next sub section, I will describe the use of a "feasibility 
plan" that, will help to reduce planning workload. The feasibility plan 
also have other advantages.
19.1.1 Preparation of Feasibility Plan
To prepare the feasibility plan, the county council expands the 
national aims and policies and incorporates its own "aims and policies" 
to produce a "COUNTY ATMS AND P01.ICY STATEMENT". In this statement, for 
instance the county council will state its policies towards road 
construction in order to accommodate future traffic growth.
The county council will send one of these statements to each of the 
district councils. The statement for each district will reflect the needs 
of the district as interpreted by the county council. The district 
council will combine its own aims and policios with the "county aims and 
policy statement" to form a co-ordinated "D1STKICT AIMS AND POLICY 
STATEMENT". This statement, for instance, will identify the local
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authorities policies towards growth, indicating wherever possible 
the extent and nature of desired growths by location.
This approach is intended to identify and iron out, at on early stage, 
policy differences in operating a two tier planning system (sec para
17.3.1).
If the district finds the county's aims and policies substantially 
unacceptable, the Secretary of State for the Environment will arbitrate 
between the two authorities in order to produce a "district aims and 
policy statement" which is binding on both councils.
The district council will invite tenders from those proposing to under­
take large scale development for instance including minerals working 
in the district. The proposals need not be restricted to the short 
term, however the councils should not commit themselves to support 
proposals well outside their elected term of office. The "district 
aims and policy statement" will be issued to the developers as a 
guidance in the preparation of "DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALS". Proposals can 
also originate, for instance from the council's housing department.
The approach adopted in this paragraph would reduce complaints regarding 
the development potential of sites identified in the local plan (see 
para 17.3.2). _
At this stage the developers need to submit only outline proposals.
They will identify the sites and describe the essential features, 
problems and the viability of the proposed developments. For instance, 
with respect to viability, the developers will justify the shopping 
facilities that will be available to serve proposed residential 
developments. On receipt of the tenders the district will compile a 
"FEASiniLITY PLAN".
The "feasibility plan" will include the following sections:
(i) the district aims and policy statement;
(ii) proposals recommended by the district, grouped in terms 
of urban settlements and their hinterland, wherever 
possible;
(iii) bids for largo scale works and expenditures by the county.
This should be identified with outline of proposals. For 
example, an extension to a link road identified with a 
development proposal. The district might propose that the 
county should finance the extension to complete a bypass.
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( iv) tenders received and substantially incorporated in the 
recommended proposals.
(v) Rejected proposals with reasons for rejection.
The "STRUCTURE PLAN AND TRANSPORT POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OPTIONS"
(SP 01 ’T1 ON'S) to be prepared by the county council will be based essentially 
on the feasibility plans.
19.1.2 Preparation of SP nnd TPP
The proposals recommended by the "feasibility plans" are re-arranged 
to form groups of development proposals on a countywide basis. The 
intention is that each group, after negotiations nnd adjustments should 
lead to SP options^ that embody strategic aims, policies and proposals 
acceptable to the county council. The views expressed during "PRELIMINARY 
CONSULTATION" should be considered at this stage. This method will 
provide practical propositions for the several public authorities nnd 
private groups to base their negotiations (see para 17.2.5).
In preparing options, negotiations will be initiated by the county 
planning department but in negotiations relating to outline planning 
proposals, the relevant district planning department should actively 
participate. These negotiations would normally involve, in addition 
to the planning departments' staff, representatives from the developers, 
other local authority departments and outside bodies such as the 
statutory undertakers. There will be other SP and TPP meetings where 
the districts should be kept informed through observers or by the 
minutes of the meeting. The guiding principle should be that every 
assistance should be given for the districts to prepare local piano 
that amplify the intentions of the structure' plan and that negotiations 
for SP and TPP should be seen as Betting the context for LP negotiations 
later. This arrangement will rectify short comings identified in para
17.3.1 - a function of the local plan is to apply the strategy of the 
structure plan.
A number of those SP and TPP options (SP OPTIONS) are selected now for 
public consultation. Also a revised county aims and policy statement" 
is produced that will reflect those aims and policies that arc likely 
to be achieved in practice. The county council may recommend a 
particular SI> OPTION to the public. The documents for public SP 
CONSULTATION will include the following:
(i) The revised County Aims ami Policy Statement.
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(ii) The SP and the related TPP options.
(iii) Development proposals that leeito the different options.
(iv) Illustration of strategic proposals using particular
development proposals ns examples. In using illustrations,
It should be made clear that the councils are not committed 
to accept any of the proposals at this stage.
(v) Guide-lines for small scale or other developments not 
covered specifically in LP.
(vi) The various "feasibility plans". These should be readily
available as separate documents for public inspection with a 
summary exhibited.
(vii) The basic statistics of each district and town, e.g. existing 
populations.
(viii) An outline budget associated with each option, apportioned
by major expenditure streams to each district. For instance 
some typical expenditure streams may be transportation, 
education and council housing.
It is recommended that consideration should be given to preparing 
policies and programme statements for eacli expenditure stream of each 
option in a manner similar to TPP options. Those should undergo public 
scrutiny as part of the structure plan consultation process. The 
approved policy-and programme option for each stream including 
transportation (this will be the TPP) will be presented as appendices 
to the structure plan. However, in order to reduce confusion, I will 
continue to refer to this more comprehensive document ns the structure 
plan (SP). The formal SP FOR SUBMISSION to the Central Government is 
prepared now by the county council. This document will take into 
consideration public comments and will involve further negotiations 
■with district councils, developers and other bodies. The ENQUIHY IN 
PUBLIC (EIP) will be based on the submitted SP. All interested parties 
are given an opportunity to submit their views at the EIP. Thedistrict 
councils and the county council can begin their local plan preparation 
soon after the SP is submitted for approval.
The approved structure plan will consist of the letter of approval, 
the modifications by the Secretaries of State and the modified Submitted 
Structure Plan. The latter will cover the following sections.
(i) Introduction
(ii) Background discussion to the Plan including the nature of 
proposals received for development, the options considered 
and the reasons for selecting the particular strategy.
(iii) The Bevised County Aims and Policy Statement.
(iv) The short term strategic proposals in each local plan district 
(or subject area) indicating l ikely areas for development and 
thoughts for the future - (A discussion on the possibilities 
and directions for further development as applicable in the 
long term should follow each short term proposal).
(v) Strategic proposals to prepare a local plan applicable to 
areas not covered by specific local plans. (A rural areas 
local plan will be prepared by each district based on these 
proposals.)
(vi) Putting the plan into effect -
Financial resources 
Implementation 
Monitoring
(vii) Key Diagram
(viii) Appendices (for instance the TPP).
19.1.3 Preparation of LP
Progress in publishing draft local plans will depend inter alia on the 
extent to which the district council agrees with the proposals contained 
in the submitted SP for the area under consideration. It is unlikely 
that the recommended method could lend to a district council disagreeing 
with proposals for a largo number of local plan areas. Where the 
disagreement is substantial, the district should have the right to 
delay the 1.P preparation for a number of areas until the SP is approved. 
However, on approval of the SP, the district council will be expected 
to commence work on the outstanding local plans and submit them for 
approval by the county council within six months from the date of 
approval of the former plans. Failing this the county council will be 
expected to prepare the outstanding local plans.
The approval of the SP empowers the county council to approve local 
plans which together with the former become the only valid landusc 
plans for the area. If a county council fails to approve a local plan 
shortly after submission, the Secretary of State for the Environment 
shall "call in" the submitted local plan for arbitration. The Secretary 
of State should take into consideration the provisions of the approved 
SP. However his decision should be final and binding except in points 
of law when the decision may be contested in the High Court.
The local plan will include an outline of all the major proposals
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approved for the area. The development will be undertaken in stages 
wherever possible. This should be agreed during negotiations for local 
plan preparation. The stages will be clearly identified in the local 
plan. The approval of the local plan automatically provides outline 
planning permissions for the identified areas. It further commits 
the councils to provide the infrastructure works, which stemmed from 
the SI1 and identified in the local plans as necessary for the 
development to proceed.
In ttio method described above, the local plan covers a period of about 
five years. It will take in excess of one year after the local 
elections for the district councils to publish their local plans.
Until a local plan is published the previous local plan for the area 
will be in force. This plan will over-run into the term of the next 
council for a period of one to two years and will elapse soon after a 
new local plan is approved. The outline planning permissions given 
by the old plan will also elapse except for those stages where detailed 
permissions have been obtained. Detailed permissions will enjoy 
safeguards in a similar manner as at present.
19.1.^ Further Discussion on TPP
The TPP will be prepared in similar detail to the Structure Plan to 
cover a period of five years. It will look forward for a further 
period of up to ten years, ns applicable, indicate the likely outcomes 
that might result in implementing the short term plans and recommend 
different strategies that may be adopted for the future.
Each group of development proposals that form a structure plan option 
will provide the basis for one or more TPP options. The intention is 
that the transport expenditure identified ns necessary to promote 
a proposed landuse plan will form the initial input to the TPP. The 
transport proposals need not be necessarily local in nature. For 
instance, if a structure plan option is to form dispersed residential 
developments supported by employment and commercial development in a 
large county town then it may be necessary to improve the transport 
infrastructure leading into the town.
INTERNAL CO-ORDINATION of expenditure streams is achieved by 
considering problems step wise from projects of national importance 
down to problems associated witli urban settlements. A number of options 
are drawn up to solve existing and anticipated short term problems by
different methods but using n co-ordinoted approach. Long term 
problems may be identified and taken into consideration but should 
not dictate the outcome to short term problems.
ELIMINATION OF BIAS towards different terms of expenditure is 
encouraged by this approach because of the following two reasons. 
Firstly, discussions in public will provide different approaches to 
solve the problems of an area. Secondly, when consideration is 
given to solve problems which are internally co-ordinated by areas, 
this will produce professional groups who will think in terms of 
solving landuse transportation problems. This is different from the 
present approach where professionals are compartmentalised into 
specialist streams solving a problem in a given manner, e.g. one 
stream solving traffic problems by highway construction and the next 
by traffic management. Presently, minimum consideration is given to 
generate intermediate solutions.
TO 11EDUCE Tim DEGREE. OF SUPERVISION it is reasonable that the 
Government should take measures to -
(i) safeguard the standards associated with certain provisions;
(ii) make the local councils more accountable to the local
community.
Standards are maintained at present by several means. For example 
by issuing departmental standards and circulars. The following 
additional recommendation is made in order to reflect national 
priorities in local transport provisions. When the Government wants 
certain minimum levels of expenditure to be maintained it should do so 
by specifying the need directly. This direct approach will help to 
reduce confusion in local decision making. Also the exclusion of 
statutory expenditures from the overall transporg budget will help 
the public appreciate the level of flexibility available in local 
decision making.
CONCLUSION
The structure and local plans should cover a period of five years with 
the former dealing with likely outcomes for a further period of ten 
years. Structure planning work should be based on feasibility studies 
undertaken in conjunction with district councils and major developers. 
This approach would amongst other things produce realistic proposals, 
reduce tension in operating a two tier planning system and enhance 
consultation with public and other authorities.
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The Transport policies and programmes (TPP) should he prepared at 
part of the SP to cover a similar period. Programmes in the same 
manner should also he prepared for other expenditure streams. These 
programmes should undergo public consultation and should form 
appendices to the SP.
CHAP T E R  TWENTY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
20.1 DETAILED STUDIES FOR APPLYING THE RECOMMENDED 
METHOD
20.2 APPLICATION TO OVERSEAS COUNTRIES
20.3 CONCLUSION
In this research local political discontinuity, pressure group resistance 
and lack of continuity of chief engineers were identified to be the 
important factors that resulted in low implementation of plans. In 
Chapter 19, I recommended a new planning methodology that is more likely 
to be in phase with political changes in local councils. Provisions were 
also made for increased public participation. Following detailed studies 
need to be undertaken before the recommended method can be applied in 
practice.
20.1 DETAILED STUDIES FOR APPLYING THE RECOMMENDED METHOD
1. At present, local authorities adopt an annual budgetory 
cycle. The implications by basing the financial negotiations 
with the Government on a structure plan published every four 
years or so need to be examined.
2. A procedure whereby different sets of proposals covering a 
specific area are presented and discussed in public may be 
satisfactory to improve co-ordination and public participation. 
However, such an approach will not be appropriate for 
determining national priorities between projects, for instance 
to determine the relative importance of two local road schemes 
from different partsof the country. How can this problem be 
overcome other than by promulgation of expenditure norms as at 
present?
20.2 APPLICATION TO OVERSEAS COUNTRIES
Traditional planning methods that were rejected in the United 
States and Europe are now being applied with greater vigour in 
developing countries. These countries with their very rapid urban 
growth need an effective transport planning process. The methods 
now being imported from developed countries are expensive to apply, 
yet there is little evidence that the problems that were identified 
in this thesis do not also affect traditional plans in developing 
countries. For instance, planning proposals for developing 
countries should reflect the availability of capital and professional 
resources for implementing the plans. Also terms of office of 
provincial and central government in developing countries do not 
normally extend for periods in excess of about five years. This 
should be a criteria in setting planning horizons in these countries.
20.3 CONCLUSION
Further research should be undertaken - 
(i) on the detailed application of the planning method 
recommended in chapter nineteen;
(ii) to identify factors that influence plan implementation 
in developing countries and to recommend planning 
methods.
PLAN DETAILS AND CALCULATIONS FOR FMR AND! FMQ FOR THE 
FOLLOWING PLAITS ARE CONTAINED IN TITIS APPENDIX ONE
1. MERSEYSIDE AREA LAITDUS3 TRANSPORTATION STUDY
2. TYNE WEAR PLAN
3. ST. HELENS TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT PLAN 
4* COVENTRY TRANSPORTATION STUDY': PHASE I
5. SOUTHAMPTON OUTLINE TRANSPORTATION PLAN
6. TEESSIDE SURVEY AND PLAN
7. PORTSMOUTH FUTURE RO.AD PATTERN
8. NOTTINGHAN PRIMARY HIGHWAY NETWORK
9. CAMBRIDGE TRANSPORTATION PLAN
10. LEICESTER TRAFFIC PLAN
11. OXFORD CENTRAL AREA STUDY
12. ABINGDON ENVIRONMENT ..AND TRANSPORT STUDY
13. BATH : A PLANNING AND TRANSPORT STUDY
14. SLOUGH TRANSPORTATION STUDY
15. HERTFORD WARE AND HODDESDON TRANSPORTATION STUDY
16. HITCHIN LETCHWORTH BALDOCK TRANSPORTATION STUDY
17. DIDCOT ABINGDON WANTAGE TRANSPORTATION STUDY
18. SELNEC HIGHWAY PLAN DETAILS ARE CONTAINED IN SECTION 5.7 
OF THIS THESIS.
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A1
MERSEYSIDE AREA LANDUSE-TRANSPOR TAT I ON STUDY
DETAILS OK RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND BUDGETED PHASING
NON-TRUNK ROADS - 1 9 6 6  PRICE BASIS ¿1 MILLIONS
SCHEME
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1966 1970 1972 197't
to to to to
19(>7 1971 1973 1975
1
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
1/»
31
32
33
3't
35
36
37
3«
LIVERPOOL
Outer Ring Road - A59 to A580 3.88
A505O Queens Drive/Rice Lane Flyover - 1.10
dual 2-lane
Lower House Lane/dwerry House Lane -
Improvement - East Lancashire Road to
Muirhond Avenue 0.10
Rocky Lane/West Derby Road Improvement -
Shicl Road to Muirhead Avenue 1.40
A59 - Scotland Road - Improvement to dual 
3-lane motorway - Queensway Tunnel to
Wallasey Tunnel 0.80
Tunnel Relief Flyovers - Islington to City
Centre 1.80
Roe Street/Hood Strect/Line Street
Improvement 0 . U 0
ASO^ iO Aigburth Road Improvement - Aigburth
Vale to Ullet Road 0 . U 0
A J O ' i O Aigbnrth Rond Improvement - St Mary's
Road to Mersey Rond 1.10
Kingswny Tunnel - First Tube 15*20
Inner Ring Road - Northern Leg - Stage 1 6.00
Inner Ring Road - Northern Leg - Stage II
Islington Radial - Inner Ring Road to North- 
South Primary
Great Homer Strcet/St Anne Street Improvement
Kirkdale Road to Islington
Low Hill Improvement - Islington to Upper
Parliament Street
Kingswny Tunnel - Second Tube
Scotland Road Motorway- Wallasey Tunnel to
East Lancashire Road Extension
East Lancashire Road Extension
2.00
2. 0 0 - 2.00
60
0.80
0.90
2.50
2.00
]  .00
A3
156 Inner Ring Rond - Water Front Leg 2.00
Gt Howard St to South Lancs Motorway
48 Outer Ring Rond - A57 to Soutli Lancs
Motorway 2.90
47 Outer Ring Road - A57 to A58O 3.80
50 Garston Bypass O .70 0.80
BUDGETEU PHASING
CUMULATIVE TOTAL NON TRUNK ROAD SCHEMES
23.20 17 .0 1 lfi.17 5-Ko
23.20 40.21 58.38 6 1.16
A3
MERSEYSIDE AREA LAND USE TRANSPORTATION STUDY
DETAILS CE RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND EXPENDITURE'PHASING
NON THUNK ROADS - 1 9 6 6  PRICE BASIS £ MILLIONS
SCHEME
NO SCHEIE DESCRIPTION
1966
to
1969
1970 
to
1971
1972 
to
1973
197*»
to
1975
15 BIRKENHEAD
15 A552 Borough Road Improvement - Nelson St
to Whetstone Lane 0.20
20 A553 Bidston Bypass and Wallasey Spur from
A552 to Mid-Wirral Motorway 1.50
21 Birkenhead Tunnel Approach Roads 3.50
22 Rockferry Bypass - New Kerry Bypass to A U l 0.90
CUMULATIVE TOTAL,NON TRUNK ROADS 6.10 6.10 6 .10 6 .10
CHESHIRE
2 Hooton Industrial Road - Mid Wirral Motorway
to Study Boundary 0.60
CUMULATIVE TOTAL - NON TRUNK ROADS 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
LANCASHIRE
3 Prescot Bypass - A57 to A 58 0.60
*»9 Bootle-Thornton Diversion (Lancashire Section) 1.2 5
CUMULATIVE TOTAL - NON THUNK ROADS 0.60 0.60 1.85 1.85
WALLASEY
16/10 Motorway Access - Docks Link ft Bayswater Rd 
Link
2.60
17 A5088 Poulton Bridge Road Improvement - Beck
Road to Dock Road 0.03
19 A551 Leasowe Road Improvement - Pasture Road
to Wallasey Village 0.20
20 A553 Bidston Bypass ft Wallasey Spur - A552
to Mid Wirral Motorway 1.50
CUMULATIVE TOTAL - NON TRUNK ROADS '*.33 4.33
e-> *».33
BOOTLE
li A565 Rimrose Rd - Rimrose Bridge to Balliol Rd 2.00
5 A5058 Balliol Rd Improvement Derby Rd to A 
A 5057
0.30
'19 Booti e-Thornton Diversion (Bootle Section) 1.85
CUMULATIVE TOTAL - NON TRUNK ROADS 
CUMULATIVE TOTAL - MALTS NON TRUNK ROADS
2.30
38.51
2.30
56.82
3.35
7/i.8l
3.35
80.61
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MERSEYSIDE AREA LAND USE TRANSPORTATION STUDY
DETAILS OF RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND EXPENDITURE PHASING
NON TRUNK ROADS 19 6 6  PRICE BASE £  M ILLIO NS
SCHEME
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1966 1970 1972 1974
to to to to
1967 1971 1973 1975
TRUNK ROADS
23 A59 Warbreck Moor Improvement Park Lane to
A567 0.40
24 South Lancashire Motorway - Outer Ring Rond
to Queen's Drive 7 . 0 0
25 Moreton Spur - Mid Wirral Motorway to
Moreton Road O .30
26 Mid-Wirral Motorway - Study Boundary to
Wallasey Tunnel 12.20
The construction of the following schemes 
27 to 30 are assumed to take place evenly 
distributed between 1970 to 1991
27 Liverpool - Preston Motorway - Outer Ring 
Road to Study Boundary
28 A565 Crosby Road Improvement A5C36 to South 
Road
29 Dock Road - A565 to A567
30 A567 Church Road Improvement B!>422 to 
Boundary Road
Toual Cost of £5.2G million equally spread
over 22 yenrs 0.48 0.48 0.48
CUMULATIVE TOTAL - TRUNK ROADS 19.90 20.38 20.86 21.34
PUBLIC TRANSPORT
City Centre Rail Links 3*20 5*5°
Electrification and Station Improvements 2.00
CUMULATIVE TOTAL - PUBLIC TRANSPORT SCHEMES 0 3.20 10.70 10.70
FIGUREA5
MERSEYSIDE AREA LANDUSE-TUANSPORTATION STUDY
D ETAILS OF SCHEMES COMPLETED AND ANNUAL OUT-TURN OK EXPENDITURE
NON-TRUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN  19 6 6  PRICE BASIS  £  M ILLIO N S
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1966 1978 
to to
1967 1969
1970 
to
1971
1972 
to
1973
1974
to
3975
LIVERPOOL
6 A5058 Queen's Drivc/Rice Lane Ely Over 0.44 0.44 0.22
10 Tunnel Relief Flyovers-Queen's Way Tunnel 0.28 0.56 0.27
34 Gt Homer St/St Anne St - Improved arterial 
from Kirkdale Rond to Islington 0.38 0.38
8 A50/iQ Rocky Lano/West Derby Road improve-
ment from Shiel Road to Muirhead Avenue 0.37 0.37 0.37
14 Kingswny Tunnel - First Tube 2.35 5.07 5.07 2.53
11 Roe Street/Hood Street/Lirce Street
improved arterials 0.20 0.20
12/13 A.9040 Aigburth Road-Ullet Rond to Serpentine 0.25 0.25
1 M57 Liverpool Outer Ring Road - A59 to A580 1.94 1.94
-i //o(/ ho 
it 61
M57 Liverpool Outer Ring Road A58O to A57 
Stage II, A57 to Soutli Lancashire motorway: 
Stage III, ft Huyton Link 2.49 4.97
36 Kingsway Tunnel - Second Tube 1.50 3.00 3.00
3» East Lancashire Road Extension 1.00
OUT-TURN EXPENDITURE ON RECOMMENDED SCHEMES 4.00 8.32 13.81 13.89 0.00
CUMULATIVE EXPEND I TURF. 4.0012.32 56.13 4).0240.02
BIRKENHEAD
21 Birkenhead Tunnel Approacli Roads 2.04 1.02
15 A552 Borough Road Dualling from Nelson
Street to Wheatstone Lane 0.10 0.10
20 A553 Bidston Bypass - A552 to Mid-W’irrnl 0.14 0.26 0.26
Motorway
22 Rock Ferry Bypass - New Ferry Bypass To A4l 0.38 0.39
OUT-TURN EXPENDITURE ON RECOMMENDED SCHEMES 2.04 1.02 0.24 0.74 0.65
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE 2.04 3.06 3.30 4,o4 4^,69
CHESHIRE
Hooton Industrial Road - Mid W'irrol
Motorway to Study Boundary 0.60
OUT-TURN EXPENDITURE 0.60
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE O.GoO.f.O 0.60 0.60 0.60
A6
MERSEYSIDE AREA LAND-USE TRANSPORTATION STUDY
DETAILS OK SCHEMES COMPLETED AND ANNUAL OUT TURN EXlliNDITUIiE
NON-TRUNK ROADS: EXPENDITURE IN 1966 PRICE BASIS £ MILLIONS
SCHEME
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1966
to
1967
1968
to
19C9
1970 
to
1971
1972 
to
1973
1974 
to
1975
LANCASHIRE
3 Prescot Bypass - A57 to A58 0.14 0.29 0 .15
60 B5192 Improvcment-Maughall Lane to Hall 
Lane
0.4o
109 Deljih Lone improvement - Outer Ring Road
to East Lancashire Road O.O'i 0.09
OUT-TURN EXPENDITURE ON RECOMMENDED SCHEMES 0.58 0.38 0 .15 - -
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE 0.58 0.96 1 . 1 1 1.11 1.11
WALLASEY
18 Mid-Uirral Motonvay Access Roads - Docks
Link & Bays Water Road Link - 0.89 0.89 0.44
OUT-TURN EXPENDITURE ON RECOMMENDED SCHEMES 0 0.89 0.89 0.44 0
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE 0 0.89 1.78 2.22 2.22
BOOTLE
4/5 A565 Rinrone Rond widening from Rimrosc
Bridge to Bnlliol Road 0.20 0.88
OUT-TUP.N EXPENDITURE ON RECOMMENDED SCHEMES 0 0 0.20 0.88 0
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE 0 0 0.20 I.08 I.92
MALTS AREA
• CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE ON RECOMMENDED NON-
TRUNK ROADS 7.63 17.88 33.76 4l.6l V!. 12
TRUNK ROADS
23 A59 Wnrbreck Moor I improvement-From Perk 
Lane to A567 0.4o
25/26 Mid Wirral Motorway & Moreton Spur 3.13 6.25 3.12
24 South Lancashire Motorway-Outer Ring Road
to Queens Drive 7.00
28 A565 Crosby Road Improvement - From A5036 
to South Road 0.36
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE ON RECOMMENDED 
TRUNK ROADS
0.40 3.53 9.78 12.90 ho.: :6
A7
PUBLIC TRANSPORT
Hamilton Square Burrowing Junction 
Terminal Loop and Exchange - Centrul
Scheme 5.2 5*5
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE ON RECOMMENDED 
PUBLIC TRANSPORT SCHEMES 5.2 10.7
• A8
MERSEYSIDE AREA LANDUSE TRANSPORTATION STUDY 
DETAILS OF SCHEMES COMPLETED OUTSIDE THE PLAN 
1966 PRICE nASIS £ MILLIONS
EX!’END I TURE PHASING
SCHEME DESCRIPTION 1966to
1968
to
1970
to
1972
to
197^
to
1976 1969 1971 1973 1975
LIVER)’OOL - NON TRUNK ROADS
1 B5192-Lon<jmoor Lime Improvement 0.12
2 Bowerino Park Railway Bridge Improvement 0.10 0.04
3 A59 - Second Tunnel Approach Roads 0.34 0.34 0.16
4 Roe Street/Hood Street Gyratory Scheme 1.63
CUMULATIVE TOTAL OF SCHEMES
OUTSIDE PLAN RECOMMENDATIONS 0.22 2.23 2.57 2.73 2.73
MALTS - TRUNK ROAD
5 A5036 1/ithcrlond Lift Bridge Diversion O .85 1 
? 
! 
b>
1 v
i
CALCULATION OF FliR & FMQ : NON TRUNK
LIVERPOOL
Cumulative expenditure planned 4.00 12.32 26.13 O O w 40.02
Recommended phasing cumulative FMR 0.34 0.53 0.65 0.69 O .65
Cumulative Expenditure - Planned +
outside plan 3.89 12.99 23.94 33 .12 CO b
FMQ 0.94 O .83 0.89 0.92 0.93
BIRKENHEAD
Cumulative Expenditure Planned 2.04 3.06 3.30 4.04 4.69
Recommended phasing - cumulative 6.10 6.10 6.10 6 .10 6.10
FMR 0.33 0.50 0.54 0.66 0.77
FMQ = 1.00
CHESHIRE
Cumulative Expenditure - Planned 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Recommended phasing - cumulative 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
FMR = 1.00 FMQ = 1.00 •
LANCASHIRE
Cumulative expenditure - planned O .58 0.96 1.11 l.ll 1 . 1 1
Recommended Phasing - Cumulative 0.60 0.60 1.85 1.8 5 1.83
FMR 0.97 1.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Cumulative Expenditure planned+ outside O .58 0.96 1.11 1.96 1.96
FMQ 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.37
A9
Mil (SKY SIDE AREA LAND USE THANSP0UTAT1 ON STUDY 
CAIOULATION OF FMU & FMQ 
COSTS IN £ MILLIONS - 1966 PRICE BASIS 
NON-TRUNK ROADS (CTD)
1966
to
1967
1968
to
1969
1970 
to
1971
1972
to
1973
1974 
to
1975
WALLASEY
Cumulative Expenditure - Planned 0 0.89 1.78 2.72 2.22
Recommended Phasing - Cumulative 4.33 4.33 '».33 '*.33 4.33
FMR
FMQ =1.00 0 0.21 0.4l O .5 1 0 .51
BOOTLE
Cumulative Expenditure - Planned 0 0 0.20 1.08 1.08
Recommended Phasing - Cumulative 1 . 1 5 2.30 3.55 3Ô5
FMR 0 0 0.09 0.30 0.30
MALTS AREA - NON TRUNK ROADS
Cumulative Expenditure - Planned 7.22 17.83 33.12 49.07 49.72
Recommended Phasing - Cumulative 19.25 38.51 56.82 74.81 80.61
FMR o.4o 0.46 0.54 0.56 0.60
Cumulative Expenditure Planned + outside 7.85 20.11 33.33 44.34 50.85
FMQ 0.97 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.95
CALCULATION OF FUR & F.MQ - TRUNK ROADS
Cumulative expenditure - Planned 0.40 3.53 9.78 12.90 20.26
Recommended Phasing - Cumulative 9.95 19.80 20.38 20.86 21.34
FMR o.o4 0 .17 0.48 0.62 0.95
Cumulative ExpenditurePlanned + outside 0.40 3.53 9.78 13.75 .2.1.96
FMQ 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.92
CALCULATION OF FMR & FMQ - PUBLIC TRANSPORT
Cumulative Expenditure - Planned 0 0 0 5.2 10.70
Recommended Phasing - Cumulative 0 3.20 10.70 10.70 10.70
FMR 0 0 0 0.49 1.00
FMQ =1.00
TYNE WEAK PLAN
D ETAILS  OF RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OF BUDGETED EXPENDITURE
NON-TRUNK ROADS. EXPENDITURE IN  1969  PRICE B A S IS  (£  M ILLIONS')
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1970 
TO
1971
1972 
TO
1973
1974 
TO
1975
1976 
TO
1977
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY
8. Hadrian Road to Bewicke Street 
Improvement, Walsend 0.44
9. Al86 Holystone to Earsdon 0.36 O .36
10. A191 Benton/Four Lane End 
Intersection 0.62 0.62
1 1 . A 191 Benton Quarry to 
Holystone Improvement 0 .18 O.3G 0 .18
17. Al83 Benton Lane Duplication 0 .18 0.18
22. A695 Prudhoc Bypass O .36 O.36
CUMULATIVE BUDGET - RECOMMENDED 0.98 1.70 3.04 4.20
DURHAM COUNTY
47- Washington New Town Roads 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
54. A694 Improvement - Rowlands 
Gill to Dipwood Village 0.14 0.14
56. A 185 Albert Road, Jarrow 
livel Crossing 0.18 0.18
59. A693 Improvement - Pellon 
Link to Cheoter-lc-Street 0.48 0.48
6l* A693 Improvement through 
Stanley 0.34 0.34
52. A695 Blaydon to Now 
Scotswood Bridge 1.05 1.05
53. A695 Blaydon Extension 
West of Stella 0.25 0.25
55. A692 Wickham Highway 
Improvement - 
High Marley Hill 0.68 0.68
62. A6127 Chcster-le-Street 
By-pass: Stage I 0.46 0.46
48. Gateshead Western Bypass - 
Durham County Section 2.65 2.65
CUMULATI VE BUDGET - RECOMMENDED 5.74 11.48 13.77 16.06
TYNE WEAK PLAN
DETAILS OE RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OF 11UDGETED EXPENDITURE
NON-THUNK ROADS. EXPENDITURE IN  19 6 9  PRICE DAS1S (£  M ILL IO N S )
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1970 
TO
1971
1972 
TO
1973
1974
TO
1975
1976 
TO
1977
NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE
70.. 
& 71.
AIO58 Improvement - Jesmond Road 
to Stephenson Road 3.46 1.21
72. Central Motorway East 5.30 5.30
73. Claremont Road Improvement 0.38 O .38
74. A695 - Shields Road 
Motorway - Stage 1 0.75 0.75
75- A695 - Shields Road 
Motorway - Stage II 0.88 O.C7
76. East-West Motorway 4.50 4.50
CUMULATIVE DUDGET - RECOMMENDED 9.89 17.53 22.91 28.23
GATESHEAD
84. Gateshead Western Bypass - 
Gateshead Section 1.00 1.00
79. A692 Charles Street 
Improvement 0.04 0.04
oO# A6082 Redheugh Bridge and 
approaches 0.88 0.88
81. West Central Route - Stage I 0.41 0.41
82. A6083 - East/West Route - 
Stage I O .58 0.58
CO VJ
1 Consett Route - Western By­
pass to Redheugh Bridge 1.20 1.20
r\
oo 
! 1 Al Low Fell Bypass 0.70 0.70
CUMULATIVE BUDGET - RECOMMENDED 4.11 6.22 8.92 9-62
TYKE WEAK PLAN
D ETAILS  OK RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OK BUDGETED EXPENDITURE
NON-TRUNK ROADS. EXPENDITURE IN  19 6 9  PRICE BASIS  (£  M ILLIO N S )
SCHEME
SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1970 
TO
1971
1972 
TO
1973
1974
TO
1973
1976 
TO
1977
SUNDERLAND
COCO Washington (Northern) Cross 
Route - Phase 1 O .36 0.37
89. AI83 Chester Road Widening 
- Springwell Road to Borough 
Boundary 0 .10 0 .10
100. . Trimdon Street/Silksworth Row 
Improvement 0 .10 0 .10
108. AI83 - Inner Ring Road - 
Stage 11 0.88 0.87
110. A690 - Durham Road Widening 
Vine Place to Royalty 0.19 0.19
95. Queen Alexandra Bridge and 
Approaches 0.78 O .78
109. AI83 Inner Ring Road - Stage 3 0.62 O .63
111. A690 New Wear Bridge and 
Approaches 0.58 2.04 2.04
CUMULATIVE BUDGET - RECOMMENDED 1.63 3.86 7.30 10.75
TYNEMOUTH
121. A 191 New York Road Improvement 0.20 0.20
122. A695 Albion Road Improvement - 
Stage I 0.12 0. 12
123. A695 Albion Road Improvei. 2nt - 
Stage 11 0.12 0. 12
124. A693 Albion Road Improvement - 
Stage III 0.18 0.18
130. AIO58 Duplication of Beach Road 
- Billy Mill to Preston Road 0.42 0.43
CUMULATIVE BUDGET - RECOMMENDED 0.44 1.06 1.66 2.09
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TYNE WEAK
D E TAILS  OK RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OK BUDGETED EXPENDITURE
NON-TRUNK ROADS. EXPENDITURE IN  1969  PRICE BASIS ( £  M IL L IO N S )
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1970 
TO
1971
1972 
TO
1973
1974
TO
1973
1976
TO
1977
SOUTHSH1ELDS
13/4. A 1055 Improvement - Western 
Approach Jarrow Road and 
Arches 0.35 0.35
135. A 1055 Western Approach from 
existinp dual carriageway 
to Jarrow Road 0.19 0.19
136. Central Area Through Road 
Stage 3 0.11 0.1?.
137. AI85 Western Approach - 
Arches to West Way 0.35 0.35
138. A 185 Western Approach - 
West Way to Alice Street 0.08 0.07
139. AI85 Western Approach - 
Alice Street Improvement 0.07 0.08
140. A19 Sunderland Road Improvement 
Hepscott Terrace to Westoe Road 0.08 0.07
CUMULATIVE BUDGET - RECOMMENDED 1.00 2.00 2.23 2.45
TYNE WEAR AREA: RECOMMENDED 
BUDGET - CUMULATIVE 23.91 45.87 59.67 73.29
TRUNK ROADS
32. A69 - Throckley, Heddon, 
Horsley Bypass 2.50 2.50
51. A1 - Improvement: North of 
Birtley Bypass - Improvement 0.4? 0.47
33. A1 Gosforth Bypass 1.34 1.35
TRUNK ROADS 2.97 5.94 7.28 8.63
Al 3
TYNE WEAK
D ETAILS  OK RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OK BUDGETED EXPENDITURE
NON-TRUNK ROADS. EXPENDITURE IN 1969  PR IC E B AS IS  (C  MI),LIO N S )
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1970 
TO
1971
1972 
TO
1973
1974 
TO
1975
1976 
TO
1977
SOUTHSHIELDS
134. A1053 Improvement - Western 
Approach Jarrow Road and 
Arches 0.35 0.35
135. A1055 Western Approach from 
existinp dual carriageway 
to Jarrow Road 0.19 0.19
136. Central Area Through Road 
Stage 3 0. 11 0.12
137. A 185 Western Approach - 
Arches to West Way 0.35 0.35
138. A 185 Western Approach - 
West Way to Alice Street 0.08 0.07
139. AI85 Western Approach - 
Alice Street Improvement 0.07 0.08
140. A19 Sunderland Road Improvement 
Hepscott Terrace to Westoe Road 0.08 0.07
CUMULATIVE BUDGET - RECOMMENDED 1.00 2.00 2.23 2.45
TYNE WEAR AREA: RECOMMENDED 
BUDGET - CUMULATIVE 23.91 45.87 59.67 73.29
TRUNK HOADS
32. A&9 - Throckley, Heddon, 
Horsley Bypass 2.50 2.50
51. Ad - Improvement: North of 
Birtley Bypass - Improvement 0.4? 0.47
33- A1 Gosforth Bypass 1.34 1.35
2.97 5.94 7.28 8.63TRUNK ROADS
Al 4
TYNE WEAR FEAN
DETAILS OE SCHEMES COMPLETED AND ANNUAL OUT-TURN OK EXPENDITURE
NON-TRUNK ROADS EXPENDITURE IN 1969 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLIONS)
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1970 
TO
1971
1972 
TO
1973
1974 
TO
1975
1976 
TO
1977
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY
8. Hadrian Road io Bewicke Street 
Improvement, Walsend 0.29 0.15
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 0.29 0.44 0.44 0.44
DURHAM COUNTY
54. A694 Rowlands Gill to Dipwood 
Village Improvement 0 .16 0.09
4 0. A613 Gateshead Western Bypass 
- Durham County Section 1.06 2 .12 2 .13
52. A695 Blaydon to New Scotsv.'ood 
Bridge Improvement 0.82 0.79
4?. Washington New Town Roads 0.98 0.98 1.01 0.62
ANNUAL OUT-TURN EXPENDITURE ON 
RECOMMENDED SCHEMES 2.20 3.19 3.96 1.41
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PIAN 2.20 5.39 9.35 10.76
AG93 Stanley Town Centre By- 
Pass - Expenditure outside 
plan 0.31 0 .3 1
CUMUIAT1VE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
AND OUTSIDE PLAN - DURHAM 2.51 6.01 9.97 1 1 .3 8
NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE
72. Al (a 6127) Central Motorway East 0 3.88 2.92 0.64
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN
North West Radial Route - Stage 
II - expenditure outside plan
0 3.88 6.8O
0.35
7.44
O . 17
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
AND OUTSIDE PLAN - NEWCASTLE 0 3.88 7.15 7-96
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TYNE WEAN ELAN
DETAILS OF SCHEMES COMPLETED AND ANNUAL OUT-TURN OF EXPENDITURE
NON-TRUNK ROADS EXPENDITURE IN 1969 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLIONS)
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1970 
TO
1971
1972 
TO
1973
1974 
TO
1975
1976
TO
1977
GATESHEAD
G4. A613 Gateshead Western Bypass 
- Gateshead Section 0.4o 0.80 0.80
8 1. West Central Route - Stage 1 0.16 0.32 0.32
85. Consett Route - Western Bypass 
to Redheugh Bridge 2.00
80. Redheugh Bridge and approaches 0.31 0 .6 1
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 0.56 1.99 5.72 5.72
SUNDERLAND
COCO B1289 Washington (Northern) 
Cross Route Phase 1 0 . 1 * 2
100. Trimdon Strect/Silksworth 
Row Improvement 0 . 2 0
110. A69O Durham Road Widening - 
Vine Place to Royalty 0.0 4 0.09 0.04
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 0.6G 0.75 0.79 0.79
TYNEMOUTH
121. New York Road/Improvement 0.39
CUMUJAT1VE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
NON-TRUNK ROADS: TYNE WEAR AREA
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 4. 18 14.38 23.97 26.02
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
AND OUTSIDE PLAN '*.49 15.00 24.94 2?. 16
TRUNK ROADS - DETAILS OF SCHEMES COMPLETED
51.
32.
A1 Improvement - North of 
Birtley Bypass
A69 Throckley, Hedden, Horsley 
By-Pass
0.86
1.17 2.35
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 0.86 2.03 4.38 4.38
Al 6
TYNE WEAN PIAN
CALCULATION OK Klttl & FMQ: EXPENDITURE IN 1969 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLIONS)
NON-TRUNK ROADS
1970 
TO
1971
1972
TO
1973
1974 
TO
1975
1976 
TO
1977
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY
1. CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 0.29 0.44 0.44 0.44
2. CUMULATIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDED O.90 1.70 3.04 4.20
FMR 0.30 0.26 0.15 0.10
FMQ = 1.00
DURHAM COUNTY
1. CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 2.20 5.39 9.35 10.76
2. CUMULATIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDED 5.7'* 11.48 13.77 16.06
FMR 0.38 0.47 0.63 0.67
3* CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
AND OUTSIDE PLAN 2 .5 1 6,01 9.97 11 .3 8
FMQ 0.88 0.90 0.94 0.95
NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE
1. CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 0 3.88 6.80 7.44
2. CUMULATIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDED 9.09 17.53 22.91 28.28
FMR 0 0.22 0.30 0.26
3. CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
AND OUTSIDE PLAN 0 3.88 7.15 7.96
FMQ 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.94
GATESHEAD
1. CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 0.56 1.99 5.72 5.72
2. CUMULATIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDED 4. 11 8.22 8.92 9.62
FMR 0.14 0.24 0.64 0.59
SUNDERLAND
1. CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 0.66 0.75 0.79 0.79
2. CUMULATIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDED 1.65 3.86 7.30 10.75
0.40 0 .19 0 .1 1 0.07EMU
A1 7
TYNE WEAR Pl-AN
CALCULATION OK FMR *. KM^: EXPENDITURE IN 1969 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLION)
N O N -TRUNK ROA1)
1970 
TO
1971
1972 
TO
1973
1974 
TO
1975
1976 
TO
1977
TYNEMOUTH
1. CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
2. CUMULATIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDED 0.44 1.06 1.66 2.09
FMR O.C9 0.37 O .23 0.19
TYNE WEAR AREA - NON TRUNK ROADS
1. CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
PLAN 4.10 12.84 23.49 25.54
2. CUMULATIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDED 22.81 43. «5 57-60 71.00
FMR 0. 18 0.29 0.41 O .36
3- CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN 
AND OUTSIDE PLAN 4.4l 13.46 24.46 26.68
m i 0.73 0.95 0.96 0.96
TYNE WEAR AREA - TRUNK ROADS
1. CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE VITHIN 
PLAN 0.86 2.03 4.38 4.38
2. CUMULATIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDED 2.97 5.94 7.28 8.63
• FMR 0.29 0.34 0.60 0.51
TYNE WEAR AREA - PUBLIC TUANSI’ORT INFRASTRUCTURE
Al fl
ST. HELENS TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT PLAN
DETAILS OF SCHEMES AND PHASING OF EXPENDITURE
NON-TRUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN 1970 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLIONS)
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1971
T O
1973
1974
TO
1976
1. A58 Church Street to Finger Pont 
Improvement O .56 0.39
2. A570 Church Street Improvement 0.35
3. A570 Dentons Green Lane/Kirkland 
Street Improvement 0.52
4. Inner Ring Road - Stage IV 0.30
5- A58 Park Road Improvement 0.20
6. A572 Chancery Lane - Phase 11
7. A58 Blackbrook Road at 
Borough Boundary 0.02 0.03
0. A58 Cotham Street
CUMULATIVE BUDGETED EXPENDITURE 0.58 2.37
1. A58 Church Street to Finger Root 
Improvement 0.40 0.55
2. A58 Blackbrook Road at Borough 
Boundary 0 .0 1
CUMULATIVE ACTUAL EXPENDITURE 0.40 O .96
FMR 0.69 o . 4 i
FMQ = 1.0
THE PLAN DID NOT DEAL WITH 
TRUNK ROADS
A l 9
COVENTRY
DETAILS OK RECOMMENDED SCHEMES ANI) PHASING OK BUDGETED EXPENDITURE 
NON TRUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN I967 PRICE BASIS £ MILLIONS
SCHEME
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1967 
to
1968
1969
to
1970
1971
to
1973
1974
to
1976
1 Coventry Inner Ring Road : Stage 4 1.30 - committed 
(exclude)
2 Coventry Inner Ring Road : Stage 5 2.20 2.20
3 Coventry Inner Ring Road : Stage 6 2.80 2.80
4 Clifford Bridge Road Improvement 0.16 0.30
5 North-South Motorway - Stonebridge Highway 
to London Road
3.00
6 North-South Motorway - lien Lane to City 
Boundary
1.00
7 Outer Connector - North/South Motorway to 
Foies Hill Road 0.40
8 Radford Road Improvement- Three Spires Avenue 
to Light Lane
0.40
9 Gosfor Spur: Inner Ring Road to Binley Road 1.06
10 Binlcy Road Improvements - Brindle Avenue to 
Craven Arms
0.50
ll Bell Green Road - Sewall Highway to Henley Hoad 0.16
12 Warwick Road Widening 0.20
13 Leamington Road - Reconstruction of Roundabout 
& Improvements 0.12
14 University Valley Route - Charter A venue to 
Canon Park Junction 0.20
15 Brinklow Road Improvements - Clifford Bridge 
Hd to City Boundary 0.10
16 North-South Motor Rood - Central Section: 
London Road to Hen Lane 5.10 2.60
17 Binley Road Improvement - Gosford Green to 
Brindie Avenue 0.45
18 London Road Improvement - Inner Ring Road to 
N/S Motor Road 0.22
19 Butts Radiol Extension - lour Pounds Avenue 
to Butts Hadial
0.23
20 University Volley Hood - Cannon Park Junction 
to City Boundary O.'iO
21 Outer Connector - Longford to Walsgrave 
Carriageway 1.88
A90
COVENTRY (CONTINUED)
DETAILS OF RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OF BUDGETED EXPENDITURE 
NON TRUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN J.967 PRICE BASIS £ MILLIONS
SCI IE ME 
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1967
to
I960
1979
to
1970
1971
to
1973
197;i
to
1976
22 Now Link Road - Holbrooks Lane to N/S 
Motor Road
O .50
23 London Road/A45 Junction Roundabout 
Reconstruction and flyover 0.O0
24 Charter Avenue/A45 Junction Roundabout 
reconstruction and underpass 0.60
25 Tile Hill Lane/A45 Junction Roundabout 
reconstruction and new flyover 0.G0
26 Mitchell Avenue Extension 0.35
BUDGETED PHASING 3.36 5./i0 11.04 5.53
CUMULATIVE BUDGET 3.36 10.04 19.00 25.46
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COVENTRY : EXPENDITURE & CALCULATION OK FMR AND FMQ
DETAILS OK RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PIIASINC. OK BUDGETED EXPENDITURE
NON TRUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN 1967 PRICE BASIS £ MILLIONS
SCHEME
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1967 
to
1968
1969 
to
1970
1971
to
1973
1974
to
1976
COMPLETED SCHEMES : RECOMMENDED
2 Inner Rina Road - Stage 5
- Swanswell Terrace to London Hoad 1.86 1.86
3 Inner Ring Road - Stage 6 1.7 2 1.15
4 B448l Clifford Bridge Road - Stages 2 & 3
Two Bridges to Craven Arms 0.29
5 North/South Road - A423 London Road to 
Stone Bridge Highway (A45) 0.63 0.95
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE 1.86 3.72 6.36 8.'16
CUMULATIVE BUDGET (BROUGHT DOWN) 3.36 18.8*i 19.88 25.46
FMR 0.55 0 • :o 0 O .32 0.33
FMQ = 1.00
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SOUTHAMPTON : OUTLINE TRANSPORTATION PLAN 1968
DETAILS OF RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OF BUDGETED EXPENDITURE 
NON TRUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN 196? PRICE BASIS £ MILLIONS
SCI IE ME 
NO
I960 1971 197'* 1976
SCHEME DESCRIPTION to to to to
1970 1973 1975 1978
1 The Western Approach 0.24 0.80 2 .16
2 Docks Road, Stage III 0.12 0.04
3 A3024 Bitterne Bypass 0.82
4 Portswood Link 1.45 1.4 5 2.00
5 A3024/A33/i Northam Road, Six Dials to
Northern Bridge, Improvement 0.38 1.37
6 Windhover Interchange with A2? and A3024
Bursledon Road, east of the City
7 Hedge End Interchange with a link road
to Thornhill Roundabout
0. West End Interchange with Link Road to 
A27 and Town Hill Way (Town Hill Link)
9 Nursling Interchange with link Road
to A 3057 " Romsey Road with a
connection to an extension of the Lord's
Hill Spine Road
10 Red Bridge Roundabout Grade separation
SUB TOTAL - ITEMS 6 to 10 5.52
CUMULATIVE BUDGET : RECOMMENDED SCHEMES 0.88 4.37 9.35 16.87
DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION
2 Docks Road Extension - St Mary's Place to 0.27
Queen's Park
11 A35 - Red Bridge Road Improvement O .52
1 The Western Approach (advance railway 
bridge works) 0.73 0.10
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE 0.79 1.52 1.62 1.6 2
FMR O .96 0.35 0 .17 0 .10
TEKSIDE SURVEY AND PLAN
DETAILS OE SCHEMES AND CALCULATION OK KMQ AND FMR: EX1TÏNDITURE 
IN 19f>6 PRICE BASIS (E MILLIONS)
SCHEME
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1966
to
1973
1974
to
1976
1977
to
1978
MIDDLESBOROUGH : NON TRUNK ROADS
A RECOMMENDED SCHEMES
1 A171 North Ormsby Bridge O .90
2 A1027 Ring Road : Stage 3 0.35
3 Northern Loop - Stage IA 2.60
4 Northern Loop - Stage IB 0.95 0.95
5 Northern Loop - Stages II and III 0.90 0.90
CUMULATIVE RECOMMENDED TOTAL 4.80 6.65 7.55
B IMPLEMENTED SCHEMES
1 A171 North Ormsby Bridge O .83
2 A1027 Ring Road : Stage 3 0.24
3 Northern Loop - Stage 1A 2.60
(Implemented by Teeside CDC)
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE TOTAL I.07 3.67 -
FMR 0.22 0.55
No major schemes outside the plan was implemented until 1976 
Therefore, KMQ = 1.00
AH4
PORTSMOUTH s FUTURE ROAD PATTERN
DETAILS OF RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OF BUDGETED EXPENDITURE 
NON-TRUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN 1965 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLIONS)
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1965
TO
1967
1968
TO
1969
1970
TO
1973
197'*
TO
1976
1 . Continuation of Inner Ring Route 
(Anglesea Road-St. Michael’s
Rond) 0.22
2 . East-Vest Route: St. Michael's 
Road Intersection to Bradford 
Road Junction/Fratton Bridge 0.80
3. North/South Route - Inner Ring 
Route to Alexandra Park 2.00
1*. North/South Route - Alexandra 
Park to Southampton Road 1.19 O .30
5. Inner Ring Route: Bradford Road 
Roundabout to Lake Road Rounda­
bout
O-IS
6. Inner Ring Route: Flyover at 
Unicorn Road 0.35
7- Eastern Road Extension - Tangier 
Road to Eastnoy Esplanade 0.58 0.15
8. East/Hest Route: Bradford Road 
Junction to Locks R/About r•0 0.22
The next 3 roads were planned for 
the 5 years 1975-1979* I have 
aesumed 1*0% of the total to be 
completed during 1975 and 1976
9. London Road (Portcbridge to City 
Boundary) 0.18
10. Southampton Road (Allaway Avenue 
to City Boundary) 0.2 It
11. North/South Route: Alexandra Park 
to Victoria Road North Z .'tO
CUMULATIVE TOTAL BUDGET 0.22 1.02 6.7 4 1 0 . 1 * 1
A35
PORTSMOUTH : FUTURE ROAD PATTERN
DETAILS OF COMPLETED SCHEMES AND CALCULATION OF FMR AND KMQ 
NON-TRUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN 1965 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLIONS)
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1965
TO
1967
1968
TO
1969
1970
TO
1973
1974
TO
1976
1 . Extension of Dockyard Loop to 
Anglesey Road 0 .1 1 0. 1 1
2. A2046 Inner Ring Road: Southern 
Section: Stage 1 0.39
3. M275 ~ Tipner Link Stage I:
Tipner Lane to Kingston Crescent 1.46 0.98
4. M275 - Tipner Link Stage II: 
M27 to Tipner Lane 1 .0 1 O .67
5. A2046 Southern Section - 
Stages 2 & 3s Goldomith 
Avenue 0.31 0 .17
6. A3 Commercial Road - Church Street 
to Kingston Crescent 1.06
CUMULATIVE ACTUAL EXPENDITURE t*•O
1
0.22 3.39 6.27
FKR 0.50 0.22 0.50 0.60
FMQ = 1.00
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NOTTINGHAM
DETAILS OE RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OE BUDGETED EXPENDITURE ' 
NON THUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN 1966 PRICE BASIS £ MILLIONS
SCHEME 1976 1971 1974
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION to to to1970 1973 1977
RECOMMENDED SCHEMES
1 A6130 - Sheriffs Way- Phase I 3.3
2 A6130 - Sheriffs Way- Phase II 3.6
3 Eastern bypass - Phase I 0.3
4 A6OO8 - Theatre Square Gyratory system 0.3
5 A6l2 •• London Road: Meadows Way to Canal St 3.4
6 A612 - London Road : Canal St Southwards 2.7
7 Clifton Boulevard Improvement, Barton Lane to
Queen's Drive 2.4
88 Barton Lone Improvement - Clifton Boulevard
to County Boundary 1.8
9 Castle Boulevard Improvement 1.6
10 Canning Circus Underpass 1 . 1
BUDGETED PHASING 10.9 5 .10 4.5
CUMULATIVE BUDGET O • O 16.00 20.5
COMPLETED SCHEME £
Canal Strcet/London Road Roundabout
z
l 0.10 >5
2 A6l2 London Road High Level Station to 0.10 >
Canal Street O
3 A6OO8 Inner Ring Road Eastern Sector 0.32
WD
4 A6OO8 Inner Ring Road/Theatre Square
gyratory 0.32
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE 0.20 0.84 0.84
FMR 0.20
L“\
O•c O . O ' i
FMQ 1.00 1.00 LOW
LEICESTER TRAFFIC FLAN
DETAILS OF RECOMMENDED * COMPLETED SCHEMES AND CALCULATION OF 
FMR AND FMQ : 1965 PRICK BASIS
SCHEME
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
£
Mi 11 ion
19o5
to
1973
1974 
to
1975
The recommended proposals including its 
phasing is shown in Fig 1*01 (Appendix). 
The whole scheme was estimated to cost 
£107.5 million (1964 costs) of which:
Phase I (Planned for implementation 
between 1964-73) Estimate -
Phase II (Planned for implementation 
between 1975-84) estimate =
Phase III (Planned for implementation 
between 1985-94) estimate =
Therefore, Recommended budget for the 
period
1964 to 1973
Recommended budget for the period 
1974 to 1975
32
31
44.5
3 2 .0
38.2
DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTED SCHEMES
A Within Plan
1. Central Ring Road : Stages 4 and 5 = J.65
2. St Margarets Way Improvement: = 0.94
Phase 1
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN PLAN 2.59 2.59
FMR 0.08 0.07
Plan Replaced by Greater Leicester 
Transportation Study
B DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTED SCHEMES 
Outside Plan
3. A6 Abbey Park Rond/A46 Beigrave Road Improvement 0.92
4. AfSO Granby Halls Gyratory 0.47
5. Loughborough Rond to Melton Road: A46 Improvement 0.20 0.20
6. St Margaret's Way to Humherstone Road Improvement 
(PART ONLY) 0.82
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN AND OUTSIDE PLAN 2.79 5.00
FMQ 0.93 O .52

A  2 8
Cambridge t r a n s p o r ta t io n  plan
This plan was published in 1972 for a period up to 1986. The 
study referred to the following trunk roads which were all 
completed ns planned.
A45 (T) Newmarket Road dualling (Coldhnm's Lane to Ditton Walk) 
A45(T) Madingley Rond improvement at Merton Hall Farm 
A10(T) Magdalene Bridge improvement 
Mil Western by-pass - Stumps-X to A604(T)
A'*5(T) Northern by-pass
A604(T) Huntingdon Road improvement
Cambridge Northern by-pass
However the plan also recommended non-trunk road schemes to the 
value of £2.44 million (1970 prices) to be completed during the 
period ’972-76. None of the non-trunk road schemes were 
implemented within this period.
Therefore, FMR - 0 FMQ n Not applicable
THIS STUDY WILL NOT BE USED FOR DETAILED ANALYSIS BECAUSE 
CAMBRIDGE IS NOT A COUNTY BOROUGH.
OXFera) CENTRAL AREA .STUDY
This study recommended a cumulative investment of 16 million i>ounds 
plus or minus 20 per cent to be expended over a study period of 13 years. 
However no scheme either reconmicmded or outside the plan was implemented 
during the study period within the study area.
Therefore FMR = 0 Also FMQ is NOT APPLICABLE
AUTNGPON ENVIRONMENT AND TRANSPORT STUDY
This study was commissioned by the Abingdon Borough Council to look into 
the environmental implications of implemsntating the proposals contained 
in the Didcot, Abingdon, Wantage Transportation Study. The consultants 
to the former study Llewelyn Davies Weeks Forestier - Walker & Bor 
recommended alternative river crossings for the Thames in Abingdon.
These alternative recommendations were found unacceptable to the highway 
Authority - the Berkshire County Council.
197«
Therefore FMR 0, FMQ is NOT APPLICABLE
A30
HATH : A PLANNING AND THAKSl'OHT STUDY
This study was published in 1965 for completion in four phases 
by 1985.
Estimated cost of Phase I (1965-1969) = £5«535 million 
Estimated cost of Phase II( 1970-197^* ) = £0.968 million
However, none of these plans were implemented. Therefore
FMR = 0 and FMQ = NOT APPLICABLE
The study identified two trunk roads for completion (M'i and M5) 
which were completed ns planned.
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SLOUGH TRANSPORTATION STUDY
DETAILS  OF SCHEMES AND PHASING OF EXPENDITURE NON-THUNK ROADS
EXPENDITURE IN  19 6 9  PRICE BASIS  (£  M IL L IO N S )
SCHEME
NO.
1970 1973 1975 1977
SCHEME DESCRIPTION TO TO TO TO
1972 1974 1976 1978
1. Wellington Street extension to 
relieve A4 - Slough High Street 3»33
The foilowing roeda were programmed 
for completion during the period 
1971 to 1980 however no expenditure 
phasing is given in the plan.
Since Slough is not a county 
borough, I will not be using this 
result for detailed analysis.
Therefore, I have simply assumed 
an equal distribution of budgeted 
phasing to calculate FMR for 
Chapter V only.
2. Local cross-route between Slouth 
'finding Estate in Farnham (West) 
of town and Uxbridge Road - 
Dual carriageway
3. The Canal Drive - East/West arm 
of the inner ring-road to the 
North of town
4. Realignment, of A332 single c/ 
way from the junction with 
Slough Northern Road to the 
bottom of Balls Hilln
5 . Divefeion of Upton Road B37^ 
and the realignment of 
Albert Street
6. Dualling of A332 - Windsor Road 
and Stoke Rond
7. Duulling of Uxbridge Road A412
0. Dualling of Fcrnhar.i Read B473
9* Langley High Strect/Station 
Rond - Langley: ll4?0
10. Dualling of Church Street, Chalvey 
Road West, Chalvey Road East 
and Albert Road
A 3  2
SLOUGH TUANSPORTATION STUDY
D ETAILS  OK SCHEMES AND PHASING OF BUDGETED EXPENDITURE NON-TRUNK HOADS :
EXPENDITURE IN  19 6 9  PRICE B A S IS  ( £  M ILLIO N S )
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1970
TO
1972
1973 
TO
1974
1975 
TO
1976
1977 
It)
1978
11. Dualling of Datchet Road
The estimated coat of completing 
the lant 10 items io £8.80 million
Cumulative budgeted expen­
diture phasing:
Items 2-11 = 1.76 3.52 5.28 7.04
Cumulative budgeted expen­
diture phasing:
Items 1-11 = 5.09 6.85 8 .6 1 10.37
DETAILS OF C0MP1ÜTED SCHEMES
1. Wellington Street Extension 2.42 0.91
Cumulative expenditure - 
Actual 2.42 3.33 3-33 3.33
FMR 0.48 0.49 0.39 O .32
FMO = 100%
TRUNK ROADS PLANNED
1. North Orbital Road from A40/M40
junction at Denham on the North 
to the A30 at Egham on the
South with an intersection with 
M4 at Richings Park, Iver.
Thi s together with M4, M40 and 
the Marlow Bypass (A404) in 
expected to form a motorway 
box round Slough and is 
assessed in the plen
2. Diversion of A355 from South of 
Farnham Royal Village to North 
of Knrnham Common
None of the trunk road schemes were 
completed until 1978
FMR (TRUNK ROADS) = 0
FMO = Not applicable
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HERTFORD, WARE AND HODDKSDON TRANSPORTATION STUDY 
TRAFFIC AND ROADS l>)8l
PUBLISHED BY : HERTFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL - MARCH 1968 
DETAILS OF SCHE1ES RECOMMENDED AND IMPLEMENTED : NON TRUNK ROADS 
(All Co3ts Stated Below are in 1968 Price Basis)
(i) SCHEMES RECOMMENDED FOR COMPLETION BETWEEN 1968 and 1972
(ii)
SCHEME ESTIMATE
(million)
OUT TURN EXPENDITURE 
1978 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
PHASING 
1974 1975 1976
1, Hertford LirkRoad 0.220)
0.220*
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08
2. North Orbital Link Rd
3. Hoddesdon Relief Road
Phase 1(a) - committed 
scheme completed by 
1969
0.214
4. Hoddesdon Relief Road 0.055 0.02 0.02 0.02
Phase 1(b)
5. Ware Relief Road, Ph 1 0.620
6. Hertingfordbury bypass 0.220 0.05 0.06 O c 0.06
& A4l4 to Cross Lane
7. Stans+ead Abbots by- 0.677
pass
8. Hertford North Relief 0.275
Road, Phase 1
9. Station Road Hertford 0.045
SUB TOTAL EXCLUDING
SCHEME (3) 2.332 0.03 0.13 0.16 0 .15 0.03
SCHEMES RECOMMENDED FOR COMPLETION BETWEEN 1973 and 1981
10. Ware Relief Rd, Ph II 0.400
11. Hertingfordbury by­
pass & A4l4 dualling 0.350
12. Hertford/Ware Link Rd 0.360
13. A602 Dualling Ware Rd 
to Hertford Link
0.100
l4. Hertford North Relief 
Rd, Pha se 11 1.225
15. Western Link Road 0.220
16. Old Cross Link Road 0.220
TOTAL RECOMMENDED 
EXPENDITURE 1968 to 
1981 (ex scheme 3)
4. 207
TEKSIDE SURVEY AND PLAN
D E TAILS  OK SCHEMES AND CALCULATION OF FMQ AND FMR: EXPENDITURE
IN  1966 P R IC E  IIA S IS  ( î ; M IL L IO N S )
SCHEME
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1966
to
1973
197't
to
1976
1977 
to
1978
MIDDLESBOROUGH : NON TRUNK ROADS
A RECOMMENDED SCHEMES
1 A171 North Ormsby Bridge O .90
2 A1027 Ring Hoad : Stage 3 0.35
3 Northern Loop - Stage IA 2.60
It Northern Loop - Stage IB 0.95 0.95
5 Northern Loop - Stages II and III 0.90 0.90
CUMULATIVE RECOMMENDED TOTAL 1*. 80 6.65 7-55
B IMPLEMENTED SCHEMES
1 A171 North Ormsby Bridge O .83
2 A1027 Ring Rofid : Stage 3 0.2 >k
3 Northern Loop - Stage IA 2.60
(Implemented by Teeside CBC)
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE TOTAL 1.0? 3.67 -
FMR 0.22 0.55
No major schemes outside the plan was implemented until 1976 
Therefore, KMQ = 1.00
Af>4
PORTSMOUTH : FUTURE ROAD PATTERN
DETAILS OF RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OF BUDGETED EXPENDITURE
NON-TRUNK ROADS ; EXPENDITURE IN 1965 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLIONS)
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1965
TO
1967
1968
TO
1969
1970
TO
1973
197'*
TO
1976
1. Continuation of Inner Ring Route 
(Anglesea Road-St. Michael's
Rond) 0.22
2. East-Vest Route: St. Michael's 
Road Intersection to Bradford 
Road Junction/Fratton Bridge 0.80
3. North/South Route - Inner Ring 
Route to Alexandra Park 2.00
4. North/South Route - Alexandra 
Park to Southampton Road 1.19 0.30
5. Inner Ring Route: Bradford Road 
Roundabout to Lake Road Rounda­
bout
O.T 3 O-IS
6. Inner Ring Route: Flyover at 
Unicorn Road 0.35
7. Eastern Road Extension - Tangier 
Road to Eastney Esplanade 0.58 0 .15
8. East/West Route: Bradford Road 
Junction to Locks R/About O.Sl 0.22
The next 3 roads were planned for 
the 5 years 1975-1979* 1 have 
acsun-.cd 40% of the total to be 
completed during 1975 and 1976
9. London Road (Portcbridge to City 
Boundary) 0.18
10. Southampton Rond (Allaway Avenue 
to City Boundary) 0.24
11. North/South Route: Alexandra Park 
to Victoria Road North 2.40
CUMULATIVE TOTAL BUDGET 0.22 1.02 6.74 10.41
A : 7 5
PORTSMOUTH : FUTURE ROAD PATTERN
DETAILS OF COMPLETED SCHEMES AND CALCULATION OF FMR AND FMQ 
NON-TRUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN 1965 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLIONS)
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1965
TO
1967
1908
TO
1969
1970
TO
1973
1974
TO
1976
1. Extension of Dockyard Loop to 
Anglesey Road 0.11 0. 11
2. A2046 Inner Ring Road: Southern 
Section: Stage 1 0.39
3. M2-75 ~ Tipner Link Stage I:
Tipner Lane to Kingston Crescent 1.46 0.98
4. M275 - Tipner Link Stage II: 
M27 to Tipner Lano 1.01 0.67
5. A2046 Southern Section - 
Stages 2 & 3* Goldnmith 
Avenue 0.31 0 .17
6. A3 Commercial Road - Church Street 
to Kingston Crescent 1.06
CUMULATIVE ACTUAL EXPENDITURE 0.11 0.22 3*39 6.27
FMR 0.50 0.22 0.50 0.60
FMCJ = 1.00
A26
NOTTINGHAM
DETAILS OF RECOMMENDED SCHEMES AND PHASING OF BUDGETED EXPENDITURE ' 
NON TRUNK ROADS : EXPENDITURE IN i9Cf> PRICE BASIS £ MILLIONS
SCHEME
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1976
to
1971
to
197;*
to
1970 1973 1977
RECOMMENDED SCHEMES
1 A6130 - Sheriffs Way- Phase I 3.3
2 A6130 - Sheriffs Way- Phase II 3.6
3 Eastern bypass - Phase I 0.3
4 A6OO8 - Theatre Square Gyratory system 0.3
5 A612 •• London Road: Meadows Way to Canal St 3.^
6 A612 - London Road : Canal St Southwards 2.7
7 Clifton Boulevard Improvement, Barton Lane to
Queen's Drive 2.4
88 Barton Lane Improvement - Clifton Boulevard
to County Boundary 1 .8
9 Castle Boulevard Improvement 1.6
10 Canning Circus Underpass 1 . 1
BUDGETED PHASING 10.9 5 .10 '*.5
CUMULATIVE BUDGET 10 .9 :L6.00 20.5
COMPLETED SCHEME C
l Canal Strcet/London Rond Roundabout 0 .10
2 A612 London Road High Level Station to 0 .10
§
>
pCanal Street
3 A6OO8 Inner Ring Road Eastern Sector 0.32
wu
4 A6OO8 Inner Ring Road/Theatre Square
gyratory 0.32
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE 0.20 0.84 0.84
FMR 0.20 O • O 0.04
FMQ 1.00 1.00 LOW
LEICESTER TU A IT  IC  PLAN
DETAILS OF RECOMMENDED & COMPLETED SCHEMES AND CALCULATION OF
EMU AND KMQ : I9f>5 PRICE BASIS
SCHEME
NO SCHEME DESCRIPTION
£
Hi 11 ion
1905
to
1973
1974
to
1975
The recommended proposals including its 
phasing is shown in Fig l-O] (Appendix). 
The whole scheme was estimated to cost 
£107.9 million (19G4 costs) of which:
•
Phase I (Planned for implementation
between 19G4-73) Estimate ^ 32
Phase II (Planned for implementation
between 1975-84) estimate = 31
Phase III (Planned for implementation
between 1985-94) estimate = 44.5
Therefore, Recommended budget for the 
period
1964 to 1973 32.O
Recommended budget for the period
1974 to 1975 38.2
DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTED SCHEMES
A Within Plan
1. Central Ring Road : Stages 4 and 5 = ) .65
2. St Margarets Way Improvement: = 
Phase 1
0.94
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN PLAN 2.59 2.59
FMR 0.08 0.07
Plan Replaced by Greater Leicester 
Transportation Study
B DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTED SCHEMES 
Outside Plan
3. Ah Abbey Park Road/A46 Beigrave Road Improvement 0.92
4. A|50 Granby Halls Gyratory 0.47
5. Loughborough Road to Melton Road: A46 Improvement 0.20 0.20
6. St Margaret's Way to llumbcrstone Road Improvement
(PART ONLY) «
cc0
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE WITHIN AND OUTSIDE PLAN 2.79 5.00
FMQ 0.93 0.52

A  2 8
CAMBRIDGE TRANSPORTATION PLAN
This plan was published in 1972 for a period up to 1986. The 
study referred to the following trunk roads which were all 
completed as planned.
A*i5 (T) Newmarket Road dualling (Coldham's Lane to Ditton Walk) 
iT) Hndingley Road improvement at Merton Hall Farm 
A10(T) Magdalene Bridge improvement 
Mil Western by-pass - Stumps-X to A604(T)
A^5(T) Northern by-pass
A604(T) Huntingdon Road improvement
Cambridge Northern by-pass
However the plan also recommended non-trunk road schemes to the 
value of £2.44 million (1970 prices) to be completed during the 
period 1972“76. None of the non-trunk road schemes were 
implemented within this period.
Therefore, FMR - 0 FMQ = Not applicable
THIS STUDY WILL NOT BE USED FOR DETAILED ANALYSTS BECAUSE 
CAMBRIDGE IS NOT A COUNTY BOROUGH.
A29
oxrortl) CENTRAL ARE A STUDY
This study recommended a cumulative investment of 16 million pounds 
plus or minus 20 per cent to be expended over a study period of 13 years. 
However no scheme either recommcmded or outside the plan was implemented 
during the study period within the study area.
Therefore FMR {J = 0 Also FMQ is NOT APPLICABLE
ABINGDON KNVIRON'FENT AND TRANSPORT STUDY
This study was commissioned by the Abingdon Borough Council to look into 
the environmental implications of implementating the proposals contained 
in the Didcot, Abingdon, Vantage Transportation Study. The consultants 
to the former study Llewelyn Davies Weeks Forestier - Walker & Bor 
recommended alternative river crossings for the Thames in Abingdon.
These alternative recommendations were found unacceptable to the highway 
authority - the Berkshire County Council.
Therefore FI-JR = J'MQ is NOT APPLICABLE
A30
BATH : A PLANNING AND THAN Si’OUT .STUDY
This study was published in 19f>5 for completion in four phases 
by 1985.
Estimated cost of Phase I (l9f>5-1969) = £5«535 million 
Estimated cost of Phase II(1970-197M = £0.9f>8 million
However, none of these plans were implemented. Therefore
FMI = 0 and FM-9 = NOT APPLICABLE
The study identified two trunk roads for completion (M^ i and M5) 
which were completed as planned.
A31
SLOUGH TRANSPORTATION STUDY
DETAILS OF SCHEMES AND PHASING OF EXPENDITURE NON-TRUNK ROADS : 
EXPENDITURE IN 1969 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLIONS)
SCHEME 1970 1973 1975 1977
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION TO TO TO TO
1972 197^ 1976 1978
1.
2.
3.
4.
5-
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Wellington Street extension to 
relieve A4 - Slough High Street 3*33
The following roads were programmed 
for completion during the period 
1971 to 1980 however no expenditure 
phasing is given in the plan.
Since Slough is not a county 
borough, I will not be using this 
result for detailed analysis.
Therefore, I have simply assumed 
an equal distribution of budgeted 
phasing to calculate FMR for 
Chapter V only.
Local cross-route between Slouth 
Trading Estate in Farnhsm (West) 
of town and Uxbridge Road - 
Dual carriageway
The Canal Drive - Eact/West arm 
of the inner ring-road to the 
North of town
Realignment, of A332 single c/ 
way from the junction with 
Slough Northern Road to the 
bottom of Balls Hills
Diversion of Upton Road D37t 
and the realignment of 
Albert Street
Dualling of A332 - Windsor Road 
and Stoke Road
Dunlling of Uxbridge Road A412
Dualling of Farnhar.i Read B473
Langley High Streot/Station 
Road - Langley: B4?0
Dunlling of Church Street, Chalvey 
Road West, Chalvey Road East 
and Albert Road
SLOUGH TRANSPORTATION STUDY
DETAILS OK SCHEMES AND PHASING OF BUDGETED EXPENDITURE NON-TRUNK ROADS : 
EXPENDITURE IN 1969 PRICE BASIS (£ MILLIONS)
SCHEME
NO. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1970
TO
1972
1973 
TO
1974
1975 
TO
1976
1977
TO
1978
11. DuAlling of Dat.chet Road
The estimated coat of completing 
the last 10 items io £8.80 million
Cumulative budgeted expen­
diture phasing:
Items 2-11 = 1.76 3.52 5.28 7.04
Cumulative budgeted expen­
diture phasing:
Items 1-11 = 5.09 6.85 8.61 10.37
DETAILS OF COMPLETED SCHEMES
1. Wellington Street Extension 2.42 0.91
Cumulative expenditure - 
Actual 2.42 3.33 3.33 3.33
FMR 0.48 0.49 0.39 O .32
FMQ = 100%
TRUNK ROADS PIANEED
1. North Orbital Road from A40/M40 
junction at Denham on the North 
to the A30 at Egham on the 
South with an intersection with 
M4 at Kichings Park, Iver.
This together with M4, M40 and 
the Marlow Bypass (A404) is 
expected to form a motorway 
box round Slough and is 
assessed in the plen
2. Diversion of A355 from South of 
Farnham Royal Village to North 
of Fnrnham Common
None of the trunk road schemes were 
completed until 1978
FMR (TRUNK ROADS) = 0
FMQ = Not Applicable
A33
HERTFORD, WARE AND HODDKSDON TRANSPORTATION STUDY 
TRAFFIC AND ROADS 1 >>01
PUBLISHED BY : HERTFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL - MARCH I960 
DETAILS OF SCHE1ES RECOMMENDED AND IMPLEMENTED : NON TRUNK ROADS 
(All Co3ts Stated Below are in I960 Price Basis)
(i) SCHEMES RECOMMENDED FOR COMPLETION BETWEEN I960 and 1972
SCHEME ESTIMATE
(million)
OUT TURN EXPENDITURE 
1978 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
PHASING 
1974 1975 1976
t. Hertford LirkRoad 0.220) 
0.220j
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
2. North Orbital Link Rd
3. Hoddesdon Relief Road
Phase 1(a) - committed 
scheme completed by 
1969
0.214
4. Hoddesdon Relief Road 0.055 0.02 0.02 0.02
Phase 1(b)
5. Ware Relief Road, Ph i 0.620
6. Hertingfordbury bypass 0.220 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
& A4l4 to Cross Lane
7. Stans+ead Abbots by- 0.677
pass
0. Hertford North Relief 0.275
Road, Phase 1
9. Station Road Hertford 0.045
SUB TOTAL EXCLUDING
SCHEME (3) 2.332 0.03 0.13 0 .16 0 .15 0.03
SCHEMES RECOMMENDED FOR COMPLETION BETWEEN 1973 and I98I
10. Ware Relief Rd, Ph II 0.400
11. Hertingfordbury by­
pass & A4l4 dualling 0.350
12. Hertford/Ware Link Rd 0.360
13. A602 Dualling Ware Rd 
to Hertford Link
0.100
14. Hertford North Relief 
Rd, Phase 11 1.225
15. Western Link Road 0.220
16. Old Cross Lilli« Road 0.220
TOTAL RECOMMENDED 4 . 20?
EXPENDITURE I960 to 
1901 (ex scheme 3)
A 3  4
YEAR 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 197«
CUMULATIVE 
TOTAL OF 
RECOMMENDED 
EXPENDITURES 0.4? 0.93 1.40 1.87 2.33 2.65 2.97 3.29 3.61 3.93 4.25
CUMULATIVE
OUT-TURN
EXPENDITURES 0 0 0 0 0.0O 0.21 0.37 0 .52 0.60 0.60 0.60
CUMULATIVE 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.08 0.13 0 .16 0.17 0.15 0.14
FMR
EXPENDITURE No expenditure outside the plan was undertaken within 
OUTSIDE THE. this area 
PI AN Therefore FMQ = 100
x £106
x £106
FMRI970
Hertford, Ware & lloddesdon Transportation Study 
HITCH]N, 1 K'iCHlJORTH, BALPOCK TRANSPORTATION STUDY
This study recommended a cumulative expenditure of £3.75 million for the 
six years ending 1968/1073 and a further £3.45 million for the eight 
years ending 1981«
However, no recommended scheme was implemented during these periods.
Only one scheme A5 0 5 Gt Offley bypass was completed outside the plan at 
a cost of £ 1 .3 2  million (1967/68 costs) during the period 1972/76. 
Cumulative FMH = 0.
Therefore, Cumulative FMQ for the period 1972 to 1978 = 0
DIUCOT, ABINGDON, WANTAGE TRANSPORTATION STUDY
This study recommended a cumulative expenditure of £3.8 million to be 
expended over the period 1968-81. However no major principal road 
construction scheme was undertaken during this period within the study 
area.
T h e r e fo r e ,  FMR = 0 FMQ i s  NOT APPLICABLE
REPRODUCED 
FROM THE 
BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY
